Towards sustainable tuna fishing: understanding the role of private incentive mechanisms by Tolentino-Zondervan, Frazen

PROPOSITIONS
1. Tuna fishers that do not have the capability to improve will be excluded by all incentive 
mechanisms.
(this thesis)
2. The least risk averse fishers are the most willing to adopt sustainable fishing practices.
(this thesis)
3. The environmental issues dealt with by ecological sciences require an interdisciplinary approach 
that involves social sciences. 
4. Theoretical research without empirics can contribute to scientific knowledge, but empirical 
research without theory cannot lead to scientific knowledge.
5. A woman’s investments in a family and in a career are not mutually exclusive.
6. The European Union (EU) can drive sustainability change in developing countries by creating 
tailored rather than blueprint solutions.
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1.1  Background of tuna fisheries 
The sustainability in tuna fisheries has been an interest both in scientific and management 
levels (Barclay & Cartwright, 2007; Hilborn, 2007a; Langley et al., 2009; Pauly et al., 2002). 
Research on the sustainability of tuna fisheries has mostly focused on the two ends of a broad 
spectrum of fishers represented by small and large-scale fishers (Chand et al., 2003; Froese et al., 
2011; Haward & Bergin, 2001; Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002). This skewed focus has meant that 
the middle scale fishers along this scale have received less attention, while they too have 
an impact on the sustainability of tuna fisheries.
Representative of this ‘missing’ middle-scale, the majority of Filipino tuna fishers operate neither at 
the small-scale subsistence level, nor at a large industrial scale as seen in countries like Europe and 
the United States. The Philippines is the 4th largest tuna producer in the world (Vera & Hipolito, 
2006). Some of these middle scale Filipino tuna companies have established fishing operations and 
canneries in countries like Indonesia and Papua New Guinea (Lewis, 2004). With their fishing 
practices, Filipino tuna fishers have an impact on the sustainability of the fishery. For instance 
around 75% of the Philippine fishing grounds are considered to be overfished due to the 
unsustainable fishing practices of Filipino fishers (Oceana, 2015), while many of the Filipino tuna 
fishers that have access to the international waters of Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) 
contribute to the pressure on tuna stocks in this region (Miyake et al., 2010). 
Sustainability issues in tuna fisheries include the use of unsustainable fishing methods and the 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Filipino tuna fishers employ different kinds of 
gears ranging from handline to purse seine in catching three important tuna species in WCPO; 
namely skipjack (Katsuwomis pelamis), yellowfin (Thunnus albacares), and bigeye tuna (Thunnus 
obesus). Skipjack tuna, a low value species caught in higher volume for the canneries market, is not 
overfished and is also not subject to overfishing. Yellowfin and bigeye tunas, two high valued 
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species targeted to fresh and sashimi markets, however, are perceived to be nearly overfished and 
are subject to overfishing (Bailey et al., 2012; Hampton, 2010; Langley et al., 2008). These latter 
species are threatened by, among others, unsustainable fishing practices of fishers in the WCPO. 
For instance, purse seining, which is the most dominant fishing practice in WCPO, heavily relies on 
the use of Fish Aggregating Devices (FADS), floating objects that increase the efficiency and 
catchability of skipjack tuna but at the same time, results in by-catch of juvenile yellowfin and 
bigeye tunas (Dagorn et al., 2007; Dagorn et al., 2013; Dempster & Taquet, 2004; Macusi et al., 
2015). With many fishing nations trying to increase their effort to further utilize the skipjack 
fishery, the yellowfin and bigeye stocks might face further decline (Langley et al., 2008). Moreover, 
the WCPO tuna fisheries are also challenged by Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, 
which is any activity of fishing vessels and fishers that violates fishery laws. IUU fishing includes 
the use of unlicensed fishing vessels, use of prohibited fishing techniques, and fishing in restricted 
areas. IUU fishing contributes to the depletion of fish stocks, to food security issues of developing 
countries, and to millions of dollars loss in revenue by the governments (Agnew et al., 2009).  
Putting an end to unsustainable fishing methods and IUU fishing in tuna fisheries requires effective 
fishery governance. Government regulations, such as catch quotas, restrictions in fishing gears and 
licenses, and seasonal closures of fishing areas (see for e.g. O'Keefe et al., 2013; Oosterveer, 2008;
Stefansson & Rosenberg, 2005; Townsend, 1990), have been traditionally used to address
conservation challenges in WCPO tuna fishery. However, the widely perceived failure of the 
government has led to a shift towards private incentive mechanisms as an innovative form of 
fishery governance (Grafton et al., 2006; Greiner et al., 2000; Oosterveer, 2008; Pascoe et al., 
2010). 
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1.2 Private incentive mechanisms to improve sustainability of Filipino tuna 
fisheries 
Private incentive mechanisms aim to change the behaviour of value chain actors through price 
premiums and/or preferential market access to voluntarily change their fishing practices (Jack et al., 
2008; Van Riel et al., 2015). Private incentive mechanisms in tuna fisheries include a range of 
certification schemes, industry and NGO funded fishery improvement projects (FIPs), and industrial 
coalitions between fishing and/or trading firms, and use the market to incentivise the change in 
fishing practices of fishers. The increase in use of these mechanisms is partly due to the increasing 
demand for sustainable tuna from the Western markets such as Europe and America, as part of the 
strategy of brand members and retailers to ensure sustainability along the global chain (Iles, 2007;
Oosterveer, 2008; Parkes et al., 2010; Ponte, 2008b). They may also provide fishers access to global 
chains through upgrading, or improving their production and positions in the value chain
(Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000, 2002a). However, it is unclear to what extent private incentive 
mechanisms influence fishers’ decision to upgrade, which is to move towards sustainable fishing 
practices, either in the short- or in the long-run.  
As the range and scope of private incentive mechanisms expands, there is a need to review private 
incentive mechanisms for two reasons. First, private incentive mechanisms are selective in nature 
because they determine who will participate or not, among developing country fishers, in global 
chains (Bolwig et al., 2010b; Gibbon et al., 2008; Ponte, 2008a). For instance, one of the major 
criticisms of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is that it excludes developing country fishers 
due to the structural deficits in data management, the failure to set harvest control rules, and the 
high cost of auditing both for the fisheries and the chain of custody (Constance & Bonanno, 2000; 
Gulbrandsen, 2009; Jacquet & Pauly, 2008; Pérez-Ramírez et al., 2012a). Second, existing 
incentive mechanisms may differ in their definition of what constitutes a ‘sustainable’ fishery. For 
example, the MSC criteria for sustainable fisheries include the presence of sustainable fish stocks, 
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use of fishing practices that minimise environmental impacts, and the presence of effective fishery 
management (Marine Stewardship Council, 2014b). By benchmarking these MSC criteria, FIP, a 
step-wise approach for improving fisheries practices and management of developing country 
fisheries, may enable fishers to achieve MSC certification at the end of a FIP program. However, 
while a fishery is currently improving its progress towards achieving similar or exactly the MSC 
principles, FIP participants can already access high value markets in the global chains while not 
fully complying with MSC standards (Bush et al., 2013; Sampson et al., 2015).  
Understanding whether and to what extent private incentive mechanisms are effective in bringing 
sustainable improvements in the fishery requires a deeper insight into the decision making of fisher 
on changes in their practices (Charles, 1995; Hilborn, 1985; Opaluch & Bockstael, 1984; Wilen, 
1979). Most studies on private incentive mechanisms focus on the different kinds of incentives that 
might motivate fishers to improve their fishing practices (Costello et al., 2010; Grafton et al., 2006;
Greiner et al., 2000; Pascoe et al., 2010). Some studies analysed the failure and successful cases of 
private incentive mechanisms in the fishery (Christian et al., 2013; Hilborn, 2007b; Ponte, 2012).
However, there are hardly any studies that have analyzed the extent to which private incentive 
mechanisms influence the decision making of fishers to improve their fishing practices.
Analysing the effect of private incentive mechanisms on the decision making of tuna fishers to 
improve their fishing practices brings useful insights to different stakeholders in tuna fishery. Policy 
makers and fisheries management involved in the implementation of incentive mechanisms obtain 
information into which fishers are able and are not able to participate in incentive mechanisms, and 
based on this knowledge, determine the kind of rules and support that might enhance fisher’s 
participation. By focusing on fishers’ decision making, both participating (and yet to be 
participating) fishers can assess the effects of incentive mechanisms to their short- and long-term 
decisions, and therefore can implement upgrading decisions in the chain. 
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1.3 Objective and sub-objectives 
The main objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the extent to which private incentive 
mechanisms influence Filipino fishers’ decisions to improve their fishing practices. In order to 
reach the main objective, four sub-objectives that represent the next four chapters of this 
dissertation in scientific article format, are formulated (see Figure  1.1).
Figure 1.1 The research framework regarding methods used
The first sub-objective is to analyse and compare the ways existing incentive mechanisms influence 
the upgrading strategies of Filipino tuna fishers in the value chains. This sub-objective assesses 
whether the existing capabilities of the target Filipino tuna fishers, as a condition of fishers’ 
upgrading in the value chain, match with the requirements set by existing private incentive 
mechanisms in tuna fisheries that include FIPs, MSC, and International Seafood Sustainability 
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Foundation (ISSF). Moreover, this sub-objective explores the ways public and private actors 
outside the chain influence the capabilities of fishers in order to allow fishers to upgrade in the 
chain. By analysing the capabilities of fishers, this sub-objective can then provide insights into the 
different types of incentives for improving fishing practices, and whether these fishers are able to 
adopt specific upgrading strategies based on their capabilities. This will then provide clarity about 
the degree of inclusiveness for developing country fishers of the private incentive mechanisms.  
The second sub-objective is to evaluate small-scale handline fishers’ decisions to participate in 
FIPs. The case of FIPs is selected because the majority of the fishers participating in this program 
are less capable and disadvantaged than other actors in the value chain. This sub-objective further 
assesses the issue of inclusiveness in incentive mechanisms by providing insights into the factors 
that are needed for fishers to upgrade in the value chain using FIPs and into the fishers that are 
currently participating in FIPs.  
The third sub-objective is to model and evaluate the allocation of fishing days of Filipino purse 
seiners in response to MSC. The outcome of this chapter will provide insight into the ways MSC 
influences the income, risks, and tactical decisions of fishers in terms of allocating fishing days 
based on fishing locations and on whether to use MSC free school fishing method or not by Filipino 
purse seine fishers. Having that knowledge leads to a better understanding of the extent to which 
fishers improve their fishing practices in response to MSC and the extent MSC incentivises purse 
seine fishers given the risks in tuna  fishery.   
The fourth sub-objective is to analyse the profitability of investments in private incentive 
mechanisms such as ISSF eco-FADs and MSC free school by Filipino purse seine fishers. This sub-
objective provides insights into the question whether fishers should invest in measures to fulfil the 
requirements of incentive mechanisms based on the economic benefits associated with investments 
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of fishers. By focusing on two incentive mechanisms in purse seine fishery that differ in required 
fishing practices, level of investments, and institutional support, this chapter contributes to an 
understanding of the differences in defining a ‘sustainable’ fishery by each incentive mechanism 
and how these differences can be complementary to each other. 
Based on these four sub-objectives, this dissertation contributes to the literature on ‘missing’ 
middle-scale fishers and provides insights into how fishers make decisions in the context of private 
incentive mechanisms, and how to improve the participation of fishers in order for private incentive 
mechanisms to achieve more sustainable fishery. 
1.4 Fisher’s decision making framework 
This dissertation provides a decision making framework that integrates the decision making process 
and the kinds of improvement decisions made by fishers in short- and in long-run time horizons, in 
response to private incentive mechanisms (see Figure  1.2). The framework combines concepts from 
global value chain analysis and economic decision making theory. This framework is in line with 
the notion that the behavior of an individual is not simply influenced by economic factors, but also 
by the individual’s social interaction with society (Granovetter, 1985). The analytical concepts
underlying the decision making framework include upgrading and capabilities (in chapters 2 and 3), 
risk attitude, income, and risks (in chapters 3, 4, and 5), and tactical and strategic decisions (in 
chapters 4 and 5).  
The decision making of fishers to adopt sustainable fishing practices using private incentive 
mechanisms is referred to as the ‘upgrading’ in the global value chain literature (Ponte & Ewert, 
2009; Ponte & Gibbon, 2005). There are at least four different upgrading strategies that fishers can 
adopt. They can improve their product, the process of production, the functions they perform in a 
value chain or combine any of these strategies (Riisgaard et al., 2010). There are a number of 
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frameworks for assessing the decisions of producers, like fishers to adopt a particular upgrading 
strategy for ultimately contributing to a goal like sustainable fishing (Antunes et al., 2006; Ostrom, 
2009). This dissertation focuses on two specific factors that run through the GVC and economic 
decision making literature.
Figure 1.2 Framework for understanding fisher’s decision making using the decision making 
theory and upgrading in global value chain 
First, upgrading requires producers to be capable of making changes in their fishing practices. A 
capability is a specific skill or competence of an individual to achieve the necessary functions and 
strategies to realize an endowment (Sen, 1993). In the GVC literature, it is recognised that these 
capabilities are not inherent to an individual but are influenced by the relations of a producer in the 
Chapter 1 
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value chain, as well as wider state and community institutions in which they are embedded (Giuliani 
et al., 2005; Robeyns, 2005). To understand the capabilities of a fisher, both these relations and the 
use or availability of firm-level resources, specific knowledge and skills, and forms of social 
organisations need to be considered (e.g. Helfat et al., 2009; Nussbaum, 2003; Robeyns, 2005). By 
characterising these capabilities, the extent to which producers are able to build and follow through 
with an upgrading strategy can be assessed.  
The second factor that influences upgrading is the level of income and risk associated with 
upgrading, which are among others determined by the risk attitude of fishers (Rohrmann, 2008). 
Capabilities and risk attitude in decision making literature constitute the ‘characteristics of decision 
makers’, which are the first variable group in Figure  1.2 that influence the decision making of 
producers. In general, fishers with lower risk aversion are expected to choose a strategy that 
generates a higher expected income with higher associated risk, such as upgrading (Abadi Ghadim 
& Pannell, 1999; Lindner, 1987). Based on their risk attitude and the characteristics of the choice 
alternatives, fishers make decisions on whether or not to upgrade, which type of upgrading 
strategies to pursue, and to what extent to upgrade. The characteristics of the choice alternatives that 
vary in levels of income and risks, are external to the decision maker and constitute the second 
group of variables (in Figure  1.2) that influence decision making. Together, the characteristics of 
decision makers and the characteristics of the alternatives are the two important components of the 
decision making theory (McFadden, 1973) . 
A cross cutting element of upgrading is time. Fishers can build an upgrading strategy through a 
combination of short- and long-run decisions. Short-run or tactical decision making refers to 
decisions within a time horizon of one year, while long-run or strategic decision making refers to 
decisions within a time horizon of more than a year (Kay et al., 2005). In this dissertation, the 
tactical decisions of fishers involve the allocation of fishing days using different types of fishing 
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gear at different fishing ground. The strategic decisions focus on investing or not in equipment that 
is needed to comply with incentive mechanisms such as FIPs, MSC certified free school tuna 
fishing and/or the adoption and use of ISSF eco-FADs.  
1.5 Methodologies 
In order to address the main- and sub-objectives using the theoretical concepts outlined above, this 
dissertation employs multiple approaches that combine qualitative and quantitative forms of data 
collection (Figure  1.1). The multiple approaches used in this dissertation are: (multiple) inductive 
case studies, positivist approach, and normative modelling. The choice of an approach to be used in 
each chapter is based on a combination of three factors: the objective of the chapter, the available 
data, and the gap in literature. The advantage of using multiple approaches is that each approach can 
validate or strengthen the results of other approaches and can also address the limitation of other 
approaches (Byrne & Humble, 2007). By applying multiple approaches, this dissertation makes a
stronger analysis of private incentive mechanisms.
1.5.1 Inductive multiple case studies 
Inductive research is based on and iteratively amends theory based on empirical data, while case 
studies also specifically address the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of research in contemporary events and use 
either a single or multiple cases approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). The advantage of using 
inductive multiple case study is that a researcher can have a wider understanding of the existing 
case phenomenon and can make more convincing generalisations based on the differences and 
similarities between the cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). The use of inductive 
multiple case study perfectly fits in understanding the new and innovative phenomena of private 
incentive mechanisms and in further advancing the relatively recently emerging theories of global 
value chain. Thus, this approach is employed in chapter two, which analysed and compared three 
private incentive mechanisms (FIPs, MSC, and ISSF) that Filipino tuna fishers participate with. 
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In chapter two, the data used for doing inductive multiple case studies are extensive and the 
information are from wide range of value chain and institutional actors that are involved in 
incentive mechanisms. The qualitative techniques that are employed in this chapter are: key 
informant interviews, on-site visits, attendance and participation in the conferences, literature 
reviews, and desk research. 
1.5.2. Positivist approach 
The positivist approach starts with a hypothesis or assumption, which is tested using quantitative 
forms of data gathering such as survey and experiments (Crowther & Lancaster, 2008). This 
approach is employed in chapter three employing data obtained from small scale fishers in 
Occidental Mindoro, Philippines. The data set has a large number of observations and a wide range 
of variables that might explain fisher participation in FIP; hence an econometric analysis is a
suitable method in this chapter. By doing this analysis, this chapter addresses the gap in literature in 
terms of the availability of highly quantitative and empirical research in FIP. 
1.5.3 Normative approach 
The normative approach uses subjective and value based research and determines which aspect of 
the subject area requires improvement based on these set criteria/values (Hardin, 2008). The 
normative approach is used in this dissertation for two reasons.  
The first reason is derived from the specific sub-objectives. For instance, chapter four models the 
effect of risk aversion of fishers on their allocation of fishing days in response to MSC. This chapter 
uses the Mean-Variance Approach because this normative modelling approach accounts for the risk 
aversion while determining the optimal allocation of fishing days of fishers. Chapter five assesses
the profitability of investments associated with the adoption of private incentive mechanisms. The 
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use of Monte Carlo simulation in calculating the profitability of investments is a suitable method for 
achieving the objective of this chapter. 
The second reason for using normative approaches in this dissertation is the challenge of getting 
empirical and highly quantitative data of purse seine vessel based on the sensitivity of information 
and on time constraint in data collection. Not all fishing companies are willing to give information 
regarding their vessel activities because they consider this information as crucial for competing with 
other industry players. At the same time, the skippers stay at sea for a long period of time (average
of one year), thus doing a quantitative sampling that is similar to the one done in chapter three will 
require a longer time horizon and will involve higher costs. These data include time series 
quantitative data of prices and catches at an aggregate level and information on published literature 
and websites of government, industry, and NGOs engaged in incentive mechanisms.  
1.6 Outline of the dissertation 
The rest of this dissertation is organised as follows. Chapter two discusses the general overview and 
overall comparison of the three incentive mechanisms (FIPs, MSC, and ISSF) in Philippine tuna 
fisheries. Chapter three focuses on the important factors that influence small-scale handline tuna 
fishers participation in FIPs. Chapter four analyses the influence of MSC on short-term decision 
making and on level of gross margins and risks of Filipino purse seine fishers who are fishing in 
PNA. Chapter five evaluates the level of profitability related to the adoption of incentive 
mechanisms (MSC and ISSF) by Filipino purse seine fishers. Finally, chapter six synthesizes the 
results from chapters two to five and recommends improvements in the design of incentive 
mechanisms and discusses the theoretical implications of this dissertation.
Chapter 1 
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Chapter 2 
Comparison of private incentive 
mechanisms for improving 
sustainability of Filipino tuna fisheries 
This chapter has been published as:  
Tolentino-Zondervan, F., Berentsen, P., Bush, S., Idemne, J., Babaran, R., & Oude Lansink, A. 
(2016). Comparison of private incentive mechanisms for improving sustainability of Filipino tuna 
fisheries. World Development, 83, 264-279. 
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2.1 Abstract 
This paper analyses the influence of three private incentive mechanisms over decision making 
related to improved sustainability of fishing practices in Filipino tuna fisheries. The three 
mechanisms compared are the World Wide Fund for Nature’s fishery improvement project model, 
Marine Stewardship Council certification, and the International Seafood Sustainability Foundation 
pro-active vessel register. The main question addressed in this paper is how and to what extent the 
private incentive mechanisms support the development of fisher capabilities to respond to the 
requirements set out by these mechanisms. Applying a global value chain approach to analyse 
results collected from key actors involved in Philippine tuna fishers contributing to both domestic 
and regional economic development in the Western Pacific, we explore the structure and function of 
these private incentive mechanisms in achieving both environmental and economic development 
outcomes. Our results show that these private incentive mechanisms deliver different direct and 
indirect incentives for changing to more sustainable fishing practices, and that the success of these 
mechanisms is dependent on the extent to which the mechanisms support the development of target 
fisher capabilities to comply with their sustainability requirements. We conclude that the future 
success of these incentive mechanisms depends for a large part on stricter sustainability 
requirements, but also on the capacity of the mechanisms to incentivise the inclusion of more 
developing country fishers. These findings contribute to a wider understanding of how the
capabilities of developing country producers are influenced by their relationship with chain and 
non-chain actors, and with the wide institutional arrangements that the producers operate in. 
Keywords: Philippines; private incentive mechanisms; sustainability; tuna fishery; value chain
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2.2. Introduction 
Improved management and more equitable distribution of benefits from tuna fisheries is widely 
recognised as fundamental to the long-term sustainability of tuna fisheries in Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean (WCPO) (Barclay, 2010; Barclay & Cartwright, 2007). However, achieving both 
development and resource sustainability goals has been complicated by the complex interaction of 
different fishing gears with three main species; yellowfin (Thunnus albacares), bigeye (T. obesus), 
and skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis). While skipjack tuna remains underexploited, both juvenile 
yellowfin and bigeye tuna, both of which associate with skipjack, are more vulnerable to 
overexploitation; with bigeye already in an overfished state and with ongoing overfishing taking 
place (Hampton, 2010; Harley et al., 2011; Langley et al., 2008). Fisheries surrounding these tuna 
species account for up to half of the gross domestic product (GDP) of some Pacific island countries 
(Havice, 2010), and make up 20% of total fisheries production in archipelagic countries such as the 
Philippines (Bailey et al., 2012). Finding governance mechanisms that can successfully steer fishers 
towards improved resource stewardship while maintaining an important source of regional, national 
and local income, is therefore a clear policy imperative for both national and regional sustainability 
and development. 
State-led fisheries management and control, such as restrictions in fishing licenses, gears, and 
harvest, have been traditionally applied to addressing conservation challenges in WCPO tuna
fisheries. However, the perceived limitations of state regulation have led to a shift towards 
regulation through private incentive mechanisms (Grafton et al., 2006; Hilborn et al., 2005;
Oosterveer, 2008). Private incentive mechanisms aim to change the production and consumption 
behaviour of value chain actors towards sustainability by delivering economic incentives, such as 
price premiums and/or market access, while allowing actors to decide the extent to which they will 
adopt changes to their practices (Jack et al., 2008; Van Riel et al., 2015). The use of private 
incentive mechanisms in the value chain to motivate fishers to improve their fishing practices has 
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increased considerably over the last decade and is often presented as a new opportunity for creating 
sustainability outcomes (Iles, 2007; Parkes et al., 2010). However, the impact of private incentive 
mechanisms in developing countries such as the Philippines has been widely debated given their 
potential adverse effect on poor or disadvantaged primary producers (e.g. Fairhead et al., 2012). 
Questions therefore remain about the extent to which these different mechanisms stimulate so called 
‘developing world’ fishers to improve their fishing practices in order to achieve sustainability goals
(see Stratoudakis et al., 2015).  
Existing studies on private incentive mechanisms for fisheries have focused predominantly on eco-
labels, including the MSC, Krav-Eco, Friends of the Sea (FOS), Naturland, and Marine Ecolabel 
Japan. These studies have focused on the ways in which standards or criteria for fishery 
sustainability are developed, introduced, and adopted by fisheries in different parts of the world 
(Gulbrandsen, 2009; Parkes et al., 2010; Ponte, 2008b; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; Potts & Haward, 
2007). Some studies highlight how private incentive mechanisms improve the management of 
developing country fisheries, resulting in economic- and non-economic benefits for producers 
(Bolwig et al., 2009; Lopuch et al., 2008; Pérez-Ramírez et al., 2012a; Warning & Key, 2002). 
Other studies, however, show how private incentive mechanisms have limited and 
marginalised developing country fisheries’ participation in the global chain (Pérez-Ramírez et al., 
2012b; Ponte, 2008a; Tran et al., 2013). To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that 
systematically compare different types of private incentive mechanisms in a single commodity, nor 
whether these mechanisms incentivise fishers to shift towards more sustainable production practices.
This study compares the effects of three private incentives mechanisms – the World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF)-led Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs), the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 
certification, and the International Seafood Sustainability Foundation’s (ISSF) pro-active vessel 
register (PVR) – and their effect on the domestic and international involvement of the Philippines in 
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WCPO tuna fisheries. We have chosen these mechanisms because of their emerging influence over 
tuna fisheries in the WCPO and the range of institutional, social and economic challenges that have 
emerged around their implementation in developing countries (e.g. Kirby et al., 2014). We have 
chosen to focus on Filipino tuna fisheries for five reasons. First, tuna has been an important source 
of livelihoods and economic development in the Philippine economy, contributing around $681
million of export revenue in 2013 (Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, 2013). Second, the 
Philippines is the fourth major tuna producer in the world behind China, Japan, and Indonesia (Food 
and Agriculture Organisations, 2005). Third, the sustainability challenges faced in the Philippines 
have reached an acute stage, where domestic stocks of tuna are significantly depleted (BFAR, 2012;
Vera & Hipolito, 2006), forcing Filipino investment offshore within the WCPO region. Fourth, the 
Filipino tuna fishers range from small-scale nearshore handline fishers to industrial scale offshore 
purse-seine fishers, so both different type and scale of tuna fisheries are included. And fifth, there 
are at least four private incentive mechanisms currently implemented in the Philippines that aim to 
create change towards sustainability of tuna fisheries.
The objective of this paper is to compare the ways in which different types of private incentive 
mechanisms influence upgrading of Filipino tuna fishers in the value chain. In order to achieve this 
objective, we analyse how the capacity of fishers to make decisions related to upgrading is 
influenced by prevailing value chain governance arrangements and the local institutional 
arrangements that structure the practices of fishers. We compare these incentive mechanisms 
through the analytical lens of ‘upgrading’ in global value chains (GVCs). By doing so we analyse 
the conditions under which producers can capture more value for their products through compliance 
to market requirements, while at the same time balancing a range of economic, environmental, and 
social benefits and risks (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000; Ponte & Ewert, 2009). Building directly on 
the GVC literature (Gibbon & Ponte, 2005; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002b; Mitchell & Coles, 2011), 
we contribute to a wider understanding on how the interaction between firm and non-firm actors 
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involved in these incentive mechanisms influences the capabilities of developing countries 
producers to upgrade in globally traded products such as tuna.  
The following section provides an explanation of GVC analysis and of upgrading, before outlining 
the methods used in this study. The paper continues by presenting the private incentive mechanisms 
and comparing and discussing them in the context of globally commodified natural resources. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn related to upgrading of fishers under each mechanism.
2.3 Global Value Chain Analysis 
Governing sustainability ‘through’ value chains involves a set of normative and regulatory practices 
that use the chain as a medium for influencing producer decision-making, and strategies for 
upgrading their practices for sustainable production (Bush et al., 2014). But while considerable 
attention has been given to the structural dimensions of GVCs, including lead-firm strategy and 
state support to private incentive mechanisms such as certification (e.g. Foley, 2013; Ponte, 2008b),
less has been given to how these strategies enable producers to improve their capability for 
upgrading to more sustainable production practices (e.g. Giuliani et al., 2005; Marchi et al., 2013). 
The relationship between private incentive mechanisms and producer capabilities in GVCs raises 
important development-related questions, such as how the governance of value chains in tuna 
fisheries enable developing country producers to access markets, how incentives for participation in 
these markets are distributed among participating countries, and in how far producers are exposed 
to economic, social and environmental risk as a consequence of their participation (Barrientos et al., 
2011; Perez-Aleman, 2012). A particularly underexplored question is how and to what extent 
incentive mechanisms support the development of capabilities of fishers to respond to the 
requirements they set out for market compliance. Addressing this gap, we now turn to an 
explanation of how the GVC framework enables a more precise elaboration of producers 
capabilities and how capabilities are influenced by the interactions of producers with chain actors, 
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with private and public actors outside the chain, and with the existing institutional arrangements of 
the operating environment.  
2.3.1 Upgrading 
Firms are expected to upgrade their practices towards specified goals such as more sustainable 
production, when the benefits of upgrading exceed maintaining existing practices (Jack et al., 2008). 
Private incentive mechanisms are therefore designed with the purpose of coordinating (or enabling
firms to coordinate) the conditions in the value chain and the incentives to be delivered, which force
other firms to comply with the pre-determined standards or requirements. 
The different ways in which producers and other firm actors upgrade their position or process of 
production in value chains, have been variously classified (Gibbon & Ponte, 2005; Humphrey & 
Schmitz, 2002b; Mitchell & Coles, 2011). Following Riisgaard et al. (2010), these ways can be 
summarised into four main strategies. First, upgrading the process, the product characteristics and 
the volume, which can improve the quality, yield and value per unit sold. Second, either increasing 
or decreasing the number of chain functions, which corresponds in broad terms to functional 
integration or specialisation. Third, changing the level of coordination set out in contracts, either in 
terms of vertical business relationships or horizontal business relationships with firms in the same 
chain node (e.g. forming a cooperative or association). And fourth, combining any of the three 
upgrading strategies in order to achieve specific production related goals.
While this upgrading typology can be used to explain strategies post hoc, it does not provide a 
means of analysing the conditions under which firms are able to respond to private incentive
mechanisms in order to upgrade. We therefore argue that any comparison of these private incentive 
mechanisms requires focusing on the relations firms have with other firm and non-firm actors that 
facilitate and constrain the willingness and capacity of those they target to adopt pre-defined or 
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standardised upgrading strategies. In doing so, we focus on three broad dimensions of the value 
chain, as shown in Figure  2.1. First, the vertical dimension of value chains, with attention given to 
the movement of products downstream from suppliers to buyers, and information and more specific 
production requirements flowing back upstream from buyers to suppliers. Second, the horizontal 
dimension of value chains, made up of both public and private institutions that set rules and norms 
over the conduct of producers, while at the same time providing institutional support that enables
producers to implement their upgrading strategy. And third, at the confluence of vertical and 
horizontal dimensions of value chains, the capabilities of producers, which are a function (as well 
as constituent part) of the conditions in the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the value chain.
We now turn to a breakdown of these three dimensions into a set of analytical variables (as outlined 
in Table  2.1), starting in reverse order.
Figure 2.1 The analytical framework links the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the chain 
to producer’s upgrading strategies. Based on Riisgaard et al. (2010) 
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Table 2.1 The summary of GVC analytical concepts and how they are applied in th  case of tuna value chains
GVC analytical
variables
Theoretical definition Key Questions Tangible outcomes References
1. Upgrading 
(function of 
capabilities and long
term goals)
The process of improving
production processes, products, and 
functions to ‘move up’ the chain
(Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000,
2002b).
What are the improvements in
fishers’ practices in the chain?
What are the long-term aims or
goals of the fishers?
Offering sustainable fish, increasing
activities in the chain, forming fisher
association, forming business tie-ups
with processors
Improvem nt on fishers livelihood,
securing long-term income, and
minimising risks
Interviews
Interviews
2. Capabilities
(influenced by
coordination and 
institutional 
arrangements)
The ability to deliver certain tasks
in pursuit of long-term goals
(Nussbaum, 2003; Sen, 1990) 
What are the skills, practices, and
forms of organisation producers
have to pursue a strategy?
What are the internal resources
producers have in complying with 
transaction requirements?
Being able to fish using sustainable
fishing gear, being able to separate 
FAD- and non-FAD catches, being
able to comply with local and national 
fishery legislations, cooperatives,
forming fishers’ association
Material resources – fishing boats,
fishing technologies, experiences;
Relational resources – formal and 
informal credit relations between
fishers and traders
Interviews, (Vera & Hipolito,
2006) 
Interviews, (Ruddle, 2011; Vera
& Hipolito, 2006) 
3. Coordination
(vertical dimension)
Organisation of the economic 
transactions between suppliers and
buyers, determined by complexity
of transaction, codifiability of
information, and capabilities of
producers to comply with
transaction requirements (Gereffi et
al., 2005; Williamson, 2002) 
Who governs the chain?
What instruments are being used 
within the mechanisms to shape
transactions?
What are the incentives in the
transactions?
What kind of information is being 
transmitted from retailers to
producers?
Lead firms (e.g. brands, retailers)
Contracts, certificates, catch
documents, and markets (e.g. spot and 
auction markets)
Price premiums, improved production
efficiency, m rket access
Information on requirements of
incentive mechanisms (e.g. using 
sustainable fishing gears, using catch 
Websit  (msc.org, issf.org, 
wwf.org.ph, sfp.org, 
www.pacifical.com), interviews
Website (msc.org, issf.org, 
wwf.org.ph, sfp.org), interviews
Interviews
Interviews, organisational reports
and manuals, conferences
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In what ways the information is
transmitted to producers?
documentation, avoiding IUU fishing)
and other specifications by buyer
Manuals, seminars, meetings,
internet, international conferences Interviews, conferences, websites
4. Institutional
arrangements
(horizontal 
dimension)
4.a. Institutional 
setting
4.b. Institutional 
support
Public (government) and private
(norms and values) rules that
determine producers’ behaviour
and constraint capabilities (North,
2005). 
External aids and networks
provided by public and non-public
actors outside the chain, to improve
the capabilities of producers
(Bolwig et al., 2010b; P nte,
2008a) 
What are the government rules
and regulations at local level 
fishery?
What are the existing practices,
and values/norms at local level 
fishery?
What organisations or institutions
provide supports?
What kind of external resources or
supports are provided t  fishers?
Fishery conservation and
management measures including 
vessel registration, limited fishing 
days, area closure, FAD-closure 
season
Casas buying system – catches are 
solely sold to casas (or financier of 
fishing operation) at much lower
price than the market price, FAD, free 
school, and handline fishing
Local Government Unit (LGUs),
Non-Government Organisations
(NGOs), Associations
Institutional resources – capacity
building, trainings on improving fish 
quality and fishing practices,
exclusive access to properties;
Material resources – provision of
fishing aids such as nets, and gears
Interviews, websites (wcpfc.int,
bfar.gov.ph, sffaii.org), 
conferences, (BFAR, 2012;
Murua et al., 2014) 
Interviews, fieldwork
observation/site visits, literature
(Ruddle, 2011; Vera & Hipolito,
2006) 
Interviews, organisation websites
Interviews, organisation 
websites, Technical reports
(Murua et al., 2014) 
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2.2.2 Capabilities: A condition for upgrading 
Defined broadly as “what people are able to do or to be” (Sen, 1993p. 271), the capabilities of a 
given firm determine whether and to what extent they can pursue upgrading strategies dependent on 
specific skills, practices, experiences, and forms of social organisation, such as improved 
livelihoods or resource sustainability (Nussbaum, 2003; Sen, 1990). Translated to tuna fisheries, 
examples of capabilities that are required by fishers to respond to the requirements of private 
incentive mechanisms include the ability to chase and set nets around schools of fish, to analyse 
fishing technologies, to comply with local and national fishery legislations, to cooperate to form 
fishers’ associations or cooperatives, and to separate non-fish aggregating device (FAD) catches 
from FAD catches. The latter is of particular importance to tuna fisheries given the role of FADs in 
increasing the efficiency of fishers (Macusi et al., 2015), but also their impact on attracting 
threatened and endangered marine species that often end up as by-catch such as sea turtles, sharks 
and juvenile big-eye tuna.
Developing capabilities to respond to private incentive mechanisms also requires a firm to gain 
access to and to apply material and social (or relational) resources. Material resources refer to 
natural or material capital, such as fishing boats and gears, and also firm specific knowledge, man 
power, and experiences gained through time (Collis, 1994; Morrison et al., 2008; Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990). Relational resources are those that emerge from social capital, including formal and informal 
relationships and organisational arrangements that results in access to credit, technical support and 
legal advice (Davis & Mentzer, 2008). Building again on Sen (1993), the local institutional setting
within which an individual is embedded also affects their ability to develop these capabilities, 
especially if public or private institutions limit or enable access to the resources necessary to realise 
a capability. For example, if access to credit is limited, the option to change is also constrained. 
Therefore, capabilities, coupled with producers goals, influence whether and how upgrading 
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decisions are made. Conversely, an individual’s material and social resources may also be 
influenced by the level of requirements set by private incentive mechanisms.
2.2.3 The vertical and horizontal dimensions of the value chain influencing upgrading 
As indicated in Figure  2.1, the capabilities of producers do not exist in isolation but are instead 
influenced by actors and institutions in both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of value chains 
(Giuliani et al., 2005; Riisgaard et al., 2010). The vertical dimension describes the locations and 
relationships between value chain actors, the information and product flow in the value chain, and 
the distribution of functional labour and incentives along the chain (e.g. Dolan & Humphrey, 2000;
Gereffi, 1999; Nadvi, 2008; Schmitz & Knorringa, 2000). This dimension also focuses on how lead 
firms, often from developed countries, ‘coordinate’ the production and trade by setting conditions 
over the terms of incorporation of producers into a given chain (Bolwig et al., 2010b; Gereffi et al., 
2005; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000; Kaplinsky, 2000a; Riisgaard et al., 2010).  
A number of coordination types have been identified in the GVC literature, ranging from free 
market exchange to chains where lead firms play an increasingly greater role in the activities of 
producers – from relational to captive and hierarchical forms of coordination (see Gereffi et al., 
2005 for detail). But more importantly this literature also identifies a range of factors that influence 
the degree of lead firm coordination, often using rules, standards and norms of private incentive 
mechanisms (Gereffi et al., 2005; Nadvi, 2008; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). First, the complexity of 
transaction refers to the kind of product or production practice that is requested. Second, how 
codifiable that product or practice is will determine the level of information that needs to be passed 
down to producers. Third, how capable a producer is to respond to the complexity and codification 
set out by a firm and/or incentive mechanism determines whether they will ultimately be able to 
comply with the requirements for market inclusion. Depending on the kind of coordination,
apparent compliance with these requirements may provide incentives to producers in the form of 
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higher product prices, market-access, or improved company image (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002a). 
However, given that investments are often needed to meet these requirements, producers also have 
to balance cost against the risk of recovering any investments made associated with upgrading. As 
variously argued (Amekawa, 2013; Khiem et al., 2010; Riisgaard et al., 2010), inability to satisfy 
higher requirements or the lack of incentives for upgrading may also lead to producers exiting the 
chain (as illustrated in Figure  2.1).  
Building on the definition of capabilities and of coordination discussed previously, we assume that
producers’ capability is also influenced by the horizontal dimension in the chain in which they are 
embedded. The horizontal dimension is made up of the institutional setting in which producers
operate, including both the public (government) and private (norms and values) rules that determine 
producers’ behaviour and constrain capabilities (North, 2005). The horizontal dimension is also 
made up of what we term ‘institutional support’, or the external support given by private and public 
actors outside the chain that help develop and improve producers’ capabilities (Bolwig et al., 2010a;
Perez-Aleman, 2012; Ponte, 2008a). Both these horizontal factors influence if and how the 
producers can access resources necessary to upgrade their practices in order to participate in a value 
chain (Bush & Oosterveer, 2007; Bush & Oosterveer, 2012) and to achieve long-term goals such as 
improvements in producers’ livelihoods and fishery sustainability. 
2.4. Methodology 
2.4.1. Case Selection 
From an inventory of private incentive mechanisms in WCPO fishery presented in Table  2.2, the 
cases in this study are selected based on three criteria. First, the private incentive mechanisms must 
address tuna sustainability. Second, Filipino tuna fishers must be the target fishers of private 
incentive mechanisms due to their high involvement in WCPO tuna fishery and given the acute 
state of tuna sustainability in the Philippines. Third, the private incentive mechanisms must be 
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currently operational, as it would make no sense comparing an incentive operating in practice with 
an incentive existing only on paper. ‘Currently operational’ is understood as being open to the 
participation of tuna fishers. Based on these criteria, three private incentive mechanisms are chosen 
for comparison. The first is the FIP approach developed by a group of NGOs currently collaborating 
under the banner of the Conservation Alliance for Sustainable Seafood (CASS) (see Sampson et al., 
2015). FIPs are broadly defined as a stepwise framework known for guiding fisheries towards 
providing certified products to international markets. The second is the MSC, a private standard 
based on the three principles for certifying sustainable fishing practices and management and
rewarding fisheries with either preferential market access or price premium (Marine Stewardship 
Council, 2011). The third is the PVR, a tool used by ISSF (a private conservation organisation 
established by nine of the largest tuna brands in partnership with WWF-US in 2009, (see 
International Seafood Sustainability Foundation, 2012a) to promote long-term conservation and 
sustainable use of tuna stocks, reducing by-catch, and promoting ecosystem health.  
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Table 2.2 The different private incentive mechanisms fisheries and the example cases in WCPO tuna fisheries
Private incentive mechanisms Aims Examples and countries involved Target species
1. Fishery Improvement Project
(FIP)
To transform a fishery towards sustainable fishing 
behaviour and to provide options to move the fishery 
towards MSC certification at the end of the programme.
Philippines: The Partnership Program Towards 
Sustainable Tuna (PPTST) 
Indonesia: Fishing and Living Program (FLP)
Indonesia: Indonesian Tuna Bigeye Tuna Indian 
Ocean Group
Philippine: Philippine Blue Swimming Crab
Indonesia: Indonesia Blue Swimming Crab 
Yellowfin tuna (Thunnus 
albacares) 
Yellowfin tuna (Thunnus 
albacares) 
Bigeye tuna (T. obesus) 
Blue swimming 
crab (Portunus pelagicus)
Blue swimming 
crab (Portunus pelagicus)
2. Marine Stewardship Council
(MSC)
To promote sustainability of fish stocks and 
management of fishery; and to promote fish traceability 
to fight IUU fishing and to ensure consumers that fish 
comes from sustainable fishery. 
PNA countries: MSC Pacifical free school 
skipjack 
Maldives: Pole and-line skipjack tuna
Skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus 
pelamis) 
Skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus 
pelamis)
3. International Seafood
Sustainability Foundation (ISSF)
To initiate science-based programmes to conserve and 
sustainably use tuna stocks, to reduce by-catch, and to 
improve ecosystem.
Philippines: ISSF’s Pro-active Vessel Register Skipjack and yellowfin 
tu a (Katsuwonus pelamis
and Thunnus albacares) 
4. Fair Trade To contribute to sustainable marine fisheries that will 
lead to improved working and living conditions in 
fishing communities, improved ecosystem resiliency, 
and improved financial returns for fishers. 
Indonesia: Fair Trade Fish Yellowfin tuna (Thunnus 
albacares) 
5. Private strategies To develop company’s commitments to responsible 
seafood, provide technical advice, link supply chains, 
and partner with local stakeholders to develop and 
implement Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs) or 
Fisheries Conservation Projects
Philippines: Century Tuna Handline 
Individually Caught Tuna 
Philippines: Responsible sourcing policy f r 
canneries (Philbest and Frabelle): “Juvenile free 
skipjack”
Yellowfin tuna (Thunnus 
albacares) 
Skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus 
pelamis) 
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2.4.2. Case Analysis 
The collection of information for this study is guided by a list of analytical questions aimed at 
understanding the vertical and horizontal dimensions of upgrading production practices. Based on a 
qualitative case study method (Yin, 2009), addressing the hows and whys of research in 
contemporary events, the cases are analysed by iteratively cross checking, and comparing theory 
and empirical data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). First, each of the three private incentive 
mechanisms is presented using the analytical variables in Table  2.1: starting from coordination, 
followed by institutional supports, institutional setting, capabilities, and upgrading. Second, the 
cases are compared by identifying patterns, congruencies, and differences in terms of how the 
conditions in vertical and horizontal dimensions influence the capabilities of fishers to upgrade, as 
well as how these capabilities contribute to the upgrading decisions of fishers. Finally, based on a 
comparison of these three mechanisms, we generalise our findings in relation to upgrading of 
Filipino tuna fishers in the global value chains. 
2.4.3. Data Collection 
Multiple methods were employed in collecting data. First, a review of scientific literature and 
technical reports was undertaken. Second, a total of 158 in-depth interviews were conducted from 
July 2013 to May 2014 with hand line fishers (43), master fishermen and carrier vessel captains 
(25), traders (21), representatives from fishing companies (7), processors and retailers (26), 
NGOs (27), government (5) and academics (4). The first five groups of respondents provided first-
hand information on the way private incentive mechanisms operate in the chain, while the last three 
groups provided extended and expert information on the mechanisms. The interviews were based 
predominantly on open-ended questions that were adapted to the different profiles of respondents. 
Third, observations regarding the actual production processes, the welfares of the fishers, and the 
existing institutional settings were made at landing sites, ports, and fishing communities where the 
private incentive mechanisms are present (see Figure  2.2). The focus fisheries are Lagonoy Region 
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and Occidental Mindoro Philippines for FIP, Lae Papua New Guinea for MSC, and General Santos 
City and Navotas Manila Philippines for ISSF. Other information was also collected from a series 
of seminars and conferences, including the 2013 Fishery Improvement Project workshops in Manila 
and Bicol, the 2012 and 2013 Tuna Congress in General Santos, the 2013 European Tuna 
Conference in Brussels, and the 2014 InfoFish Tuna Conference in Bangkok.  
Figure 2.2 Map of study sites 
2.5. Presentation of private incentive mechanisms 
We now present each of the cases by starting with an overview of each incentive mechanism 
followed by an outline of the three analytical value chain dimensions. Table  2.3 summarizes the 
vertical dimensions of the value chain, comparing the private incentive mechanisms with regard to 
species traded, incentives, lead firms, coordination mechanisms, and fisher-level and specific 
product requirements. Regarding the horizontal dimension, Table  2.4 compares the different private 
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incentive mechanisms with regard to the public and private institutions involved, the institutional
settings, and the types of institutional supports. The improved capabilities at the confluence of 
vertical and horizontal dimensions and the resulting upgrading strategies are included in the case 
descriptions. 
Table 2.3 Coordination of different private incentive mechanisms
Coordination in vertical 
dimension
FIP MSC ISSF
Species traded Yellowfin Skipjack Skipjack
Incentives Preferential market 
access
1.5 time higher ex-
vessel price for tuna
20% price premium 
(10% to fishers)
Higher ex vessel price 
and priority sourcing 
Lead Firms European retailers 
(SeaFresh, Coop, Bell 
Seafood) 
Pacifical (distributor) ISSF member brands 
and processors 
Coordination 
mechanism
Catch certificates
Accreditations of 
landing sites and 
processing plants
MSC certificate 
Chain of Custody 
(CoC)
Pro-active Vessel 
Register (PVR)
Fisher (or vessel)-level 
requirements
Catch certificates
Hand line fishing
Catch documentation
Free school fishing
Registration in Vessel 
Monitoring System 
(VMS)
Unique Vessel 
Identifier, not enlisted 
in RFMO’s IUU lists, 
with human or 
electronic observer, 
shark finning policy, 
trained skippers, 
sustainable FAD 
fishing
Product requirements ≥ 35 kilos tuna,
Grade A  or export 
quality 
Separate MSC- and 
non-MSC fish, 
Canning grade quality 
Canning grade quality
Meet fish size 
requirement
Source: Fieldwork, 2013 
2.5.1 FIP: The Partnership Programme Towards Sustainable Tuna 
Starting in 2011 as a partnership between WWF-Philippines and Local Government Units (LGUs) 
in Occidental Mindoro and Lagonoy fisheries, the aim of the Partnership Programme Towards 
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Sustainable Tuna (PPTST) FIP is to enhance the sustainability of yellowfin tuna. The explicit goal 
of this WWF-led FIP is to move both fisheries towards MSC certification by the end of the program 
in 2016. 
Table 2.4 Institutional setting and support of the different private incentive mechanisms
FIPs MSC ISSF
Public and private 
institutions involved 
LGUs, WWF-
Philippines 
PNA and
PNG government
ISSF, BFAR, WCPFC
Institutional settings Casas, fisher 
registration, and boat 
licensing
Vessel registration, 
Vessel Day Scheme 
(VDS), area closure, 
FAD-closure season  
FAD and area closures, 
sanctions for IUU 
fishing, Philippine 
Fisheries Observer 
Program, and 
Monitoring, Control 
and Surveillance 
(MCS) activities such 
as deployment of patrol 
vessels, logbook 
systems, transhipment 
declaration, Vessel 
Monitoring System, 
and port State control 
Types of institutional 
supports 
Trainings (grading 
catch, proper 
slaughtering and icing 
techniques), organising 
fishers, management 
and leadership 
seminars and 
workshops, provision 
of fishing aids, nets, 
gears
Observers-on-board 
programs, Vessel 
Monitoring System 
(VMS), electronic 
catch documentation 
scheme
Skippers training on 
improved FAD design, 
handbooks, courses 
Source: Fieldwork, 2013 
Consistent with the market logic of FIPs, the PPTST seeks to incentivize upgrading through both 
preferential market access as well as an ex-vessel price for tuna 1.5 times above local market value 
price (see Table  2.3). In order to capture these market benefits, fishers must comply with specific 
fisher-level requirements set by the lead firms composed of European retailers such as Coop 
Switzerland, Bell Seafood (Germany), and Seafresh (The Netherlands). To satisfy the European 
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Union’s Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) legislation, these lead firms require catch 
certificates, recording the place, time, and name of vessel and fisher who caught the fish. They also 
need to meet food safety requirements for import to the European Union (EU). For this, landing 
sites and processing plants need to be accredited. Additional sustainability requirements set by 
WWF include the use of handline fishing gear (one hook, one catch) by fishers to reduce the 
incidence of bycatch associated with other gears, a minimum size requirement of 35 kilos, and 
Grade A or export quality fish (freshly caught, iced, red tinge to the meat) to reduce wastage and 
inefficiencies.  
Institutional support is provided by WWF-Philippines in partnership with LGUs, by means of
assisting fishers to comply with PPTST requirements (see Table  2.4). Attention has been given to 
strengthening fisher registration and boats licensing in order to officially verify information 
provided in catch certificates. The WWF-PPTST team also became highly involved in forming a
fisher core group called Barangay Fishery Aquatic Resources Management Council (BFARMC), to 
arrange fisher members’ access to management and leadership training, information, and support 
from both the LGUs and WWF-Philippines. Furthermore, BFARMC facilitates proposals from 
fishers to LGUs for providing budget and in-kind help, such as fishing aids, nets, and gears. Finally, 
WWF-PPTST and LGUs further invested in trainings aimed at changing fishers’ values and mind-
set towards improving their fishery management, practices, and income. 
The institutional support provided by WWF-PPTST and LGUs improves the capabilities of fishers
and provides incentives for participation in the FIP. For example, fishers that participate in FIP and
are registered in the municipality are prioritised by LGU programs providing livelihood assistance 
and training. This has been proven a highly effective approach, given that 90% of the population is 
actively engaged in fisheries in these two sites (with the remaining 10 percent have other income-
generating activities such as local goods stores, farming, pottery, and construction in urban areas). 
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In addition, the fisher association assists fishers to strengthen the management of their fisheries and 
to access external supports for their fishing activities. As a result fishers have established stronger 
local arrangements to support the civilian led ‘marine guards’ (bantay dagat) to stop IUU fishing. 
Lastly attention has been given to assisting fishers with upgrading their vessels (bancas), to 
improve the handling of fish at sea, including grading their catch, proper slaughtering and icing 
techniques, to maintain quality. Despite the effort put into these project activities the decision of 
fishers to upgrade their production practices is almost entirely dependent on the vertical
coordination of middlemen or Casas. Similar to many other fisheries in Southeast Asia (Ferse et 
al., 2012; Kusumawati et al., 2013; Ruddle, 2011), fishers in the PPTST FIP are highly dependent
on these Casas who control local financing arrangements and serve as fish traders in the 
vertical dimension of the chain. The high degree of control exercised by Casas on fish prices 
hinders the transmission of any price incentive to fishers. However, this hindrance is at least in 
part offset by the provision by Casas of what can be termed (‘horizontal’) social welfare benefits 
to fishers, such as health care and education assistance to family of fishers, which are important in 
the absence of strong state support. As such, Casas are a typical example of patron-client
relationship, providing an informal source of credits for fishers in exchange for lower ex-vessel
fish prices. The influence of Casas is strong in both Occidental Mindoro and Lagonoy. 
Overall, ninety three percent of interviewed fishers in both fisheries rely on financing by Casas
and are obliged to land their tunas to their respective Casas at a lower price than the market price. 
The rest of the interviewed fishers personally finance their fishing operations and have the option
to sell their fish to a Casa or a market that offers a higher price. In order to deal with fishers’ high 
dependency on Casas and to increase tuna prices, the WWF-PPTST team provided trainings on 
proper handling, grading, and icing of tuna to fishers.
Around a quarter of interviewed fishers from both PPTST sites have been able to upgrade their 
fishing practices so far, which is promising. However, the majority of fishers have chosen not to 
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upgrade because they either saw no direct benefit or because of the limitations they face in making 
autonomous decisions through their relationship with Casas. To continue satisfying those 
fishers already engaged, and to extend participation to other fishers, PPTST has to ensure 
that the incentives promised are delivered. In the short term, fishers interviewed from both 
PPTST sites are complaining that higher ex-vessel prices are not being delivered, which in turn 
runs the risk that they will exit the programme. However, there is also evidence that these
interviewed fishers are able to improve their efficiency based on improved handling techniques,
which increases the quality and therefore value of the tuna landed. To extend participation to 
the 75% of fishers not yet participating, it seems longer term goals also need to be met by the 
programme, such as improving the overall well-being of fishers like housing and children’s
education, increasing ownership of fishing vessels, and improving health of fish stocks. Aligning
these wider goals with the immediate incentives of fishers appears to dictate the long term 
success of the FIP. Finally, in terms of development, the PPTST aims for an on-going
improvement in the fishery, beyond the life of the project.
2.5.2 MSC: The Pacifical free school skipjack 
The MSC certification of skipjack purse seine fisheries using free school or non-FAD techniques in 
the waters of the Parties of Nauru Agreement (PNA) is the largest single certified fishery in the 
world in terms of potential landed volume. The certification was awarded in 2011 to Pacifical BV, a
50/50 public-private partnership between the PNA countries and the Dutch-based company 
Sustunable BV and is valid for five years. Fishers changing their practices to comply with the MSC 
non-FAD requirement are rewarded by lead firm Pacifical through a 20% price premium; divided 
among cannery (5%), fishing company (10%), and PNA/Pacifical (15%) (Table  2.3). There are 
currently around 314 purse seine vessels operating in the PNA that are potentially MSC-eligible, of 
which 54 are Filipino vessels. 
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The institutional setting of the PNA sets clear regulatory requirements with which all fishers must 
comply, and which the MSC certifies. The regulation of the non-FAD fishery comes under the 
Vessel Day Scheme (VDS), in which fishing companies buy fishing days, currently at a cost of 
$6000/day/vessel. Vessels also have to invest in a monitoring system to continuously improve 
PNA’s conservation and management measures such as their harvest control rules, reference points, 
and harvest strategies (Forum Fisheries Agency, 2015b). In the case of Papua New Guinea (PNG), a 
member country of PNA where three major Filipino fishing companies operate, fishing companies 
are also obliged to land their catches in PNG cannery as a condition for issuing fishing licenses. In 
addition, the MSC Chain of Custody (CoC), designed for verifying that fish sold from fishers to 
retailers (Marine Stewardship Council, 2013) are from an MSC certified fishery, is also in place.
The MSC CoC requires training of vessel crews and master fishermen, as well as fulfilling a 
number of requirements including a trip number from the PNA office, the presence of on-board 
observers, and enrolment of the vessel in Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), all of which are 
instituted in the conservation and management measures of the PNA. In addition MSC and non-
MSC skipjack must be separated on board and after being caught, and transferred from catcher to 
carrier vessels with the presence of MSC-certified observer. Lastly, processing of MSC skipjack for 
canning must be done separately from non-MSC skipjack.
Faced with these conditions, Filipino fishing companies have taken steps to improve their 
capabilities to meet MSC and PNA requirements. First, Filipino fishing companies establish joint 
venture companies with locally owned processors in PNG, in addition to existing vertically
integrated companies, meaning a company owning the fishing fleets and canneries. The vertical 
integration and new joint ventured companies means these companies meet PNG requirements for
maintaining fishing licenses, they facilitate the traceability of MSC skipjack, and they meet the 
national requirements of the PNG government to meet the zero percent duty of PNG canneries to 
EU. Second, Filipino fishing companies hired Korean, Japanese, and Taiwanese master fishermen 
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due to their formal schooling (including university degrees) in fishing. According to interviews, 
learning from foreign master fishermen improves the Filipino master fishermen’s knowledge and 
fishing techniques. Third, fishing companies invested in learning how to use helicopters and 
advanced GPS tracking devices to aid catcher vessels in detecting schools of tuna. Executives of 
fishing companies strongly believe that the fishing skills of master fishermen and the free school 
fishing technologies are the keys in fishing success. Development of these capabilities  also serves 
as a coping strategy of fishers for dealing with assumed  higher fuel costs of non-FAD fishing
(Parker et al., 2015). 
Benefits from investing in upgrading strategies to comply with MSC requirements, as well as those 
of PNG, are recognised by Filipino companies. Company executives note that the quality of fish 
from non-FAD catches is also in their interest, because of the larger size of fish and the more 
homogenous schools being caught. Not only are larger fish more valuable, they are more efficient to 
process compared with juveniles and small fish caught on FADs. However, despite the launching of 
Pacifical’s first MSC canned skipjack in November 2013 by an Austrian retailer, only 400 metric 
tons (MT) out of potentially 440,000mt (less than 0.1%) of MSC skipjack reached the market, for
three reasons. First, fishing companies and industry players remain hesitant to participate in MSC as
they perceive that the MSC price premium may be insignificant, given the high costs and high risks 
in catching and getting MSC skipjack to the port. In contrast, catches on FADs are more predictable 
and provide assured income. MSC also requires additional time and effort for training crews, for 
extra documentation, and for extra care when handling fish. Second, the industry players including 
fishing companies seem to lack confidence in the PNA-Pacifical set-up. Some industry players see 
Pacifical as a broker in the chain that is cutting their margin, while other brands are not open for any 
offer of ‘co-branding’ because they see Pacifical as potential brand competitor. Finally, the industry 
has also been reluctant to join as a result of the dispute between Pacifical and Earth Island Institute
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(EII), another certification body in fishery (as outlined by Miller and Bush (2014), EII has 
threatened action against those companies that support (MSC certified) Pacifical traded tuna. 
Overall it appears that the MSC certification of the PNA non-FAD skipjack fishery has offered a 
series of requirements and incentives for fishers to upgrade their practices to participate in a 
‘sustainable’ value chain. However, the participation of one of the three Filipino fishing companies 
currently operating in PNG demonstrates a wider set of apparent limitations. Irrespective of the 
developed capabilities, fishing companies are limited in their participation because the majority 
perceive the cost of participation to be too high, the price premium offered to be relatively weak,
and the conflict between non-chain actors and the PNA-Pacifical set-up as high risk. 
2.5.3 ISSF: The Pro-active Vessel Register 
ISSF promotes sustainability in FAD fisheries by incorporating association membership and market 
power to change fishing practices. Fishing companies of member brands and retailers1 (lead firms) 
of International Seafood Sustainability Association (ISSA), an affiliate of ISSF, and fishers
supplying to members are urged to enroll their vessels in the Pro-Active Vessel Register (PVR).
The incentives for registering vessels in the PVR are the priority sourcing for tuna and the higher 
ex-vessel price per ton of fish supplied, which is negotiated between vessel owners and buyers (see
Table  2.3). The PVR as a coordination mechanism in the chain, allows vessel owners to publically 
demonstrate steps towards upgrading of their fishing practices in order to indicate their progress 
towards becoming a full compliant to the ISSF (International Seafood Sustainability Foundation, 
2014b). The PVR seeks to complement and supplement the conservation and management measures 
of the Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). For example, the PVR can 
facilitate centralized data collection on FAD fishing, a requirement that supports but goes further 
1 The ISSA members include Bumble Bee Foods, Clover Leaf Seafoods, Bolton Alimentari, MW Brands, Princes, Sea 
Value Company, Starkist Company, Chicken of the Sea International, TriMarine International, and Thai processors 
such as Sea Value, Thai Union, CMC, King Fisher, Siam International, and Pattaya. Retailers such as Walmart and 
Loblaw. 
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than the requirements set out by the RFMO. As Filipino fishers and processors are directly involved 
in the value chains that supply skipjack to the ISSA members, they are also subject to ISSF 
commitments.
For enrolment in the PVR, the requirements at vessel level include having a Unique Vessel 
Identifier (UVI) number, having a shark finning policy, having  skippers trained through the ISSF
(including improved FAD design for more selective fishing practices), no listing in any RFMO’s 
IUU vessel registers, and the presence of either human or electronic on-board observers (Murua et 
al., 2014). By December 31, 2015, purchasing from PVR registered vessels will be a requirement 
for all ISSA members. To encourage enrolment and scaling up of the system, annual fees for the 
PVR are waived for first two years. After that, vessels are required to pay an annual fee of 
US$5,000 for vessels larger than 2000MT, US$4,000 for vessels between 1,200 to 2,000MT,
US$3000 for vessels between 800 to 1199MT, US$2,000 for vessels between 350 to 799MT, and 
US$1,000 for vessels less than 350 MT. Any tuna landed must be of canning grade quality and meet 
the fish size requirements of processors. 
The institutional setting in the Philippines supports the measures of the PVR, which are designed to 
align with existing management arrangements under the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 
(BFAR) and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) (see Table  2.4). 
BFAR’s management measures, following from its membership to the WCPFC, include FAD and 
area closures, sanctions for IUU fishing, the Philippine Fisheries Observer Program, and 
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) activities such as the deployment of patrol vessels, the 
use of logbook systems, transhipment declarations, VMS, and port state controls. As a full member 
of the WCPFC, the Philippines through the representation of BFAR, has to comply with all the 
conservation and management measures related to overcapacity, non-target species, IUU fishing, 
and data transparency (Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 2014). To further 
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strengthen the capabilities of fishers to comply with PVR, ISSF also provides institutional support 
to fishers such as handbooks, courses, and trainings to support compliance to WCPFC measures.
Despite several Filipino fishing companies having  the capabilities to meet the PVR requirements,
only 24 fishing vessels (including those that are PNG flagged) of one fishing company, out of 309 
Filipino-owned purse seine and carrier vessels (Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 
2014) initially enrolled in the PVR. An addition of 15 more vessels from three Filipino fishing 
companies joined the PVR in 2015, thus generating a total of 39 PVR enrolled Filipino-owned 
vessels. The increase in number of vessels enrolled is driven by ISSF resolution on solely
purchasing from PVR enrolled vessels and by one Filipino processing company becoming a full-
fledged member of ISSF in 2014. Moreover, two important events have contributed to vessel 
enrolment in PVR. First, the granting of a Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP+) status to 
Philippines that allows the country to export with zero percent tariff to EU motivates Filipino 
fishing companies to comply with EU regulations in order to access European market. Second, the
European Commission handed an IUU Red Card to the Philippines in 2014, which provided an 
extra incentive for Filipino vessels to demonstrate regulatory compliance. A Red Card is issued to 
countries which have not taken sufficient action to control IUU activity in their waters or by their 
flagged vessels and enforces economic and trade sanctions, including banning imports to the EU
market. 
Non-enrolment of the majority of Filipino fishing vessels in the PVR is due to three reasons. First,
Filipino fishing companies are concerned that the incentive for compliance cannot offset the annual 
fees of enrolment in PVR, particularly since the PVR is at its introductory stage and there is a
decreasing marginal profits caused by declining skipjack prices. After a number of years with high 
skipjack prices (with a peak of US$ 2,400/MT in 2013) in 2014 the price of skipjack reached a
record low of US$ 1150/MT (Atuna, 2015). According to interviewed industry players, the fall in 
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skipjack prices was assumed to be caused by the high capacity in skipjack fishing which was 
boosted in the years before with high skipjack prices. Interviewed fishing companies and traders are 
also concerned that ISSF associated processors and brands will capture any market benefits, while a
few of these interviewees also argued that consumers are not willing to pay more for ‘PVR 
compliant fish’. Second, some respondents are concerned about the path dependency of adopting 
PVR requirements making the adoption of alternative mechanisms, such as MSC certification,
overly complicated. Third, the goals of fishing companies that include sustaining their long-term 
income through improved fishing process, do not necessarily match with the possible outcomes 
sought by ISSF. For example, two big Filipino fishing companies are already preparing to shift 
from FAD to free school fishing in order to reduce their risks in case of stricter FAD regulation at 
either RFMO or national level. The investment made in free school fishing is a movement away 
from sustainable FAD fishing, which the ISSF pursues. 
2.6. Discussion 
We now compare the three private incentive mechanisms based on how the vertical and horizontal 
dimensions of the value chain influence the capabilities of fishers to upgrade their fishing practices. 
We then extend the discussion on the effectiveness of the mechanisms in the value chain by looking 
at the delivery of incentives to fishers, the extent to which the goals of fishers and the mechanisms
are aligned, and how selective these mechanisms are on different types of fishers. 
2.6.1 Upgrading Filipino tuna fisheries 
In support of our framework (Figure  2.1), the three cases show how specific capabilities enable 
producers to respond to the incentives offered by the mechanisms and therefore invest in different 
upgrading strategies. Overall, fishers are able to develop capabilities that are necessary to upgrade, 
and the choice of these fishers to both engage in process and functional upgrading is determined by 
their goals and by their capabilities (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002b; Riisgaard et al., 2010). Fishers 
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involved in the PPTST FIP improved the quality of the tuna being caught, and were partly enabled 
to do so by drawing on the ‘horizontal coordination’ of the tuna fishers association, which was 
supported directly by WWF as the FIP provider. Fishers involved in MSC certified skipjack chain 
were able to benefit from their participation by not only complying with MSC regulation, but also 
improving their post-harvest handling practices, thus increasing the value of their tuna. At the same 
time, these MSC fishers functionally upgraded by establishing a joint venture company with local 
processors. The capabilities required for upgrading are supported by MSC through training of vessel 
crews and master fishermen and through provision of observers-on-board. Finally, fishers 
complying with the ISSF PVR demonstrated a clear potential to benefit from greater degrees of 
vertical coordination by strengthening their relations with ISSF processors and related traders 
further down the chain. In this case, ISSF supports this compliance by supporting the development 
of capabilities of fishers through training. 
The cases also show that how incentive mechanisms are implemented in the value chain is
important for understanding the extent to which capabilities are developed for upgrading in order to
meet the requirements set by these mechanisms. The greater the degree of coordination of lead 
firms, the more control they have in setting the terms of participation for fishers to strengthen lead
firms positions in the value chain (Gereffi et al., 2001; Kaplinsky, 1998). In all three cases, the 
vertical coordination of the chain differed considerably in terms of forms of coordination and
degree of control by lead firms. Both the MSC and ISSF cases demonstrate the use of hierarchical 
forms of coordination by lead firms. In the fishery certified by MSC there is even a strong 
hierarchical form of coordination given the degree of control held by Pacifical BV. Consistent with 
the literature (Gereffi et al., 2005; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; Riisgaard et al., 2010), information 
exchange and deliverance of sustainability requirements is evident with strong lead 
firm coordination and control. In contrast, the FIP case demonstrates a captive form of 
coordination as manifested through the strong role of Casas in capturing fishers in economic 
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'contracts' through provision of credits and social security (Bush, 2004; Platteau & Abraham, 
1987; Ruddle, 2011). This coordination of lead firms in the chain reveals a potential paradox 
outcome. The strong coordination of lead firms requires fishers to develop more specialised 
capabilities that allow them to upgrade and later on receive incentives from the mechanisms.
However, the extent to which this specialised capabilities are beneficial to fishers still remains 
unclear in case lead firms withdraw their support from the chain or do not pass up benefits up the 
chain, particularly if there is less or no alternative for fishers under greater lead firm coordination.
Whether these lead firms will continue to contribute to both sustainability and development 
outcomes from their employment of incentive mechanisms is at the current stage unclear.
In addition to the implementation of the mechanisms, our result also shows how these mechanisms
themselves tend to reinforce control of the value chain by lead firms. The WWF and ISSF have 
strengthened the coordinating role of lead firms in FIP and ISSF cases respectively, although to 
varying degrees, given the strength of existing relationships and contracts between fisher and lead 
firms. Only in the MSC case, a new entrant (Pacifical BV) is playing the coordinating role of lead 
firm in the chain. In none of the cases, the various mechanisms foster greater coordinating power by 
fishers, indicating that capabilities are driven by the requirements of lead firms using these 
mechanisms rather than in response to any form of empowerment. 
2.6.2. The delivery of incentives 
Contrary to much of the literature focussing on creating change through incentive based 
mechanisms, the incentives in the value chain do not reach fishers in a linear fashion as is often 
assumed (Grafton et al., 2006; Jack et al., 2008). Instead, the forms of vertical coordination of the 
value chain appear to determine whether and how incentives are to be delivered to fishers. The 
vertical dimension of these chains seems to provide the structure and requirements for delivering 
incentives to fishers and thereby stimulating fishers to upgrade towards more sustainable production 
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practices. However, the delivery of incentives is influenced by existing social and economic 
relationships between actors in the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the value chains. 
Our results show that two related processes determine how incentives are delivered. On the one 
hand the incentives in the vertical dimension are influenced by the rent-seeking (income) behaviour 
of chain actors, but on the other hand they are deemed inadequate by fishers to invest in a 
corresponding upgrading strategy. For example, Casas and exporters in the FIP case capture many 
of the price premiums associated with export requirements, while in the ISSF case, member
processors and brand firms are more likely to capture the benefits associated with upgrading. A 
price premium has been made explicit in the MSC case by Pacifical, but fishing companies have not 
seen this premium as adequate enough to offset the higher costs and risk of fishing free-school 
skipjack tuna.  
The results also reveal that looking only at the delivery of a price premium obscures other
incentives that are delivered to fishers engaging with these incentive mechanisms. For example, in 
the MSC case, the improved processing efficiency afforded by larger size tuna caught in free school 
purse seine is seen as a measurable incentive of supporting greater volumes of certified fish. 
Likewise, preferential sourcing of ISSF member brands and processors for tuna supply provides a 
potential incentive for fishers to upgrade their vessels to comply with PVR. However, in both cases 
it was observed that producers do not simply change their practices in line with what might be 
described as the ‘economics of upgrading’; i.e. an evaluation on whether the incentives outweigh 
the costs and risks of investment. Instead their decisions are dependent on their capabilities and on 
their perception of costs and risks to receive and respond to these incentives. 
Finally, it appears in support of our framework (Figure  2.1) that the delivery of more indirect 
incentives from institutions in horizontal dimension develops the necessary capabilities of fishers to 
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make decisions around upgrading. As identified in other value chains (Bolwig et al., 2010a;
Giuliani et al., 2005; Riisgaard et al., 2010), the institutions deliver similar indirect incentives to 
producers under private incentive mechanisms. These include in-kind support such as fishing aids 
provided to fishers in FIPs or indirect support derived from: 1) income generated as an outcome of
conserving the fishery by local fishers (e.g. ecotourism); 2) subsidies and external funding as a 
result of fisher associations’ project proposals; or 3) trainings, capacity buildings, and information
(Kiss, 2004; McNeely, 1988). However, it appears that indirect incentives will only be considered 
as an incentive from the horizontal dimension if these also develop the capability of fishers to 
achieve their goals.
2.6.3 Goals of fishers and of private incentive mechanisms 
In support of Grafton et al. (2006) and Hilborn et al. (2005), all three cases demonstrate evidence 
that the better the incentives are matched to the goals of the fishers, and the better the institutions
support the capability of fishers to upgrade, the more likely fishers will upgrade their production 
practices under private incentive mechanisms. The short-term goals of fishers are the food security 
and income goals, while their long-term goals include securing long-term income and minimising 
risks. When incentives are delivered to fishers and their short-term goals are realised, fishers are 
more inclined to make future investments needed for continued or full participation in order to 
support their long-term goals. However, this is not yet realized by most of fishers as illustrated in 
the cases. For example, in the FIP case, the ‘social contracts’ (Bush, 2004; Platteau & Abraham, 
1987; Ruddle, 2011) established with Casas enable fishers’ to meet short term food security goals, 
but the lack of an ongoing price premium due to control of Casas in prices appears to limit the
willingness of fishers to make long-term investments. In the MSC case, the perceived high risk and 
high costs of providing MSC certified products to the market, limit the delivery of MSC skipjack in 
the market, thus making fishing companies unable to satisfy their profit goals. Similarly in ISSF,
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the perceived weak incentives in PVR may not deliver the income goals of fishers, thus restraining 
fishing companies to make future investments related to PVR.
It is also apparent in these cases that the time bounded nature of incentive mechanisms limits 
fishers’ decision to invest in long-term upgrading investments. Both in the FIP and the MSC cases 
show that these mechanisms are at least initially set for period of five years, with an unknown 
continuation. Both developing capabilities and participating in a mechanism that will exist for a 
short period of time increase uncertainty and the risk for fishers of losing any investment they make 
in upgrading. This negatively contributes to realisation of the goals and it results in less 
participation. 
2.6.4 Mechanisms’ selectiveness regarding type of fishers 
The results indicate that there is no single type of private incentive mechanism that works in all 
fisheries (Christensen & Raakjær, 2006; Poos et al., 2010; Turner, 1997). Philippine tuna fisheries, 
just like other fisheries in the world, are highly heterogeneous. The important component in 
explaining the differences in capabilities of different fishers is the level of institutional supports in 
the horizontal dimension, which supplements the existing level of coordination of fishers in the 
vertical dimension. 
As outlined in the results, the level of coordination of fishers differs based on their numbers, 
investment capabilities, scale of operation, and strength of relationships between actors in the value 
chains. In support of our framework, varying levels of institutional support were observed that assist 
fishers to develop their capabilities to upgrade. In the FIP case, the high level of institutional 
support include the provision of fishing aids, funding, and training. In both MSC and ISSF cases, 
the institutional supports are mainly based on trainings and education with strengthened regulations 
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given the availability of capabilities of fishing companies, therefore enabling fishers to comply with
MSC and PVR requirements, respectively.  
2.7 Conclusion 
This study has evaluated and compared the ways different private incentive mechanisms influence 
upgrading of Filipino tuna fishers in the value chain. Overall, the private incentive mechanisms 
stimulate fishers to improve their fishing practices. Yet, these mechanisms still face challenges in 
terms of improving both environmental and development outcomes. Each mechanism differs in 
terms of strengths (and weaknesses) in delivering incentives, in building capabilities of fishers, and 
in incorporating fishers in their regulation of sustainability. From this, three conclusions can be 
drawn. First, it appears that some of the mechanisms have to do more than delivering direct benefits 
to fishers in the form of higher ex-vessel fish prices; they also have to develop the capabilities of 
those fishers they wish to engage with these incentives. This applies to fishers involved in FIPs in 
developing countries in general. Second, as shown in the cases of MSC and ISSF, the incentives 
delivered by the mechanisms must be able to offset the additional costs and risks of upgrading in 
order to increase and sustain the participation of fishers. Third, our analysis shows that while all 
three mechanisms have had made inroads to promoting sustainable tuna fisheries, there remains 
room for improvement in terms of incorporating the fishers that they are targeting and ultimately 
leading to significant sustainability impact in developing country fisheries.  
To be more effective in changing the behaviour of fishers in developing countries, these
mechanisms have to involve a wide set of actors both within and outside the value chains. 
Moreover, the mechanisms have to initiate investment in institutional means of support for fisheries 
to realise the benefits any incentive has to offer in order to stimulate changes to their practices on 
the water. In support of this, the interaction between firm and non-firm actors involved in the 
application of private incentive mechanisms, and the wide institutional arrangements that include 
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regulatory and normative institutions operating at and beyond local-level production, need closer 
consideration in the design and implementation of private incentive mechanisms. 
This study contributes to a wider understanding of the impact of private incentive mechanisms and 
their role in developing countries. Bringing these mechanisms into sharper focus reveals that 
incentive-based approaches have a role to play in fostering natural resource sustainability in 
different kinds of developing world fisheries. But in doing so we need to consider the degree to 
which they expose fishers to both benefits and risk based on their participation. By focusing on 
capabilities and upgrading in the global value chains, we are able to show how these benefits and 
risks differ between incentive mechanisms, based on the influence of both vertical value chain
coordination and horizontal institutional support. The extent to which fishers can respond to 
incentives by upgrading is therefore dependent on the combined effects of these value chain
dimensions. Further research is called for to assess the relevance of this framework beyond tuna, 
including other fisheries and other food and non-food value chains involving developing world 
producers subject to private forms of sustainability governance. 
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Chapter 3 
Fisher-level decision making to 
participate in Fisheries Improvement 
Projects (FIPs) for yellowfin tuna in the 
Philippines 
This chapter has been published as:  
Tolentino-Zondervan, Frazen, Paul Berentsen, Simon R. Bush, Larry Digal, and Alfons Oude 
Lansink. "Fisher-Level Decision Making to Participate in Fisheries Improvement Projects (FIPs) for 
Yellowfin Tuna in the Philippines." PloS one 11, no. 10 (2016): e0163537.
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3.1 Abstract 
This study identifies the capabilities needed by small-scale fishers to participate in Fishery 
Improvement Projects (FIPs) for yellowfin tuna in the Philippines. The current literature provides 
little empirical evidence on how different models, or types of FIPs, influence the participation of 
fishers in their programs and the degree which FIPs are able to foster improvements in fishing 
practices. To address this literature gap, two different FIPs are empirically analysed, each with 
different approaches for fostering improvement. The first is the non-governmental organisation-led 
Partnership Programme Towards Sustainable Tuna, which adopts a bottom-up or development 
oriented FIP model. The second is the private-led Artesmar FIP, which adopts a top-down or 
market-oriented FIP approach. The data were obtained from 350 fishers surveyed and were 
analysed using two separate models run in succession, taking into consideration full, partial, and 
non-participation in the two FIPs. The results demonstrate that different types of capabilities are 
required in order to participate in different FIP models. Individual firm capabilities are more 
important for fishers’ participation in market-oriented FIPs, which use direct economic incentives to 
encourage improvements in fisher practices. Collective capabilities are more important for fishers to 
participate in development-oriented FIPs, which drive improvement by supporting fishers, fisher 
associations, and governments to move towards market requirements.  
Keywords: capabilities; decision making; fishery improvement projects; Philippines; small-scale 
fishers
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3.2 Introduction 
The sustainability of fisheries is driven in large part by the alignment of fisher practices with 
management goals (Botsford et al., 1997; Pauly et al., 2002). State regulations, such as restrictions 
on fishing gears, harvest control rules, and access restrictions have traditionally been applied to 
change fisher behavior. However, the perceived weakness of these state regulations, or total absence 
in many developing country fisheries (DCFs), has led to the emergence of private incentive 
mechanisms, which are designed to improve compliance with existing rules and management 
approaches (Grafton et al., 2006; Hilborn et al., 2005; Oosterveer, 2008). The design and objectives 
of these private incentive mechanisms differ, but most commonly involve incentivising changes in 
fishing practices through value chain based arrangements such as industrial coalitions, 
improvement projects, and eco-certification (e.g. Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 2016a). 
The most dominant private incentive mechanisms for sustainable fisheries is the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) standards, against which fisheries practices, the health of stocks and 
habitats, and the capacity of management to deliver sustainable outcomes are measured and 
certified (Cummins, 2004). However, one of the main criticisms of the MSC is its limited capacity 
to adequately include DCFs. As of 2015, only 8% MSC-certified fisheries are from developing 
countries (Marine Stewardship Council, 2015). This limited inclusion is attributed to the high cost 
of certification, the lack of data on fish stocks available for assessment, and the inadequate or 
absence of effective governance and regulatory systems (Constance & Bonanno, 2000; Jacquet & 
Pauly, 2008; Pérez-Ramírez et al., 2012a; West et al., 2011). Recognising the difficulties of DCFs 
to move towards certification, a range of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and private 
consultancy firms have developed Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs), a step-wise methodology 
for improving fisheries practices and management that originally started in developed world 
contexts but is also focused on DCFs (Bush & Oosterveer, 2015; Deighan & Jenkins, 2015; 
Sampson et al., 2015).  
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FIPs utilize the market incentives in seafood value chains to stimulate sustainability improvements, 
which may or may not lead to MSC certification (Sampson et al., 2015). For example, retailers and 
food companies can push fishers towards improvements by directly funding a FIP or purchasing 
products (with or without a premium) from a fishery in a FIP (Conservation Alliance for Seafood 
Solutions). The six stages FIP model proposed by the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership is as follows: 
1. the identification of improvement goals and engagement of corporate partners; 2. agreement on
work plans for improvement between fishers and participating partners; 3. engagement of regulators 
by FIP partners to improve regulation and market partners to adopt better product specification and 
procurement policies; 4. measurement of improvements to policy and practice; 5. key scientific 
indicators demonstrating a positive trend towards management goals; and 6. (optional) certification 
against the MSC standards (Sustainable Fisheries Partnership, 2012). While differing in substance, 
other FIP models demonstrate a similar logic (see World Wide Fund for Nature, 2014) and are 
predicated on facilitating access to high end markets under the notional condition (Sampson et al., 
2015) that the fishery is working towards improvement.  
Despite convergence around the type of steps required, the mix of organisations involved, the kinds 
of fishers targeted, and the extent of institutional support provided in FIPs differ considerably. This 
is especially the case in the estimated 130-plus developing country FIPs (Sampson et al., 2015). 
Based on a recent attempt to create a general classification of FIP implementation (California 
Environmental Associates, 2015) we define two general categories: ‘bottom-up’ development-
oriented FIPs, often led by NGOs stimulating general improvements to government support and 
regulation; and ‘top-down’ market-oriented FIPs, led by firms focused on direct economic benefits 
for fishers in return for strict compliance (California Environmental Associates, 2015). It is 
assumed that these FIP models have consequences for the way fishers are included in FIP programs, 
especially in terms of the decision of fishers to change their practices in accordance with 
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improvement criteria. Yet, there is little empirical evidence to verify this (Deighan & Jenkins, 2015;
Sampson et al., 2015).  
We argue that the decisions made by fishers to participate in a FIP depend on the type of 
capabilities they have and whether these capabilities match with the requirements for participation.
These capabilities refer to the specific skills, practices, and forms of social organisations 
(Nussbaum, 2003; Sen, 1990). This study classifies these capabilities into individual capabilities at 
personal level, individual capabilities at firm-level, and collective capabilities at the fishery or 
community level. By identifying these capabilities we build a clearer understanding of the specific 
factors that influence fisher decisions to comply with requirements that seek to improve fishing 
practices.
The objective of this paper is to determine which decision making factors are important for small 
scale Filipino tuna fishers’ decisions to participate in two FIPs for yellowfin tuna (Thunnus 
albacares) in the Philippines. The first is the market-oriented Artesmar FIP, which is run by the 
private-company Meliomar and the consultancy firm BlueYou (Switzerland). This FIP sets a high 
sustainability requirement and provides economic incentives to encourage fishers participation. The 
second is the development-oriented Partnership Programme Towards Sustainable Tuna (PPTST) 
FIP, which is run by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Philippines, and seeks improved 
local governance of tuna fisheries to meet global value chain requirements. Both FIPs are focused 
on yellowfin tuna because of its market value and importance to the local economy, the scalability 
of these FIPs to other sites in the Philippines and beyond targeting yellowfin tuna, and because 
yellowfin is a species subject to overfishing in recent years (Davies et al., 2014; Langley et al., 2008;
Langley et al., 2009). 
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To understand the factors that influence fisher’s decisions to participate in FIPs, we employ a two 
stage framework including two models which are run separately. The following section describes 
both FIP models and the theoretical basis of capabilities and decision making. This is followed by 
an outline of the empirical data collection and of the probit and ordered probit models used for the 
two stage modelling. We then provide a justification for the variables adopted to explain fisher 
participation in FIPs. The paper concludes with a discussion of the key variables that are important 
for participation in different models of FIPs and recommendations for enhancing fisher participation 
in FIPs.
3.3 Participation in different FIP models 
3.3.1 Comparative FIP models 
In line with defining the different FIP models, the California Environmental Associates (CEA) 
(California Environmental Associates, 2015) created four archetypes based on combination of two 
characteristic dimensions. The first dimension focuses on the structure of FIPs, ranging from ‘basic’ 
to ‘comprehensive’. Basic FIPs are characterised as a simple, low-cost model which provides small 
incremental improvements through time, while comprehensive FIPs are considered those that are 
resource intensive model and aimed at achieving MSC certification. The second dimension focuses 
on supply chain engagement along a spectrum of bottom-up vs. top-down. Bottom-up FIPs are 
those that develop improvements first and only later attempt to access high end markets and major 
buyers who have made sustainability commitments (California Environmental Associates, 2015). In 
contrast, top-down FIPs are those that start with the demand of major buyers and retailers to put 
pressure on fisheries to engage in sustainability in exchange for market access. The four possible 
archetypes from these two dimensions allow us to classify Artesmar as a top-down comprehensive 
FIP and PPTST as a bottom-up comprehensive FIP.  
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Beginning in 2013, the goal of Artesmar is to provide market recognition and incentives for 
improved business and fishing practices of small scale fishers in the Philippines. Artesmar works in 
different regions of the Philippines, trading yellowfin from Occidental Mindoro, Albay, Quezon and 
Infanta, Antique, and Eastern Samar, Palawan, Batangas, Subic, Negros Occidental, and 
Zamboanga. Our research focused on Sablayan and Mamburao municipalities in Occidental 
Mindoro (see Figure  3.1) because the export chain for yellowfin tuna has been established since 
2010 and full participation in the FIP is observable. Both of these municipalities are characterised 
by a higher concentration of fishers with larger tuna boats and higher tuna landings than the other 
municipalities of Occidental Mindoro. The two municipalities also have good access to tuna 
processing plants due to improved roads, proximity to landing sites for easier tuna transfer, and the 
availability of transportation and major services such as communication and electricity which 
facilitates improved business transactions.  
The Artesmar FIP supports fishers to be compliant with legal catch documentation requirements, as 
well as enhancing fishery data, and fishery co-management; all of which are necessary to prepare 
the fishery for MSC certification. Artesmar also sets chain of custody requirements, including strict 
quality standards for tuna, and traceability requirements such as vessel registration and full catch 
documentation to verify the absence of Illegal Unreported Unregulated (IUU) fishing. Fishers 
participating in the Artesmar FIP are more likely to receive higher prices for their fish compared to 
fishers who do not participate because they are trained in how to handle their catch in such a way 
that improves the quality of the meat. They also have more certainty of having a buyer and 
receiving timely payment for the fish they land. These benefits of participation in the Artesmar FIP 
lower the risk of having a highly variable income, but are offset by the investment required for 
participation including time and effort allocated to training, additional effort and investment to 
satisfy traceability requirements and upgrading facilities to meet fish safety and quality 
requirements. The cost of training is particularly high because of the structure of boat ownership, 
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with fishers owning several boats having to extend new equipment, practices, and knowledge to 
their multiple boats and boat captains. 
Figure 3.1 The Occidental Mindoro fishery map
The PPTST FIP is based on a public-private partnership established in 2011 to develop sustainable 
practices of yellowfin tuna fishers in Lagonoy and in Occidental Mindoro. Although funded by 
WWF Germany and European retailers such as Seafresh (Netherlands), Bell Seafood (Germany), 
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and Coop (Switzerland), neither higher landing prices nor market access is currently used as an 
incentive to participate in the FIP. Instead the PPTST FIP can be classified as a bottom-up 
comprehensive FIP, with day-to-day management of the FIP carried out by the WWF-Philippines 
and the municipal governments to improve the wider conditions of legal compliance and fisher 
safety in the fishery. Implementation of the PPTST FIP by WWF and the municipal governments 
focuses primarily on the organisation of fishers in associations, before engaging them in a 
consultative decision making process in order to comply with chain requirements similar to the 
Artesmar FIP (e.g. Cudney-Bueno & Basurto, 2009; Pomeroy, 1995).  
The PPTST FIP targets a very wide range of fishers across the six municipalities of Sablayan, 
Mamburao, Paluan, Sta. Cruz, Calintaan, and Rizal, Occidental Mindoro (see Figure  3.1). Fishers in 
Sablayan and Mamburao are large scale and have adequate capital to meet requirements set by 
buyers in Metro Manila. Fishers in the other four municipalities have smaller scale operations, 
target species other than yellowfin tuna, and have other forms of livelihoods such as rice farming, 
carpentry, and grocery stores. Unlike the Artesmar FIP which sets strict requirements for inclusion 
in the FIP, fishers can partially participate in the PPTST FIP by attending trainings related to 
fishery governance, without delivering tuna to the chain. Full participation requires the preparation 
of catch documents and providing export quality tuna based on their attendance at training 
sessions. In general, institutional support such as training, subsidies, and in-kind help are 
recognised as important indirect incentives for the improvement of fisher practices (see 
Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 2016a). Contrary to the trainings in the Artesmar FIP, the 
trainings in the PPTST FIP are organized and funded completely by external actors such as the 
WWF and the municipalities. The PPTST trainings are not only limited to complying with tuna 
quality and traceability requirements, but also extend to improving the governance of the 
fishery, such as putting in place anti-IUU measures, and supporting the development of 
alternative livelihoods (such as ecotourism). Moreover these trainings reach different types 
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of fishers ranging from small- to large-scale, including those fishers in remote areas of the 
municipalities. The trainings, subsidies, and in-kind help are considered indirect incentives of the 
bottom up comprehensive FIPs because they are not directly associated with the market 
incentives of increased market access or a price premiums (Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 2016a).  
3.3.2 Fishers’ participation decision framework 
This study analyses fishers’ decisions to participate in the two FIPs (Figure  3.2). The first stage 
decision concerns the choice to opt for participation in the Artesmar FIP or not. In principle, the 
Artesmar FIP delivers higher returns and lowers the risk of fishers in terms of fluctuation in fish 
prices. However, higher investments for participation are required. The basic assumption here is 
that fishers who can fulfil the requirements of Artesmar FIP will choose this alternative because this 
option is expected to lead to a higher utility. As explained by the Utility Maximisation (UM) 
framework, a rational individual will maximise his/her income and will minimise risks (Hanemann, 
1984; McFadden, 1973; Schoemaker, 1982). The second assumption is that participation in the 
Artesmar FIP, though preferred by fishers, is not feasible for many fishers due to their lack of 
capabilities to comply with the requirements of the Artesmar FIP. Fishers that find themselves 
unable to participate in the Artesmar FIP might then opt for participation in the PPTST FIP as a 
second best option. Participation of a fisher in the PPTST FIP can be partial or full, depending on 
the fulfilment of requirements. As an extension of the utility framework, the third assumption is that 
the perceived social benefits of community membership (see Gintis, 2000; Jager & Mosler, 2007;
Ostrom, 1994), adds to the utility of fishers when joining  the PPTST FIP. The final option is that a 
fisher does not participate in any FIP.  
Testing the participation choices requires identifying significant variables that affect income and 
risks of fishers. The literature on decision making has extensively described the characteristics of 
decision makers that affect their level of income and risk (Abadi Ghadim & Pannell, 1999; Lindner, 
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1987; Marra et al., 2003; Pannell et al., 2006). For this study, we divide these characteristics into 
four groups: individual capabilities at personal level, individual capabilities at firm-level, collective 
capabilities, and individual risk attitude and socio-demographic characteristics. Table  3.1 shows this 
grouping of characteristics, which are also used as the explanatory variables used to analyse 
decisions for FIP participation in the empirical model explained below. 
Figure 3.2 The decision model for fisher participation
Capabilities are defined as the specific skills, practices, and forms of social organisations required 
to deliver certain tasks in pursuit of long-term goals (Nussbaum, 2003; Sen, 1990). The level of 
capabilities of individuals or firms influences the amount of risk they can handle and the income 
they can generate (Murphy C & P., 2008). For instance, a fisher that is more capable of adopting a 
certain fishing technology will find the risk of adoption lower than a fisher who still needs to build 
his/her capability to adopt the fishing technology. Moreover, the adoption of a fishing technology 
by a more capable fisher increases the likelihood of gaining a higher income (Abadi Ghadim & 
Pannell, 1999; Marra et al., 2003; Tsur et al., 1990).  
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Table 3.1 The explanatory variables for fishers’ participation in Artesmar and PPTST FIPs
Characteristics of decision
makers
Definition of variables in Stata References
FIP 1 if a fisher belongs to non-Artesmar, 0 if a fisher belongs to Artesmar
Stages 1 if fisher belongs to non-participation, 2 if partial participation in
PPTST FIP, and 3 if full participation in PPTST FIP
1. Individual personal capabilities
Fishing years Fishing experiences (in years) (Abadi Ghadim & Pannell, 1999;
Dewees C. & Hawkes, 1988a;
Dewees C. M. & Hawkes, 1988b;
Rothaermel & Hess, 2007)
Education Educational attainment of fisher (1 if fisher reaches high school, 0 
otherwise)
(Abadi Ghadim & Pannell, 1999;
Dewees C. & Hawkes, 1988a;
Rothaermel & Hess, 2007)
2. Individual firm capabilities
Initial investment Initial investment for tuna fishing boat (in ‘000,000 Philippine Pesos) (Abadi Ghadim & Pannell, 1999;
Anderson et al., 1977)
Boat ownership 1 if tuna fishing boat owner, 0 if non-boat owner (Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 
2016b)
Boat capacity Tuna capacity of boats (in ‘000 kg) (Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 
2016b)
Fishing trips Number of tuna fishing trips in a month (Squires et al., 2003)
Type of fishing employment 1 if fisher is fishing tuna year round, 0 otherwise (Squires et al., 2003)
Operating distance Tuna fishing operating distance (in km) (Squires et al., 2003)
Fishing days Number of tuna fishing days (Squires et al., 2003)
3. Collective capabilities
Membership to an association 1 if fisher has membership to a fisher association, 0 otherwise Interviews, (Tolentino-Zondervan
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et al., 2016b)
Trainings and subsidies 1 if a fisher receives trainings and subsidies from government, 0 
otherwise
Interviews, (Tolentino-Zondervan 
et al., 2016b)
Financing operation 1 if fisher personally finances his fishing operation, 0 if finances by
Casas
Interviews, (Ferrol-Schulte et al.,
2014; Ferse et al., 2012; Ruddle, 
2011; Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 
2016b)
4. Individual risk attitude and socio-demographic
Risk Attitude 1 if fisher sells in quality method, 0 if straight method (Abadi Ghadim & Pannell, 1999;
Marra et al., 2003; Rohrmann, 
2008)
Age Individual fisher’s age (in years) (Abadi Ghadim & Pannell, 1999;
Dewees C. & Hawkes, 1988a)
Number of family members Number of immediate family members (Abadi Ghadim & Pannell, 1999)
Other source of income 1 if fisher has other sources of income, 0 otherwise (Dercon, 2002; Pollnac et al., 
2001)
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The capabilities are expressed at the individual, firm and collective levels. As shown in Table  3.1, 
individual capabilities of the fishers correspond to what others have termed human capital, 
including the experiences and education of an individual, and can be used as a proxy for the 
competences and skills either inherent or acquired by that individual (Rothaermel & Hess, 2007). 
Firm capabilities refer to the collection of competences of the organisation to which the individual 
belongs (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007; Teece & Pisano, 1994) and reflect 
the use of material resources in order to comply with transaction requirements (Tolentino-
Zondervan et al., 2016a). In this study boats are considered as the unit of a firm operated by 
individuals. The material resources that are translated to individual firm capabilities include initial 
investments, boat ownership, boat capacity, type of fishing employment, number of fishing trips, 
operating distance, and fishing days (Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 2016a). These last three factors 
represent the input variables used by fishers, including gasoline/fuel, ice, and labor costs (Squires et 
al., 2003). Collective capabilities correspond to what others refer to as social capital, including 
shared resources acquired through external relationships and networks that improve personal- and 
firm-level capabilities (Rothaermel & Hess, 2007). In practical terms this extends to membership to 
a fisher association, institutional support such as trainings and subsidies, and financing business 
operations through loans either from an association or from Casas – local elites or patrons who 
control trade and provide credit for fishing, as well as for household needs such as education and 
health (see Ferse et al., 2012; Kusumawati et al., 2013; Ruddle, 2011). Based on compliance with 
market requirements the Artesmar FIP demands a higher level of capabilities for participation. This 
study hypothesizes that individual capabilities at firm-level will increase the likelihood of fisher 
participation to the Artesmar FIP because these variables reflect the higher capabilities of fishers.  
The individual risk attitude and socio-demographic variables influence the required income and 
acceptable risk for the decision maker (Abadi Ghadim & Pannell, 1999; Marra et al., 2003). This 
group of variables includes risk attitude, age, number of family members, and other sources of 
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income (Table  3.1). The risk attitude reflects the extent to which decision makers value risks
(Rohrmann, 2008). A value of 1 in the variable ‘risk attitude’ (Table  3.1) corresponds to the risk 
fishers take on by having a preference for what is termed locally as ‘quality buying’ - a method that 
requires quality inspection of tuna and assigns higher price for export quality tuna while lower price 
for rejected quality tuna. In this study, fishers with lower risk aversion (i.e. risk takers) will more 
likely choose the alternative that will give a higher expected income (Abadi Ghadim & Pannell, 
1999; Lindner, 1987; Tsur et al., 1990). This study assumes that socio-demographic variables may 
result in two opposite effects, which can influence the significance of these variables in the model. 
For instance, the age of the fisher affects the time horizon with which an investment can be 
recovered (Abadi Ghadim & Pannell, 1999; Dewees C. & Hawkes, 1988a). A higher age is 
therefore expected to decrease the likelihood for participation in the Artesmar FIP. At the same time, 
a higher age may also mean fishers have more fishing experience to improve their compliance with 
market requirements and could therefore increase the likelihood of participation in the Artesmar FIP 
(Abadi Ghadim & Pannell, 1999). Similarly a higher number of family members may reduce the 
risk of a fisher or firm by increasing the availability of labour, thus increase the likelihood of 
participation in the Artesmar FIP (Abadi Ghadim & Pannell, 1999). However, the number of family
members also places greater pressure to remain economically viable and food secure, which can 
lead to a lower probability of participation in the Artesmar FIP. Additional sources of income may 
reduce this risk by providing alternative sources of finance to firms, which in turn may increase the 
funds available and the likelihood of participation in the Artesmar FIP (Dercon, 2002). At the same 
time, other sources of income are also assumed to increase risk due to the allocation of time and 
resources to other activities, thus decreasing the likelihood of participation in the Artesmar FIP
(Pollnac et al., 2001). 
In the second-stage decision, collective capabilities such as membership to an association, and 
subsidies from the government enable fishers to comply with the requirements of the development-
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oriented FIP, while the financial dependency on Casas is either improving or limiting the 
participation of fishers. These collective capabilities reduce the exposure of fishers to risks by 
acquiring parts of investments to external actors and developing fishers’ capabilities through 
bottom-up comprehensive FIPs, and thus improve their income. We assume that membership to a 
fisher association strengthens the social relationships among fishers, enables fishers to improve the 
management of their fisheries, and allows access to the external resources that help fishers to 
improve their fishing activities in order to comply with FIP requirements (Tolentino-Zondervan et 
al., 2016a). Fishers, therefore, will perceive higher utility in joining a bottom-up comprehensive FIP 
given their focus on establishing fisher associations. Finally, we assume that the financial 
dependency of fishers to Casas can motivate fishers to participate in these FIPs because of (1) 
fishers feelings of indebtedness to Casas and/or (2) the (mis)trust of Casas that prices are correlated 
with the quality of fish. At the same time, the financial dependency of fishers to Casas may limit 
their freedom in joining a FIP in which they are not involved, because Casas may lose control over 
fishers which is based on a mix of familial and debt-tied relations (Ferrol-Schulte et al., 2014; Ferse 
et al., 2012; Ruddle, 2011). 
The non-participation of fishers in all FIPs may not only be attributable to a lack of capabilities only, 
but also to a higher perceived risk of participating in a FIP. Field results indicate that the risk 
perception of fishers is mainly influenced by four factors: 1) the existing tied-credit relation of 
fishers to Casas that results to lower fish price, while leaving no alternative higher markets to 
fishers for selling their fish; and by 2) the lack of trusts of fishers in those assessing quality at 
landing sites (Ferrol-Schulte et al., 2014); (3)  the increasing temperature that results to low tuna 
quality; and (4) the decreasing tuna catches in the recent years that causes fluctuation in income
(Van Putten et al., 2010). 
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Based on the assumptions outlined here, the rest of the paper addresses two key questions. First, 
which variables are important for fishers participation in the Artesmar and PPTST FIPs? Second, 
based on these variables, to what extent do top down and bottom up comprehensive FIPs facilitate 
participation of fishers in their programs? 
3.4 Materials and Methods 
3.4.1 Data Collection 
Individual fisher data were obtained from a survey covering the six municipalities of Occidental 
Mindoro. The Wageningen School of Social Sciences (WASS) at Wageningen University assessed 
and approved the research proposal in 2013 before fieldwork commenced in 2014. Verbal consent 
was sought from fishers by first explaining to them the objective of this study, the kind of 
information this study requires, and the use of the information they will provide. The interviews 
commenced after verbal consent was given and recorded by including the name of the fishers in the 
survey form. Written consent was not obtained due to the illiteracy of most of the fishers and the 
sensitivity of some fishers in terms of signing any form of what they perceive to be formal 
documentation containing their names.  
The total fisher population in Occidental Mindoro is 3584 fishers, according to the database of 
WWF Philippines as of June 2014. Following Field (Field, 2013), a total of 350 randomly selected 
surveys were carried out with the target of 10% of the population across spatially dispersed areas 
per municipality (see Table  3.2). The number of complete responses was 316, which can be divided 
into four groups according to their participation in the Artesmar FIP (6.3%), full participation in the 
PPTST FIP (17.4%), partial participation in the PPTST FIP (34.2%), and non-participation (42.1%) 
(see Table  3.3). The number of Artesmar FIP fishers is partly limited since the Artesmar FIP started 
two years later than the PPTST FIP and only covered two out of six FIP municipalities in 
Occidental Mindoro.  
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Table 3.2 The distribution of samples in each municipality
Municipality Total population** Number of samples* 
Sablayan 1656 165
Mamburao 850 85
Paluan 113 12
Sta. Cruz 350 25
Calintaan 315 33
Rizal 300 30
Total 3584 350
*Total number of surveys carried out is 350. However, the number is reduced to 316 due to incomplete and non-
responses of some fishers.
**Source: WWF Philippines, June 2014
Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics of variables based on four groups of fishers’ participation in 
FIP
Variables Artesmar FIP 
(n=20) 6.3% 
Full PPTST 
FIP (n=55) 
17.4%
Partial PPTST 
FIP (n=108) 
34.2%
No 
Participation 
(n=133) 42.1%
Scale variables
Fishing years 23.95 (2.7410) 21.50 (1.6487) 19.03 (1.09) 18.81 (0.9835)
Initial investments 3.79 (2.2136) 1.98 (0.3295) 0.61(0.1090) 0.74 (0.1423)
Boat capacity 1.74 (0.3172) 1.25 (0.1280) 0.90 (0.1575) 0.90 (0.0948)
Number of fishing trips 3.9 (1.0709) 3.60 (0.3349) 8.96 (0.8252) 7.67 (0.7033)
Operating distance 46.25 (9.9331) 50.27 (5.3346) 35.10 (2.8944) 35.54  (2.6733)
Number of fish days 6.6 (0.6257) 6.05 (0.3571) 4.15 (0.2737) 4.69 (0.2309)
Age 44.75 (2.8533) 42.45 (1.3530) 41.81 (1.1230) 40.53 (0.9858)
Number of family members 6.25 (0.5020) 4.96 (0.2854) 5.35 (0.2245) 5.16 (0.1801)
Nominal variables Frequency count 
(%) 
Frequency count 
(%) 
Frequency count 
(%) 
Frequency count 
(%) 
Education Reach Hs (1) 10 (50) 55 (50.9) 57 (42.9) 30 (54.5)
Do not reach Hs (0) 10 (50) 53 (49.1) 76 (57.1) 25 (45.5)
Membership to 
an association 
Yes (1) 4 (20) 67 (62.0) 12 (9.0) 44 (80.0)
No (0) 16 (80) 41 (38.0) 121 (90.10) 11 (20.0)
Trainings and 
subsidies 
Yes (1) 3 (0.15) 55 (50.9) 17 (12.8) 22 (40.0)
No (0) 17 (0.85) 53 (49.1) 116 (87.2) 33 (60.0)
Boat 
ownership 
Boat owner (1) 8 (40) 78 (72.2) 71 (53.4) 42 (76.4)
Not owner (0) 12 (60) 30 (27.8) 62 (46.6) 13 (23.6)
Financing 
operation 
Personal (1) 8 (0.4) 61 (56.5) 70 (52.6) 18 (32.7)
Casa (0) 12 (0.6) 47 (43.5) 63 (47.4) 37 (67.3)
Season Full-time (1) 8 (40) 34 (31.5) 51 (38.3) 46 (83.6)
Part-time (0) 12 (60) 74 (68.5) 82 (61.7) 9 (16.4)
Risk attitude Quality (1) 
buying
9 (0.45) 13 (12.0) 11 (8.3) 18 (32.7)
Straight (0) 
buying
11 (0.55) 95 (88.0) 122 (91.7) 37 (67.3)
Source of 
income 
Yes (1) 10 (50) 78 (72.2) 67 (50.4) 25 (45.5)
No (0) 10 (50) 30 (27.8) 66 (49.6) 30 (54.5)
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Table  3.3 also shows descriptive statistics of the independent variables that were used to explain 
fisher participation. In general, the scale variables such as fishing years, initial investments, boat 
capacity, operating distance, number of fish days, age, and number of family members show an 
increasing trend with increasing levels of participation, while the number of fishing trips shows a 
decreasing trend. The distribution of fishers is also shown for each nominal variable. The education 
level of fishers is evenly distributed across four fisher participation options. The membership to a 
fisher association and the boat ownership of fishers both increase from non-participation to full 
participation in the PPTST FIP. Artesmar FIP has the highest fraction of risk taking fishers. Also 
the percentage of fishers that prefers quality buying increases with the degree of participation in the 
PPTST FIP.
3.4.2 The empirical model 
In modelling fishers’ decision making to participate in FIPs, fishers decisions are structured in the 
two stages as explained above (Figure  3.2). The initial explanatory variables to explain fisher’s 
decision making are outlined in Table  3.1 and are coded in Stata 13, the statistical program used in 
this paper.  
We employed a two-stage modelling approach, similar to the concept of Heckman’s two-stage 
sample selection model (De Luca & Perotti, 2011; Greene, 2012; Heckman, 1979; StataCorp, 2005),
because it enables us to assess fisher’s participation in FIPs in two stages (Greene & Hensher, 2010;
Tucker, 2010). The first stage is a sample selection equation that uses a probit model. In this study, 
the sample selection deals with fishers options to choose between Artesmar FIP or non-Artesmar, 
which works for the two municipalities of Sablayan and Mamburao. The sample selection equation
is represented by:
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𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧∗ = α’w +  u
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 1[𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧∗ > 0].
The variable z* is a shadow variable ruling the fisher participation in Artesmar FIP, 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼′ is a 
coefficient of the selection process, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 is the explanatory variables known to influence the selection 
decision, and µ is the random error term of sample selection equation that is normally distributed. 
When  𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 1,  the fisher belongs to the category ‘non-Artesmar’ (and z=0 for the Artesmar FIP) 
since further analysis will be done for a  group of fishers not involved in the Artesmar FIP. All 
variables in Table  3.1 are used in the selection equation.  
Next is to use the result in the first equation to calculate the inverse Mills ratio, a selection hazard 
that is added as an explanatory variable in the second equation to remove the sample selection bias. 
Similar to Heckman’s two-stage sample selection model and to other studies (e.g. Cohen & Zarowin, 
2010; Henson et al., 2013; Ngaruko & Lwezaula, 2013; Weber & Willenborg, 2003; Wu & Zang, 
2009) that employed the same methodology, the second stage is an ordered probit equation. Since 
the second stage applies for the six regions where PPTST FIP operates (excluding Artesmar FIP in 
the analysis), individual fishers in Mamburao and Sablayan have values in their inverse Mills ratio 
while fishers in the remaining four municipalities have inverse mills ratio set to zero. The ordered 
probit equation is: 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦∗ = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 𝛾 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + Ɛ,
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 = 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 µ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦∗ ≤ µ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.
The y* represents a shadow variable ruling the ordered stages of participation to which non-
Artesmar fishers belong: β’ represents the coefficient of outcome explanatory variables x, γ is the 
selectivity bias, λ is the inverse Mills ratio, and Ɛ is the random error term for the ordered probit 
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equation. The y=j corresponds to the exact stage of participation in non-Artesmar, and is 
decomposed as follows: 1(y=1) for non-participation, 2 for partial participation in the PPTST FIP, 
and 3 for full participation in the PPTST FIP. The variables in Table  3.1 are used in the ordered 
probit equation.  
Before running the probit and the ordered probit models, two steps were conducted. First, all 
independent variables were checked for multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), 
which in this case gave values well below 10 for all explanatory variables (see Appendix C). This 
means that all explanatory variables exhibit low multicollinearity so all variables are retained in the 
model. Second, the heteroskedasticity of the model was tested using the Breusch-Pagan test to 
determine whether the variance of the error terms increases or decreases with explanatory variables. 
The heteroskedasticity test shows a significant result (see Appendix D), implying that running the 
model using robust standard errors reduces the variance of the error terms. 
Finally we added two extra steps to the model to test the robustness of our result, as shown in the 
supplementary information (see Appendix F and Appendix G). First, we checked for the 
significance of the inverse Mills ratio using the samples in Mamburao and Sablayan. Second, we 
ran a separate ordered probit model in the second stage that does not account for inverse Mills ratio 
for comparison with the one that does account for inverse Mills ratio.
3.5 Results 
First the modelling results will be presented for the first stage decision on participation in the 
Artesmar FIP, followed by the results for the second stage decision on participation in the PPTST 
FIP and the ordered outcome of non-participation in FIP, partial and full-participation in PPTST 
FIP. 
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3.5.1 Participation in Artesmar FIP 
Table  3.4 shows all independent variables that might explain participation of fishers in the Artesmar 
FIP, together with the corresponding coefficients, standard error, and Z-value. The coefficients are 
interpreted based on the direction of the effect of the variables (Greene, 2012). For instance, a 
positive coefficient means that a variable increases the participation of fishers in Artesmar FIP 
while a negative coefficient reduces the participation of fishers in Artesmar FIP. It is not possible to 
use the value of these coefficients in estimating the increase or decrease of participation because the 
coefficients are not derived using a linear model. The inverse Mills ratio shows insignificant result 
which means that there is no evidence that selection bias is quantitatively important.
The results presented in Table  3.4 show that some explanatory variables have significant effects on 
fishers’ choice for Artesmar FIP over non-Artesmar. The fit of the model based on the probit 
equation is P > χ2 = 0.00, which implies a good model fit at α=0.01. Consistent with our hypothesis, 
the initial investment for fishing boats, risk attitude, and number of family members are significant 
and positively contribute to the fishers’ choice to participate in the Artesmar FIP. Increasing initial 
investment for fishing boat reflects higher capabilities of fishers in terms of boat size, boat engine, 
and fishing equipment. These capabilities enable fishers to deliver tuna in the chain, therefore 
increasing their likelihood of choosing the Artesmar FIP and their chances of gaining higher income 
to recover their investments. A higher value for risk attitude of fishers as manifested by fishers 
preference to sell through quality buying, increases the likelihood of fishers to participate in the 
Artesmar FIP. A higher number of family members indicates that fishers also have an increase 
likelihood to participate in the Artesmar FIP. Based on field observations and interviews, fishers 
participating in Artesmar FIP often operate as part of a large scale family business. As shown in the 
literature (Zahra, 2005), family members in the fishing business  reduce fishers’ risks by having 
trusted employees, by developing the capabilities of the family members in order to succeed the 
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business in the future, and by having confidence that a fisher contributes to the welfare of the family 
member. 
Table 3.4 Results of the probit model in the first stage using data from Sablayan and 
Mamburao fishers
Coefficients Standard Error Z
FIPa
Individual personal capabilities
Fishing years  0.005 0.014 -0.35
Education 0.156 0.303 -0.51
Individual firm capabilities
Initial investment 0.089*** 0.029 -3.082
Boat ownership -0.391 0.351 1.11
Boat capacity 0.035 0.085 -0.42
Fishing trips 0.011 0.044 -0.25
Type of fishing employment -0.836*** 0.300 2.78
Operating distance -0.003 0.005 0.53
Fishing days 0.070 0.053 -1.32
Collective capabilities
Membership to Association -0.269 0.330 0.82
Financing operation -0.276 0.279 0.99
Trainings and subsidies -0.549 0.414 1.33
Individual risk attitude and socio demographic
Risk attitude 1.132*** 0.293 -3.86
Age 0.017 0.018 -0.98
Number of family members 0.259*** 0.069 -3.78
Other sources of income 0.119 0.279 -0.42
Constant 3.80 *** 0.941 4.03
N=220; Wald chi(16)=47.60; prob>(chi)2=0.000; inverse mills ratio=0.16 
* Statistical significance at α=0.10
** Statistical significance at α=0.05
*** Statistical significance at α=0.01
aFor reading the result, let 1=Artesmar FIP and 0=non-Artesmar
Note: The fisher data involve municipalities of Sablayan and Mamburao. The actual number of surveys is 222, 
but Stata eliminates observation with incomplete responses. 
Contrary to what was expected, the type of fishing employment has a negative effect on 
participation in the Artesmar FIP. The results show that the more fishers operate part-time or target 
species aside from tuna, the more likely it is that they will participate in the Artesmar FIP. Most 
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part-time tuna fishers shift from tuna fishing to catching other species during the low season for 
tuna catches in order to recover their costs of operation. Moreover, based on field interviews, some 
fishers believe that tuna stocks are declining over time, and therefore search for alternative catch to 
balance the risks of going out to sea.  
3.5.2 Participation in PPTST FIP 
The results of the ordered probit model on the degree of participation of fishers in the PPTST FIP 
are presented in Table  3.5. Variables such as type of fishing employment, operating distance, 
membership to an association, and risk attitude have positive and significant effects on the degree of 
fishers’ participation. The type of fishing employment increases the likelihood of full-participation 
in PPTST FIP when fishers target tuna on a full-time basis. Fishers specializing in tuna may have 
better skills in catching and improving tuna as compared to diversified fishers, thus enabling them 
to comply with the product requirements of PPTST FIP and therefore increasing their chance of 
generating higher income. As the operating distance increases, the likelihood of full participation in 
the PPTST FIP also increases. Fishers also note that the declining catch in municipal water (<15 km 
from seashore) drives them further seaward to search for better fishing grounds. Doing so increases 
their chances of catching and delivering tuna in the PPTST FIP, which in turn increase their chances 
of gaining higher income.   
The membership to a fisher association also increases the likelihood of fishers to move from non-
participation to full-participation in PPTST FIP. Based on interviews, fishers in the PPTST FIP 
perceive that joining a fisher association will help them improve the quality of their tuna, and will 
finally lead to higher tuna prices. The fisher association increases the perceived benefits of fishers 
since the association helps fishers to generate funding and subsidy such as fishing aids from the 
government, which improves their fishing activities. Moreover, a fisher association also organises 
activities such as the marine guards to prevent illegal fishing and conservation activities as part of 
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the improvement process in the FIP. Finally, the risk attitude of fishers shows a positive effect in 
terms of pushing fishers to fully participate in the PPTST FIP. This means that fishers are willing to 
sell more through quality buying because these fishers are confident that they acquired the 
knowledge and skills to improve the quality of tuna catches, which in turn increases the probability 
of getting higher prices for the fish they land.  
Table 3.5 Results of the estimation of the ordered probit model in six municipalities of 
Occidental Mindoro
Coefficients Standard Error Z
Stagesa
Individual personal capabilities
Fishing years  0.012 0.007 1.52
Education 0.089 0.152 0.58
Individual firm capabilities
Initial investment 0.074 0.061 1.21
Boat ownership 0.227 0.208 1.09
Boat capacity -0.037 0.071 -0.53
Fishing trips -0.009 0.014 -0.65
Type of fishing employment 0.407** 0.188 2.16
Operating distance 0.005** 0.003 2.03
Fishing days 0.026 0.040 0.65
Collective capabilities
Membership to Association 1.484*** 0.185 8.01
Financing operation -0.241 0.159 -1.52
Trainings and subsidies 0.078 0.196 0.4
Individual risk attitude and socio demographic
Risk attitude 0.770*** 0.254 3.03
Age 0.003 0.008 0.41
Number of family members -0.034 0.038 -0.88
Other sources of income -0.304* 0.157 -1.93
Inversemills1 -1.083 0.771 -1.4
Cut1 1.04 0.455
Cut2 2.57 0.474
N=296; Log likelihood= -223.4 ; LR chi(17)=168.5   P > χ2 = 0.000***
* Statistical significance at α=0.10
** Statistical significance at α=0.05
*** Statistical significance at α=0.01
a The fisher data involves the six PPTST FIP municipalities, excluding the fishers in Artesmar FIP 
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Having alternative sources of income has a negative and significant effect on the participation of 
fishers in the PPTST FIP as compared to those fishers who solely rely on fishing as a source of 
income. Based on interviews, and consistent with literature related to fishing as a form of 
employment (e.g. Pollnac et al., 2001), some fishers consider fishing as the poorest among other 
forms of employment and would like to move away from fishing if possible. Therefore, having 
other sources of income such as farming and small enterprises leads them to prioritize alternative 
sources of income rather than improving their fishing practices to satisfy FIP requirements.
Finally, the significant variables in the ordered probit model are further analysed by deriving their 
marginal effects, which show the change in probability when an independent variable increases by 
one unit. Calculating marginal effects in the second stage decision shows both the patterns and 
requirements for fishers to move from one participation stage to another. Figure  3.3 shows these 
marginal effects of the type of fishing employment, operating distance membership to an 
association, risk attitude, and other sources of income based on non-, partial-, and full-participation 
in the PPTST FIP (also refer to Appendix E for detailed information). The vertical axis of the graph 
represents the values of marginal effects from low to high, while the data labels or numbers in bold 
represent the significance of marginal effects at α=0.05. Taking the membership to a fisher 
association as an example, the graph shows that when any fisher is a member of a fisher association, 
the probability of not participating reduces by 51.5%, while the probability of partial participation 
increases by 21.4%, and of full participation increases by 22.7%. In another example, an addition of 
one km to the 35.5 km average operational distance will reduce the non-participation of fishers by 
0.2% (see Figure  3.3).
Aside from the direct interpretation of the marginal effects, the graph also shows the trends of 
marginal effects in selecting for partial or full participation in the PPTST FIP. The five variables 
show an increasing trend, which means that they generally enhance the participation of fishers from 
non- to full-participation in the PPTST FIP. The variables membership to a fisher association and 
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risk attitude  are highly significant in non, partial, and full-participation in PPTST FIP at α=0.01. 
This means that both variables are highly important in improving the participation of fishers in the 
PPTST FIP. The type of fishing employment, operating distance, and financing operation are 
significant at α=0.05 and at 0.10. It is also notable that among the five variables, the membership to 
a fisher association shows the highest marginal values, making it highly important for both partial 
and full participation. The majority of the partial participants are able to get funding from the 
government to improve their livelihoods through a fisher association. Full participants also benefit 
by being members of a fisher association by having regulatory support to fight IUU fishing in their 
area, thus ensuring greater legality of fish caught and traded.
Figure 3.3 The marginal effects of significant variables in second stage decision after ordered 
probit model
Note: The numbers in bold represent the marginal effects significant at α=0.05. 
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3.6 Discussion 
Based on these results we now further elaborate on how the capabilities of fishers influences fisher 
decision making for different levels of participation in top-down and bottom-up comprehensive 
FIPs, and on the influence these factors have on the design of different FIPs as a means of reaching 
goals of improved fishery practices and fisheries management. 
3.6.1 Capabilities, risk and FIP participation 
The results show that different types of capabilities influence the decision of fishers to join different 
kinds of FIPs. First, individual firm capabilities, such as initial investment and type of fishing 
employment, increase the likelihood for fisher participation in response to market-oriented FIPs, 
which provide economic incentives through dock side transactions based on quality. These 
individual firm capabilities are more likely to be exhibited by those with considerable financial 
capacity, owning and financing several fishing boats. Moreover, these fishers are also more likely to 
be engaged in other chain-related activities. However, consistent with now wider observations of 
how economic decisions are embedded in wider social or community relations (Granovetter, 1985;
Platteau & Abraham, 1987), the results also show that these individual firm capabilities are not 
independent from wider social relations in which these firm actors find themselves in fishing 
communities. For example, socio-demographic variables, such as the higher number of family 
members, are also shown to play a role in the probability of participating in market-based FIPs 
possibly because familial ties reduce the risk associated with individual choices to invest in 
complying with FIP requirements (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Zahra, 2005).  
Second, collective capabilities, such as membership to an association, are more likely to increase 
participation in the bottom-up PPTST FIP. The results also show that full participation in 
development-oriented FIPs remains dependent on the characteristics of the individual fishing firm. 
The results indicate that fishers fully participating in PPTST FIP have a greater degree of operation, 
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for instance by their large capacity to finance high costs of operation at a farther distance and 
through their capability to cope with risks associated with full-time tuna fishing particularly from 
March to September where catches are lower (see for example Herrero, 2004). However, partial 
participation is dominated by those fishers with smaller ‘one-man, one-boat’ operations, 
characterised by fishing at shorter distance from shore, and who are dependent on collective 
capabilities supported by fishing associations and Casas (see Bailey et al., In Press for comparable 
results). The consequence appears to be that despite the bottom-up oriented nature of the PPTST 
FIP, targeting a wider group of smaller scale and relatively poorer fishers, full participation appears 
to remain linked to those with higher individual firm level capabilities. This supports the idea of 
“elite capture” of benefits (MacNeil & Cinner, 2013), meaning that fishers with a high level of 
individual capabilities, in general, benefit from participation in FIPs. 
In addition to capabilities, the results indicate that risk attitude also influences the decision of 
fishers to participate in the two FIPs. First, the results indicate that less risk averse fishers are more 
likely to participate in the top-down Artesmar FIP. Building on work around fisher behaviour in 
response to economic risk (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Rohrmann, 2008; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007) 
this finding indicates that those fishers choosing for Artesmar FIP do so in order to not only 
generate higher income, but more importantly to reduce the lack of transparency and high price 
volatility inherent in the landing sites controlled by Casas. This means that the high price in 
Artesmar FIP reduces the risks of fishers against lower fish prices, as long as these fishers satisfy 
the fish quality requirement. In contrast, those choosing for the bottom-up PPTST FIP were not able 
to reduce this risk, as seen in many small-scale developing country fisheries (Pérez-Sánchez & Muir, 
2003; von Essen et al., 2013), because most buyers involved were not moving to quality buying and 
maintained many of the same debt-tied relations.
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3.6.2 Consequence for FIP design 
Our results hold consequences for the design of FIPs, as well as the relationship between different 
FIP models. First, reflecting wider discussions on market-based approaches to environmental 
improvement [such as eco-certification, see (Bush et al., 2013)], top down comprehensive FIPs 
requiring high level of individual capabilities have a higher risk of being selective of those fishers 
who can more easily comply with sustainability standards in exchange for immediate market access 
(Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 2016a) - with the consequence of reducing the potential for overall 
fishery improvement. In contrast, bottom up comprehensive FIPs fostering collective capabilities 
appear to be more inclusive of a larger group of fishers, but with the potential consequence of 
delivering lower overall improvements to the fishery as a whole. Balancing these trade-offs is at the 
core of the differentiation on how different FIP models are evolving (California Environmental 
Associates, 2015). 
Second, the results indicate that the design of FIPs also influences the delivery of incentives to 
fishers, which also affects inclusiveness and overall impact. As argued above, top-down FIPs 
appear to be better able to deliver more transparent price signals to fishers. The case of the Artesmar 
FIP shows that companies like Meliomar invest in vertical coordination and in doing so control the 
chain from production to export. They are thus better able to set higher prices for higher quality fish 
and to transmit this price incentive to fishers (Gulati et al., 2007; Suzuki et al., 2011). On the other 
hand, bottom-up FIPs with weaker relationships between retailers and fishers may result in weaker 
control over chain coordination. In addition, the on-ground implementation by actors operating 
outside the chain such as WWF, appears to result in weaker delivery of price-related incentives. 
Based on field interviews and observation, WWF serves as a facilitator outside the chain that links 
fishers to other seafood stakeholders. However, WWF does not have influence over the price of fish. 
Nevertheless, supporting other observations (Deighan & Jenkins, 2015; Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 
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2016a), bottom-up comprehensive FIPs do appear to offer more durable support from government 
given their closer relationship during implementation.
Finally, these results open up questions around the degree of complementarity and competition that
might exist between FIP models in relation to inclusion and improvement. While the results point to 
the differences between top-down or bottom-up comprehensive FIPs, it may not necessarily be the 
case that these or other FIP models are opposed or in competition. Instead, building on nascent 
ideas of FIP design (California Environmental Associates, 2015), two FIP models operating in one 
place points to a range of potential complementarities in terms of delivering incentives to fishers 
and improving the governance of the fishery. Here the more stringent top-down market-oriented 
approach could target fishers with individual firm capabilities, while bottom up ‘development-
oriented’ FIPs could provide a more inclusive approach. By targeting different capabilities, and 
setting different incentives, the two models could work in tandem to provide overall greater gains in 
fishery improvement. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Our results indicate the overall importance of considering fisher capabilities in understanding 
decisions of fishers to participate in different kinds of FIPs. The individual firm capabilities 
stimulate fishers to participate in strongly market oriented top-down FIPs while collective 
capabilities enable fishers to improve their practices and to participate in bottom-up FIPs aimed at 
wider fishery and community development goals. These types of capabilities and FIP models have 
consequences for the inclusiveness of different fishers, for which three insights are generated in this 
study. First, the top-down FIPs appear to be more exclusive, given that there are a few numbers of 
fishers who have the capabilities and lower risk aversion to comply with its requirements. Second, 
bottom-up FIPs appear to be more inclusive, aiming to provide broad support to the development of 
fisher capabilities and the institutional support provided to them to improve their practices on the 
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water. Third, the two FIP models exhibit competing inclusion when implemented in the same 
fishery, yet also exhibit potential complementarity in terms of delivering incentives and improving 
governance of the fishery. 
We also conclude that in order to increase the participation of fishers, those designing FIPs need to 
not only recognize the economic utility that a fisher could derive from participation, but also to 
identify and build fishers capabilities to participate in a FIP. Moreover, FIPs must also balance both 
the deliverance of incentives to individual fishers and the improvement in the governance of the 
fishery in order to enhance participation of fishers and thus achieve high sustainability impact. 
Future research may elaborate on the implementation of FIPs to poor and well performing fishers 
and to different fisheries (e.g. tuna or other species), and on their consequences to the inclusiveness 
and fishery improvement. Finally, focusing on ways to enhance the participation of fishers in FIPs 
and in other private incentive mechanisms is also relevant to achieve higher sustainability outcomes.
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Chapter 4 
FAD vs. free school: Effort allocation by 
Marine Stewardship Council compliant 
Filipino tuna purse seiners in the PNA 
This chapter has been submitted to Marine Policy as Tolentino-Zondervan, F. Berentsen, P. Bush, 
S.R., and Oude Lansink, A. FAD vs. free school: Effort allocation by Marine Stewardship Council 
compliant Filipino tuna purse seiners in the PNA. 
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4.1 Abstract 
This paper assesses the effect of Marine Stewardship Council certification on the allocation of 
fishing effort by Filipino purse seine fishers operating in the waters of the Parties of the Nauru 
Agreement. Targeting skipjack tuna, these purse seiners allocate effort under a vessel day scheme to 
either MSC certified free school fishing or non-MSC certified fishing on fish aggregating devices 
(FADs). Based on historical catch and price data, the optimal set of fishing activities are determined
in terms of the mean and variance of fishers’ gross margin at given levels of risk aversion. The 
results show that MSC certification stimulates fishers to reduce their allocation of effort on non-
MSC compliant FADs, and consequently convert this effort to MSC compliant free school purse 
seining. In general, the MSC also increases the yearly gross margin of fishers as compared to the 
situation without MSC certification. The MSC therefore appears to be effective to a certain extent in 
promoting a transition to more sustainable fishing practices. However, the results also indicate that 
the risk profile of fishers is a key but underexplored dimension of assessing the potential impact of 
MSC certification on effort allocation.
Keywords: effort allocation; Filipino; Marine Stewardship Council; purse seine; risk aversion 
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4.2. Introduction 
The skipjack (Katsuwomis pelamis) purse seine fishery in the waters of the Parties to Nauru 
Agreement (PNA) accounts for 60% of the tuna supply in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean
(Parties to Nauru Agreement Office, 2015). Acting collectively the eight Pacific island member 
states of the PNA have implemented two management measures designed to secure a greater share 
of the value of this tuna resource (Barclay, 2010; Barclay & Cartwright, 2007; SPC, 2010). The 
vessel day scheme (VDS) sets a price on fishing days within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) 
of the PNA member states, with the intention of controlling access and fishing effort by fishing 
fleets owned almost exclusively by distant water fishing nations (for details see Havice, 2013). In 
addition these fleets can voluntarily comply with the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 
certification by fishing on ‘free school’ tuna either in parallel to or replacing fishing on tuna 
associated with Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs).
The MSC certification of free school purse seine fishing in the PNA aims to reduce the observed 
negative effects of FADs on: (1) non-target juvenile yellowfin (Thunnus albacares) and bigeye tuna 
(T. obesus), both of which are considered overexploited; and (2) the by-catch of endangered and 
threatened species (Bailey et al., 2009; Bailey et al., 2013; Hampton, 2010; Langley et al., 2008). In 
support of the MSC certification, the PNA has set measures for reducing fishing effort on FADs, 
including seasonal FAD closure in the EEZs of the PNA countries and an annual limit on the 
number of FAD sets by purse seine vessels (Gilman & Lundin, 2010). During the seasonal FAD 
closures, vessels are limited to MSC compliant free school fishing. However, during the FAD 
fishing season vessels can elect to either set on free school tuna or on FADs during a voyage as long 
as there is an MSC registered observer on board (Hamilton et al., 2011). With measures in place to 
separate tuna from FAD and free school sets on-board, vessels can land both MSC and non-MSC 
tuna from a single trip. If the vessel carries a PNA member state flag it can fish either on free school 
or on FADs in the archipelagic waters of these nations under the Federated States of Micronesia 
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(FSM) Arrangement (see Yeeting et al., 2016). This fishing activity then falls outside the VDS and 
does not qualify for MSC certification. 
The possibility to make allocation decisions based on location and fishing gear on any given voyage 
is unlike other MSC certified fisheries, where all fishing activities within the ‘unit of certification’ 
are MSC compliant. Despite the flexibility this brings to purse seine fishers in the PNA, the choice 
of effort allocation also forces fishers to make tactical decisions. A key determinant of this tactical 
decision to allocate fishing days to MSC or non-MSC compliant fishing is therefore also influenced 
by their risk attitude (see for example Brick et al., 2012). For tuna fishing, these risks include 
the variation of catches on FADs and/or free schools and the variation in the price of MSC and 
non-MSC compliant tuna. By better understanding risk attitude, fishery managers may therefore 
better understand the motivation of fishers to change their fishing practices and in doing so 
enhance the sustainability of the fishery.
The relationship between effort allocation and risk attitude is understudied. Some studies have 
looked at the effect of risk aversion on effort allocation in terms of both gear and location (Dupont, 
1993; Eggert & Tveteras, 2004; Mistiaen & Strand, 2000). However, the majority of studies have 
focused on effort allocation decisions without taking the risk attitude of fishers into account
(Bastardie et al., 2010; Béné & Tewfik, 2001; Pet‐Soede et al., 2001; Poos et al., 2010; Poos & 
Rijnsdorp, 2007; Rijnsdorp et al., 2000). No study has yet assessed the influence of risk attitude on 
the allocation of fishing days in response to incentive mechanisms such as the MSC, nor assessed 
the effectiveness of MSC in promoting sustainable fishing practices based on effort allocation by 
fishers in a multi-gear fishery.
This study fills this gap by examining the mean and variance of gross margins resulting from 
different effort allocation by more and less risk averse MSC compliant Filipino purse seine vessels 
FAD vs. free school: Effort allocation by Marine Stewardship Council compliant Filipino tuna purse 
seiners in the PNA
87
in the PNA. The analysis uses a Mean-Variance Approach to account for both the allocation of 
fishing days and the risk aversion of fishers. The analysis is limited to the Filipino tuna purse seine 
fishing in PNA for two reasons. First, these vessels are currently complying with MSC at varying 
rates of effort allocation. Second, they have the widest set of options in terms of fishing in both 
archipelagic waters and the EEZ of PNA countries based on the Palau Agreement. The results 
provide insights on the extent to which the MSC can affect the allocation of ‘compliant’ fishing 
days by fishers, as well as provide guidance to managers seeking to increase the voluntary 
participation of fishers in MSC compliant fishing across the full risk-attitude spectrum. 
The following section describes the Filipino purse seine vessels and their participation in MSC 
compliant free school fishing. Section three then outlines the effort allocation framework of purse 
seiners in the PNA and the Mean-Variance Approach used to model this allocation. Section four 
presents the effects of MSC on the gross margin and effort allocation and section five discusses the 
effectiveness of MSC in affecting effort allocation. The paper concludes by outlining the 
recommendations for both fishery managers and the MSC seeking to incentivise fishers to shift to 
more sustainable practices in multi-gear fisheries. 
4.3. Filipino purse seiners’ allocation decisions 
4.3.1 Filipino tuna purse seiners fishing in Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
Filipino purse seine vessels have fished in the waters of the PNA, including interstitial High Seas 
Pockets, for more than three decades (Vera & Hipolito, 2006). Today, Filipino owned purse seine 
vessels flying a domestic Papua New Guinea (PNG) flag or chartered vessel flying a Philippines 
flag have access to PNA waters. Domestic vessels fish primarily in the PNG waters while chartered 
vessels have access to all PNA EEZs under the FSM Arrangement. PNG has introduced this 
flagging arrangement in an attempt to attract investment from vertically integrated Filipino firms 
who own both vessels and processing plants. By domesticating processing capacity the PNG 
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government hopes to increase domestic fishing capacity and in turn increase the volume of tuna 
being landed, processed, and exported from the country (Barclay, 2014). 
In 2014 there were 12 Filipino-owned domestically-flagged PNG vessels and 18 Filipino-owned 
chartered vessels in PNG (Usu et al., 2014). Philippine flag vessels chartered by PNG fished 
exclusively in the PNG waters until 2014 (Usu et al., 2013, 2014). This study focuses on Philippine-
owned domestic and chartered vessels by PNG because these vessels are included in the lists of 
MSC certified vessels regulated by the PNA (Marine Stewardship Council, 2014a). However, no 
further distinction is made between these vessels given they have the same options for fishing 
activities in PNG waters.
The majority of Filipino-owned vessels are between 50-80 meters in length. This is significant 
because vessel length determines the type of fishing license and the coverage of operation in PNG 
waters and also qualifies vessels for fully equivalent fishing days under the VDS (Forum Fisheries 
Agency, 2015a). Vessels this size are also able to engage in both FADs and free school fishing
(Barut & Garvilles, 2005; Vera & Hipolito, 2006). FAD fishing includes both anchored FADs, 
which are stationary floating objects, and drifting FADs, which are moving FADs that contain 
satellite buoys that transmit their location to fishing vessels (Dagorn et al., 2013; Fonteneau et al., 
2013). Free school fishing uses technologies such as fish finders, GPS, and sonar, to scan for tuna in 
the open ocean. Some vessels fishing free schools are also aided by a helicopter that search for tuna 
and then radio coordinates to the closest catcher vessel. 
4.3.2 Participation of Filipino purse seiners in MSC 
Under the PNA’s vessel day scheme, distant water fishing nation vessels are limited to fishing in 
the collective EEZ of the PNA members, but have the further choice of employing MSC compliant 
free-school fishing and/or fishing on FADs. However, domestic and chartered vessels by PNG have 
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the added choice of free-school and/or FAD fishing in the archipelagic waters of PNA countries as 
agreed under the FSM Arrangement. The archipelagic waters of PNG are dominated by the 
Bismarck Sea, delimited by the 12 nautical mile boundary of territorial waters to the start of the 
EEZ (see Figure  4.1). As of 2015 these archipelagic waters are accessible to PNG domestic and 
chartered vessels only (National Fisheries Authority, 2015c). 
Figure 4.1 The archipelagic baseline and EEZ coverage of PNG waters 
Source: (Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 2014) 
Fisher’s compliance with MSC free-school fishing in the EEZ is incentivised through a 20% price 
premium controlled by Pacifical B.V., a 50/50 joint venture company between the PNA and the 
Dutch trader Sustunable (Adolf et al., 2016; Miller & Bush, 2014). This premium is divided among 
the cannery (5%), fishing company (10%), and PNA/Pacifical (5%) (Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 
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2016a). Since Filipino firms have integrated fishing and processing, they receive a combined price 
premium of 15%.  
To qualify for MSC free school fishing, vessel crews and captains have to undergo MSC training 
and register the vessel for an MSC trip with the PNA office (see Table  4.1). Both carrier and 
catching vessels also have to carry a trained observer on-board to verify catch is MSC compliant.
Fishers must also comply with the VDS as one of the main harvest control measure of the PNA
(Yeeting et al., 2016). In addition to paying for VDS days at a rate of US$4,000 per fishing day, 
vessels in the EEZ zone fishing on free-school or FAD associated tuna have to carry a Vessel 
Monitoring System (VMS) that tracks the activities of a fishing vessel. The VMS is made up of 
electronic tracking, electronic monitoring, and electronic reporting (Poseidon Aquatic Resource 
Management Ltd, 2016). Finally, the catch of fishers must be documented through skippers’ 
logbook and observers’ data. 
Table 4.1 Fisher-level requirements for MSC fishing in PNA
Description Parties Involved
Fisher-level requirements 1. MSC training Vessel crews and captains, 
PNA office, and MSC.  
2. Enrol the vessel for MSC
fishing trip and for VMS
Vessel captains, PNA office
3. Separate MSC (free
school) to non-MSC catch 
(FADs, floating objects) 
Purse seine fishers
4. MSC trained observer on
board for both catcher and 
carrier vessels
MSC observers from PNA 
office
Fishing companies 
5. Documentation of the
catch
MSC observers, National 
Fisheries Authority, Forum 
Fisheries Agency, and 
Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community, Vessel captain
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The overall effort allocation framework of Filipino purse seiners (as illustrated in Figure  4.2)
includes whether to fish on FADs in archipelagic water, FADs in the EEZ, free schools in 
archipelagic water, and/or MSC free school fishing in the EEZ. Fishers make these decisions based 
on the risks and the expected gross margin associated with different fishing activities. Risk in tuna 
production is characterized by the variation in tuna catches from different fishing grounds using 
different fishing methods and by fluctuations in tuna prices. Fishers that are exposed to these 
production risks have different levels of risk aversion, which in turn influence their choice of 
fishing activities. It is assumed that a decrease in an individual’s risk aversion tends to increase the 
likelihood of adoption of innovation, which may not only have high expected gross margin but also 
high costs and risk (Marra et al., 2003). Following this assumption, this study hypothesises that less 
risk averse fishers are more likely to adopt MSC fishing than the highly risk averse fishers. Less 
risk averse fishers are able to make this decision to engage with MSC since they have more wealth, 
measured by the total value of assets owned by an individual, more experience and knowledge to 
employ free school fishing, and more established social connections to support their decisions, as 
compared to highly risk averse fishers (Guiso & Paiella, 2008; Pratt, 1964).
4.4 Methods and model specification 
4.4.1 General structure of the model 
Effort allocation is modelled using a representative Philippine-owned purse seine vessel operating 
in PNG. Skippers are considered the decision maker on these vessels because they manage the 
fishing operation of the vessels, including when and where to fish at sea (Libre et al., 2015). The 
general structure of the purse seine model includes the objectives, activities, and constraints of 
purse seine fisher as outlined above. The model covers a period of one year (365 days). 
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Figure 4.2 The decision making framework of Philippine-owned chartered purse seine vessels 
in PNG
The optimization model (e.g. Acs et al., 2009; Berentsen & Giesen, 1995; Chavez et al., 2014) uses 
the Mean-Variance Approach to determine the combination of different outputs produced given the 
inputs used by decision makers, while explicitly accounting for the risk attitude of decision makers. 
The objective is to maximise the utility at the level of the vessel. The general formulation of the 
model (Hazell & Norton, 1986; Scott J. T. J. & Baker, 1972) is:
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶′𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 𝑋 0.5𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋′𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 ≤ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑥 0.
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where Z is the expected utility to be maximized, C is the vector of gross margins for activities X, α
is the absolute risk aversion coefficient, W is the variance–covariance matrix of activities gross 
margins, A is the matrix of input–output coefficients, and B is the vector of the resource constraints. 
The utility of fishers is defined as revenues from sales of skipjack catches (in metric tons) minus 
variable costs that include costs of fuels, labours, costs of fishing days, observer costs, and costs of 
VMS, minus the risk premium 0.5𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼′𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼. The output of the model includes the optimal catch plan, 
which is the optimal number of fishing days in each fishing activity at the assumed risk aversion 
level of fishers, and the gross margins of purse seiners.  
4.4.2 Activities 
Following from section 2, the activities of fishers are (1) FAD fishing in archipelagic water, (2) free 
school fishing in archipelagic water, (3) FAD fishing in EEZ, and (4) MSC (and non-MSC) free 
school fishing in the EEZ.
4.4.2.1 Constraints 
The constraints that are included in the model are as follows:
(1) The total number of fishing days in PNG archipelagic water is limited to 5,500 fishing days per 
year (National Fisheries Authority, 2015a). The fishing days in archipelagic water is allocated based 
on the actual processing tonnage of different processing plants in PNG (McCoy, 2014). Fifty 
percent of the actual processing tonnage of processing plants in PNG is from Philippine-owned 
canneries (McCoy, 2014). A figure of 106 fishing days per year per vessel in archipelagic water is 
therefore estimated [(5,500 archipelagic water fishing days*50%)/26 domestic and chartered vessels 
of Philippine-owned canneries].
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(2) Filipino-owned domestic and chartered vessels with a PNG flag fall under the VDS scheme 
through the FSM Arrangement. Such PNA flagged vessels pay a lower price for fishing days 
compared to vessels flagged to distant water fishing nations because of their assumed contribution 
to the local development of PNA member states. The limit in fishing days in the PNG EEZ under 
the FSM Arrangement is 1,732 fishing days (Yeeting et al., 2016). There are 36 PNG flagged 
vessels under FSM Arrangement in 2014 (McCoy, 2014). The FSM Arrangement fishing days in 
the EEZ are set at 48 per vessel at a cost of US$ 4,000 per day based on 2014 figures. Vessels can 
obtain additional fishing days in PNG waters outside the FSM Arrangement after it has used its 
EEZ days at a cost of US$6000 per fishing day (National Fisheries Authority, 2015c). 
(3) The FAD closure during the months of July, August, September in the EEZ is equivalent to 92 
calendar days (Parris, 2010). In addition to the seasonal FAD closure, fishing vessels also face an 
additional one month (equivalent to 30 fishing days) FAD-ban in the EEZ, as part of an extra 
measure imposed on vessels since 2014 by the WCPFC to further conserve bigeye tuna (Western 
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 2015a). So the maximum number of fishing days for 
FAD fishing in EEZ is 243. 
4.4.3 Model input 
The model requires daily catches per fishing activity, output prices, variable costs per day per 
fishing activity, and variances and covariances of gross margins of all fishing activities. The daily 
catches and the prices of outputs and of inputs in the model are based on data from 2012-2014 since 
fishers started MSC fishing in 2012.  
The catch per fishing method in archipelagic water and in the EEZ of PNG is not directly available, 
and therefore calculated in multiple steps using different sources (Usu et al., 2013, 2014, 2015;
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 2015b) (refer Appendix H for detailed 
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calculations). The resulting skipjack catches per fishing day are presented in Table  4.2. The daily 
skipjack catches per fishing method per fishing ground were validated with data on the average 
effort of Philippine purse seiners in archipelagic and EEZ waters of PNG (National Fisheries 
Authority, 2015b). Based on the input of two regional experts (Personal communication, November 
14, 2016), the resulting catches are assumed to be representative of the age and the performance of 
Philippine-owned purse seine vessels for the years these data represent.
Table 4.2 Daily catches, prices, gross margin, and costs of Philippine-owned purse seine 
vessels flagged as PNG based on 2012-2014 
Unit FAD 
fishing in 
archipelagic
water
Free school 
fishing in 
archipelagic
water
FAD 
fishing 
in EEZ
Non-MSC 
free school 
fishing in 
EEZ
MSC free 
school 
fishing in 
EEZ
Catches mt fish day
-1
vessel-1 20.81 17.82 32.47 19.68 19.68 
Prices (in ‘000) US$ mt-1 1.931 1.931 1.931 1.931 2.221
Revenue (in 
‘000) US$ vessel
-1 40.18 34.39 62.70 38.00 43.71 
Variable costsc
(in ‘000)
• Fuels US$ vessel-1 3.60 7.20 3.60 7.20 7.20
• Labour
(share of 
crews)
US$ vessel-1 8.04 6.88 12.54 7.60 8.74 
• Share of
skippers and 
mechanics
US$ vessel-1 7.14 5.08 11.64 5.80 9.72 
• MSC
observer US$ vessel
-1 0 0 0 0 0.03 
• Cost of
VDS US$ vessel
-1 0 0 4.0 4.0 4.0
• Cost of
VMS US$ vessel
-1 0 0 0.106 0.106 0.106 
Total variable 
cost US$ vessel
-1 18.78 19.16 31.89 24.71 29.80 
Gross margin 
(in ‘000) US$ vessel
-1 21.40 15.23 30.81 13.29 13.91 
Standard 
deviation of 
gross margin 
(in’000)
US$ mt-1 5.08 17.84 16.94 6.72 6.73 
Coefficient of 
variation of 
gross margin 
(%)
0.24 1.17 0.55 0.51 0.48 
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The output price data covers the monthly price of skipjack tuna from 2012 to 2014 (Atuna, 2014).
In order to make consistent observations, skipjack prices were converted to 2014 US dollars using 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 
2016). Table  4.3 shows the deflated monthly skipjack tuna prices, which exhibits fluctuation due to 
the influence of both quality and quantity of supply of fish in the market (Jeon et al., 2008). The 
deflated monthly skipjack prices were averaged to obtain the annual skipjack prices for the period 
2012 to 2014. The average skipjack price for 2012-2014 is used in the model for all non-MSC 
compliant fishing. The price of MSC compliant free school skipjack is the average price plus the 15%
price premium.
Table 4.3 The monthly skipjack prices for years 2012-2014 in US$ using Bangkok price index, 
inflated to 2014 
Months 2012 2013 2014 Average
January 2203.6 2178.6 1430 1937.4
February 2151.4 2263.7 1250 1888.4
March 2144.9 2374.7 1200 1906.5
April 2351.3 2447.3 1250 2016.2
May 2315.9 2456 1400 2057.3
June 2369.8 2297.1 1750 2139.0
July 2426.3 1998.3 1800 2074.9
August 2425.7 1993.4 1850 2089.7
September 2518.0 2003.9 1350 1957.3
October 2305.3 2003.8 1170 1826.4
November 2062.7 1783.3 1170 1672.0
December 2035.9 1643.3 1150 1609.7
Average 2275.9 2120.3 1397.5 1931.2
MSC price (average 
price + 15% premium)
2617.3 2438.3 1607.1 2220.7
Source: Atuna 2014 
Fishing revenues are calculated based on the daily skipjack catches and average prices (see
Table  4.2). The cost of fuel is calculated based on ten face-to-face interviews by the first author 
with skippers (7) and mechanics (3) in Lae, PNG in 2014. The interviews include the fuel 
consumption of the vessel per fishing day using the FAD and free school fishing techniques (refer 
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to Appendix I for more details). The fuel consumption of FAD fishing is on average 3,000 Liters (L) 
per fishing day, while fuel consumption for free school fishing is on average 6000 L per fishing day. 
The prices of fuel in 2012, 2013, and 2014 were US$1.17 per L, US$1.30 per L, and US$1.12 per L, 
respectively (Department of Energy, 2016). The 2012 and 2013 fuel prices were inflated to 2014. 
The three year (2012-2014) fuel price is on average US$1.20 per L. Therefore, the average fuel 
consumption of purse seine fishers using FAD fishing is US$3600 per fishing day and the average 
fuel consumption for free school fishing is US$7200 per fishing day.  
The cost of labour is based on the traditional catch sharing system of the Philippine purse seine 
fishery (Vera & Hipolito, 2006). In this sharing system, 20% of the gross revenue goes to crews, 
while 25% of the net sales (gross revenue minus the costs of labour and fuel) go to skippers and 
mechanics. Interviews with skippers also revealed that skippers and mechanics on MSC compliant 
trips receive on average an extra 10% of the net sales. The fishing days in the EEZ cost US$ 4,000 
for the first 48 days, with additional fishing day costing US$6,000. The cost of MSC observers is 
US$30.60 per day based on 2014 figures, while the costs of the VMS in EEZ amounts to 
US$109.24 per day in 2015 (equivalent to US$ 106.8 in 2014) (Poseidon Aquatic Resource 
Management Ltd, 2016). The breakdown of these costs can be found in Appendix J.
Given the fishing revenues and total variable costs, the gross margins, standard deviation and the 
coefficient of variation of gross margins are calculated (Table  4.2). The gross margins for three 
years are the resulting skipjack prices in 2012-2014 multiplied by the annual skipjack catches in 
2012-2014, minus the total variable costs in each year. It is notable that FAD fishing in the EEZ has 
the highest gross margin, while free school fishing in the EEZ has the lowest gross margin among 
the four fishing activities. FAD fishing in archipelagic waters has the lowest standard deviation 
among the four fishing activities. This is followed by the MSC and free school fishing in the EEZ. 
Overall, FAD fishing in archipelagic waters has the lowest coefficient of variation of gross margins. 
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The next lowest coefficient of variation of gross margins (in ascending order) are MSC fishing in 
EEZs, free school fishing in EEZs, FAD fishing in EEZs, and free school fishing in archipelagic 
water.
The gross margins per fishing activity from 2012 to 2014 are used to calculate the variance-
covariance matrix. In order to compute for the variance of gross margins, the gross margins over 
this time period are averaged for each fishing activity, and the deviations, which represent the 
individual gross margin of each fishing activity minus the average gross margin, are calculated. The 
variance in each fishing activity is the sum of the squared deviations divided by three. The 
covariance is the sum of the product of deviations of two fishing activities for three years, divided 
by three. Table  4.4 shows the variance-covariance matrix of gross margins with MSC. Values are 
the same for the variance-covariance matrix of gross margins without MSC, except for a one unit 
increase in covariance of FAD fishing in archipelagic waters and of free school fishing in the EEZ 
without MSC. 
4.4.4 Coefficient of absolute risk aversion 
This study derives the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (α) from the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion (Rr), which is a dimensionless value that corresponds to the level of risk averseness of an 
individual. The Rr takes the value of 0 (risk neutral person); 0.5 (hardly risk averse person), 1.0 
(somewhat risk averse person), 2.0 (rather risk averse person); 3.0 (very risk averse person); 4.0 
(extremely risk averse person) (Acs et al., 2009; Anderson & Dillon, 1992). The coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion (α) is calculated by dividing the relative risk aversion (Rr) by wealth (D), 
represented by the owner’s equity. The owner’s equity is assumed to be US$1,700,000 based on the 
average investment on a large-scale tuna vessel (Libre et al., 2015). Therefore, the value of the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion ranges from 0 to 0.0000024. 
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Table 4.4 Variance-covariance matrix of gross margins (2012-2014) of Philippine-owned 
purse seine vessels flagged as PNG, with MSC (in ‘000) 
FADs 
Archipelagic 
water
Free school 
Archipelagic 
water
FADs EEZ Free school 
MSC
FADs archipelagic 
water 26 89 79 26
Free school 
archipelagic water 89 318 247 75
FADs EEZ 79 247 287 109
Free school MSC 26 75 109 45
4.4.5 Set up of the calculations 
The model was run for two situations. The first is the control, i.e. without the possibility of MSC 
free school fishing. In this situation the price of free school skipjack caught in the EEZ is the same 
as for the other three alternatives. The second situation includes the possibility of MSC free school 
fishing. The price for MSC fishing is 15% higher than the price for fish caught using FAD and 
using free school fishing in archipelagic waters. The observer costs and the extra incentive for 
skippers fishing in MSC are included. Both situations are run with different level of risk aversion of 
fishers in order to determine the effect of risk aversion on the level of the fishing activities and on 
total gross margin. 
4.5 Results 
The effect of MSC certification is determined by comparing the gross margins of fishers with and 
without MSC compliant fishing under the different levels of risk aversion (Table  4.5). The changes 
in the level of fishing activity of fishers are also presented with and without MSC compliant fishing. 
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Table 4.5 Model results for Philippine-owned purse seine vessels flagged as PNG for different values of absolute risk aversion coefficient
Without MSC With current MSC price premium = 15%
Risk neutral to
hardly risk 
averse
Somewhat
risk averse
Rather risk
averse
Very risk
averse
Extremely
risk averse
Risk neutral to
hardly risk
averse
Somewhat risk
averse
Rather risk 
averse
Very risk
averse
Extremely
risk averse
α 0.0 nd 2.0E-7 5.0E-7 1.2E-6 1.8E-6 2.4E-6 0.0 and 2.0E-7 5.0E-7 1.2E-6 1.8E-6 2.4E-6 
Rr 0 and 0.5 1 2 3 4 0 and 0.5 1 2 3 4 
Total revenue 20,103,544 16,906,948 9,698,816 7,080,072 6,083,615 20,194,860 17,513,661 11,118,237 7,939,680 6,357,561
Total variabl  costs 10,604,239 9,674,931 5,749,757 3,900,297 3,196,560 10,685,679 10,390,596 6,918,439 4,596,579 3,440,880
Total gross margins 9,499,306 7,232,017 3,949,058 3,179,775 2,887,056 9,509,181 7,123,065 4,199,798 3,343,100 2,916,681
Total variance 22,260,000 11,281,000 2,033,300 964,870 670,570 22,256,000 10,439,000 2,265,100 1,075,200 660,390
Optimal fishing
activities
•FAD fishing in
archipelagic 
water
106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106
•Free school
fishing in 
archipelagic 
water
•FAD fishing in
EEZ 243 114 243 102
•Free school
fishing in EEZ 16 145 143 74 48
•MSC free school
fishing in EEZ 16 157 157 84 48
Total fishing days 365 365 249 180 154 365 365 263 190 154
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When fishers are not MSC compliant, the level of risk aversion affects their fishing activities, which 
in turn affects their total gross margin and total variance. The results show that risk neutral to hardly 
risk averse fishers will generate the highest gross margin and highest variance when they fish 
predominantly on FADs in both archipelagic waters and the EEZ, followed by a few days of fishing 
on free schools in the EEZ. In this case, the total available fishing days in archipelagic waters and 
FAD fishing days in the EEZ are completely utilized. Less risk averse fishers in general fully utilize 
available fishing days in archipelagic waters using FADs, while FAD fishing days in the EEZ 
reduce in exchange for free school fishing. When fishers are somewhat risk averse, the number of 
free school fishing days in the EEZ is higher than the number of FAD fishing days in the EEZ. 
When fishers are rather risk averse, FAD fishing in EEZ is no longer an option. Moreover, rather 
risk averse fishers only use 249 fishing days because the extra gross margin of an additional fishing 
day cannot cover the additional risk at this level of risk aversion. Very risk averse fishers continue 
to use their free school fishing in the EEZ at the level as extremely risk averse fishers. However, 
extremely risk averse fishers have the lowest total number of fishing days of fishers. The general 
observation drawn from these results is that with increasing level of risk averseness, gross margin 
and the variance decrease. 
When fishers are MSC compliant their level of risk aversion affects the allocation of fishing effort 
and gross margin differently. Risk neutral to hardly risk averse fishers generate the highest gross 
margin when they fish most on FADs in archipelagic water and in the EEZ, followed by fishing 
using MSC compliant sets on free school tuna in the EEZ. Across all types of fishers, the available 
fishing days in archipelagic water using FAD fishing are used completely. When fishers are 
somewhat risk averse, FAD fishing days in the EEZ decline and are converted to MSC free school 
fishing days, ultimately at a higher allocation than FAD fishing days. The rather risk averse fishers 
maintain the same level of MSC fishing days in EEZ as the somewhat risk averse fishers and stop 
FAD fishing in the EEZ. The very risk averse and extremely risk averse fishers further reduce their 
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MSC fishing days. The number of fishing days of extremely risk averse fishers is the lowest and 
similar to fishers who are not MSC compliant. 
The comparison of fishing with and without the possibility of MSC compliant fishing as an 
incentive for allocating fishing effort reveals three further observations. First, the gross margins of 
fishers under different levels of risk aversion are generally higher when they are MSC compliant as 
compared to when they are not MSC compliant. Second, the number of FAD fishing days in the 
EEZ reduce and are converted to free school fishing in the EEZ when MSC is introduced. Vessels 
that are not MSC compliant do not reduce and convert FAD fishing effort to free school fishing 
effort. Third, none of the fishers change in effort allocated to FAD fishing days in archipelagic 
waters, including those who are MSC compliant. These observations indicate that overall MSC 
increases the revenues of fishers. However, in line with PNA regulations and the conditions of the 
MSC certification, MSC only incentivises a shift from FAD to free school fishing in the EEZ and 
not in archipelagic waters. 
4.6 Discussion 
4.6.1 Validation of results 
The results of the model appear to be consistent with the existing practices of Filipino fishers in 
PNG waters. Based on the model results, FAD fishing in archipelagic water is the most preferred 
option by Filipino fishers across all different levels of risk aversion. As reflected in reality, the 
fishing effort of Filipino fishers are mainly concentrated in archipelagic waters using FADs (Pilling 
et al., 2014; Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 2015b). This has a dual explanation. 
First, fishers have essentially ‘free access’ to PNG’s archipelagic waters given their investment in 
domestic processing capacity. Second, two Philippine-owned fishing companies own 88% of the 
FADs deployed in archipelagic waters of PNG between 1998 and 2012 (Pilling et al., 2014).  
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The model also shows that Filipino fishers tend to increase their allocation of free school fishing 
days when they are MSC compliant. This is consistent with practice based on the increasing level of 
free school fishing observed in the PNG EEZ -  and supported by PNA measures to support MSC 
compliance (Usu et al., 2012). Moreover, as validated by interviews, fishers increase their allocation 
of MSC free school fishing days during the seasonal FAD closures. To maximise catches during 
this closure Filipino fishers hire Koreans and Japanese skippers to educate and improve their free 
school fishing skills and use helicopters and advanced GPS tracking device to efficiently fish in 
free schools (Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 2016a). This in turn could suggest Filipino fishers might 
be in general less risk averse, giving further weight to the positive influence of MSC certification 
on free-school effort allocation. 
4.6.2 Risk aversion and allocation of fishing days of fishers 
The key result is that the level of risk aversion influences the allocation of fishing days, which in 
turn determines the extent to which the fishery as a whole will see a transition to more sustainable 
fishing practices. If a fishery is made up of risk neutral and/or hardly risk averse fishers, a greater 
effort allocation yielding the highest gross margins should be expected. In the case of the PNA this 
translates to predominant allocation of fishing effort to FADs in the EEZ followed by FADs in 
archipelagic water. Consequently there is minimal effort allocation to MSC compliant fishing by 
these types of  fishers (see Table  4.5). Conversely, if a fishery is made up of less risk averse fishers, 
it should be expected that FAD fishing effort will be reduced and converted to MSC compliant free 
school fishing.  
The results show that somewhat risk averse fishers convert 12 days from FAD to MSC compliant 
free school fishing in the EEZ. This corresponds to 3.3% of the total fishing effort of Filipino 
fishers over a one year period. However, over the same period there is no conversion of FAD 
fishing days in archipelagic water to MSC fishing by any category of fishers. The choice of fishers 
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to allocate days to FAD fishing in archipelagic waters is because this fishing practice has the lowest 
coefficient of variation of gross margin (see Table  4.2) and variance (see Table  4.4) among the four 
fishing activities. 
Finally, if a fishery is made up of more risk averse fishers, the result will be the persistence of non-
MSC compliant FAD fishing in archipelagic waters and a lower allocation of effort to MSC 
compliant fishing practices. Given the different allocation decisions of fishers at different levels of 
risk aversion, this study clearly demonstrates that in a multi-gear fishery fishers should not be seen 
as one homogenous group. By identifying the level of risk aversion of different groups of fishers 
operating in a fishery, managers will be able to predict the likely effect of incentive based 
mechanisms like the MSC before its implementation.
4.6.3 Effectiveness of MSC as incentive mechanism 
The MSC appears to be effective in motivating fishers to increase their allocation for free school 
fishing in the EEZ – the specified area of application. It therefore appears that the price premium for 
MSC compliant landings incentivises fishers to change their fishing practices. However, this price 
premium is not large to incentivise fishers to allocate effort currently allocated to FAD fishing in 
the archipelagic waters to MSC compliant free school fishing in the EEZ. In order to increase the 
fishing effort allocated both from FAD fishing in the EEZ and archipelagic waters, both the average 
gross margin would therefore need to be increased while the variance of gross margin would need 
to be reduced. This may already be observed in reality. Since the 2016 certification of free-school 
yellowfin tuna in the EEZ of the PNA, fishers appear to have both increased the probability of a 
higher overall gross margin as well as reduced the variance in gross margin (PNA, 2016). The 
certification of two free school fisheries may therefore reinforce the influence of MSC to incentivise 
an overall shift away from FAD fishing in both the EEZ and archipelagic waters.   
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In line with the wider literature, the results also show that the success of MSC as a market-based 
incentive mechanism is dependent on both government regulation and market incentives (see for 
example Grafton et al., 2006; Mansfield, 2006). The four months FAD-closure in the PNA EEZs 
and limits on fishing in archipelagic waters enable fishers under different levels of risk aversion to 
choose for MSC free school fishing. However, FAD fishing in archipelagic water and in EEZ 
remains a key component of the daily operation of risk neutral and hardly risk averse fishers. 
Moreover, the FAD fishing in archipelagic water is the main choice of all fishers across different 
level of risk aversion. It therefore appears that without regulation limiting fishing days 
in archipelagic water, fishers will continue to prefer fish using FADs in archipelagic waters  
over the MSC free school fishing in EEZ. Similarly, limiting the use of FADs in the EEZ 
enables risk neutral and hardly risk averse fishers to fish using MSC free school. Therefore, the role 
of regulation in driving fishers to voluntarily comply with the MSC requirements should 
be recognized, since it appears that economic incentives alone are not enough to shift fishers 
to do more sustainable fishing practices. 
It is notable, however, that the overall increase of both MSC and non-MSC compliant fishing effort 
in the PNA will place greater pressure on fishing stocks. The currently increased in capacity of 
fishing vessels that are doing MSC fishing in PNA puts pressure on skipjack and yellowfin tuna 
stocks (PNA, 2016), and therefore could undermine the MSC’s principle of promoting sustainable 
fish stocks. To ensure that the goal of the MSC certification is ultimately met, the government must 
continuously monitor the change in fishing effort as well as stock status. A regulation is also 
necessary to address the discrepancy in the number of active vessels fishing, which this study uses 
in the model, and of registered vessels. The actual efforts of fishers may be more or may be less 
than the projected fishing effort, thus government regulations will resolve the issue of inactive 
vessels.
Chapter 4 
106
4.7 Conclusion 
This study shows the effects of MSC certification on the allocation of fishing effort in response to 
levels of gross margin and the risk aversion of Philippine purse seine fishers. Three conclusions can 
be made based on the findings of this study. First, the MSC is to some degree effective in 
incentivising a shift from one fishing practice to another by converting FAD fishing days in EEZ 
into MSC free school fishing in the EEZ. Second, the extent to which the current price premium of 
MSC incentivizes fishers is dependent on the degree of risk aversion of fishers. And third, both 
government regulations and the market incentive working together are necessary for MSC to 
effectively work as an incentive mechanism.
Fisheries employing MSC certification should take into account not only income but also the risk 
attitude of the fishers to determine the extent they are willing to change their fishing practices. 
Fishery managers that are involved in the application of MSC certification must therefore match the 
expected price premiums with the expected risk of these fishers. Only then can they increase the 
potential impact of incentive mechanisms such as the MSC to instigate transitions in fishing 
practices across a large enough number of fishers. Consequently the government must continuously 
monitor the effort of fishers for doing MSC fishing and the effect of this effort on the fish stocks. 
Future research may extend to the effect of risk aversion of short-term decisions to the long-term 
decision making of fishers in response to MSC and/or other incentive mechanisms. 
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Chapter 5 
Profitability of investments associated 
with the adoption of private incentive 
mechanisms by Filipino purse seiners 
A modified version of this chapter will be submitted to a journal as Tolentino-Zondervan, F. 
Berentsen, P. Bush, S.R., and Oude Lansink, A. Profitability of investments associated with the 
adoption of private incentive mechanisms by Filipino purse seiners.
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5.1 Abstract 
Private incentive mechanisms for promoting fisheries assume win-win outcomes for both fish and 
fishers. However, the economic return to fishers complying with these mechanisms remains unclear. 
This study assesses the economic benefits of complying with the International Seafood 
Sustainability Foundation’s (ISSF) requirements for eco-FADs and the Marine Stewardship 
Council’s (MSC) requirements for free school fishing by Filipino purse seine fishers with different 
level of risk aversions. Returns were calculated based on the Net Present Value (NPV) of investing 
in both ISSF and MSC compliance. The results show that investing in both ISSF eco-FADs and 
MSC certified free school fishing is the most profitable outcome for fishers with low risk aversion, 
but that MSC is the most robust investment option to fishers’ with varying degree of  risk aversion. 
Fishers with low risk aversion will have the highest return on investment, and the probability of a 
positive NPV decreases as the risk aversion of fishers increases. The paper concludes that 
increasing the adoption of private incentive mechanisms requires active risk reduction strategies 
such as future contracts, floor prices, and flexible taxation schemes. Only then will more risk averse 
fishers decide to participate in the programs, which in turn will contribute to the overall 
sustainability of a fishery. 
Keywords: Filipino, International Seafood Sustainability Foundation, Marine Stewardship Council, 
Net Present Value, purse seine fishery
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5.2 Introduction 
Purse seining is the most dominant fishing practice in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
(WCPO) skipjack tuna fishery by both volume and value. Conventional purse seining uses drifting 
and anchored Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) to increase the catchability of tuna (Itano, 2007).
However, FADs remain controversial because also they increase the catch of non-target juvenile 
yellowfin and bigeye tunas, two of the most valuable tuna species in the WCPO at maturity, as well 
as threatened and endangered marine organisms (Fonteneau et al., 2000). In addition, FADs have 
been linked to marine pollution (Ocean Studies Board, 2012).  
In pursuit of the sustainable exploitation of skipjack tuna a series of effort controls have been 
implemented on FADs by regional fishery management regimes in the WCPO, including seasonal 
closures and vessel day limits (Gilman & Lundin, 2010). However, a number of ‘private’ incentive 
mechanisms controlled by non-state actors have also emerged in support of these state measures and 
in response to market demand for sustainable seafood. They include third party certification, 
industrial coalitions and fishery improvement projects (Kirby et al., 2014; Tolentino-Zondervan et 
al., 2016b). Two main private incentive mechanisms used to improve the sustainability of purse 
seine tuna fisheries in the WCPO, and at the same time create marketable sustainability claims, are 
the Marine Stewardship Council’s (MSC) certification of free school fishing and the International 
Seafood Sustainability Foundation’s (ISSF) programme to develop so called eco-FADs . 
Academic research has reviewed the effect of private incentive mechanisms on fishing practices 
(e.g. Costello et al., 2010; Pérez-Ramírez et al., 2012a; Yeeting et al., 2016), including 
quantitative assessments on fisher income (Msomphora & Aanesen, 2015; Tolentino-Zondervan et 
al., 2017; Wakamatsu, 2014). Other studies have investigated the transmission of price premiums of 
incentive mechanisms to fishers (Blomquist et al., 2015; Goyert et al., 2010; Uchida et al., 2014), 
while others still have focused on the capabilities, challenges, and opportunities of developing 
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country fishers to adopt private incentive mechanisms (Gulbrandsen, 2009; Ponte, 2008b;
Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 2016a). However, none of these studies has quantitatively assessed the 
required level of investments for fishers in private incentive mechanisms, nor the profitability of 
their investments given the number of fishing days allocated to different available fishing methods.  
This study fills this knowledge gap by assessing the profitability of investments in private incentive 
mechanisms. In doing so it contributes to a clearer understanding of the ‘business-case’ for 
improving the sustainability of fishing practices. The analysis uses Net Present Value (NPV) as a 
method for evaluating investment options (Myers, 1984). The model for calculating NPV compares 
the outcomes for fishing strategies of fishers with different levels of risk aversion and includes the 
uncertainty by allowing for stochasticity of catches, prices, and several types of costs. The four 
investment options by fishing companies included in the analysis are: (1) ISSF compliant eco-FADs, 
(2) MSC compliant free school fishing, (3) both eco-FADs and MSC free school fishing, and (4) 
business-as-usual. This research also limits the scope of analysis to Filipino fishing companies who 
have a license agreement to access Papua New Guinea (PNG) waters as a Distant Water Fishing 
Nation (DWFN). The focus on Filipino fishing companies in PNG is because they use both FAD 
and free school in purse seine fishing and have both the possibility to voluntarily employ ISSFs 
programme for eco-FADs and be a compliant with MSC free school fishing (see Tolentino-
Zondervan et al., 2016a).
The following outlines ISSF’s recommendations for eco-FADs and the criteria for MSC free school 
certification of the Parties of the Nauru Agreement (PNA) that includes PNG. The NPV method is 
then outlined, as well as the data required and the Monte Carlo simulation used to capture 
uncertainty in the NPV calculation. We then present the results before turning to a discussion of the 
profitability of investment in incentive mechanisms. Conclusions are drawn on factors that can 
influence investment strategies given returns on shifting to more sustainable fishing practices. 
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Finally, recommendations are given to encourage greater voluntary participation of fishers in these 
incentive mechanisms. 
5.3 The participation of Filipino purse seine fishers in private incentive 
mechanisms 
Filipino fishers operating under a Philippine flag in the waters of the PNA do so under bilateral 
access agreements. In 2014 there were 36 Philippine DWFN vessels registered in the PNA. These 
fishers can voluntarily participate in ISSFs eco-FAD programme as well as fish in compliance with 
the MSC free school certification. Both ISSF and MSC offer different incentives, but also require 
different levels of investment to realise the technical changes needed to move away from the 
‘business as usual’ mode of FAD fishing.  
5.3.1 International Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF) 
The ISSF was formed in 2009 through a coalition of major seafood industries and World Wide
Fund for Nature. One of its core goals is to promote the sustainability of FAD fisheries
(International Seafood Sustainability Foundation, 2017). Fishers are incentivised to voluntarily 
adopt ISSF recommendations through priority sourcing by ISSF member processors, who make up 
75% of the worlds canned tuna, an assumed price premium for tunas caught on eco-FADs, and free 
enrolment of vessels on a ‘pro-active vessel registry’ maintained by ISSF. This study assumes a 10% 
price premium based on the average premium given to producers for sustainably caught skipjack 
tuna, such as on fair trade tuna (Campling & Havice, 2015), MSC free school tuna (Adolf et al., 
2016), and pole-in-line caught tuna (Barclay, 2015). To facilitate wider uptake of their programme 
the ISSF has invested US$ 3.6 million in 2014 in research on the design of eco-FADs that are non-
entangling and/or are made from biodegradable materials (see Figure  5.1) (International Seafood 
Sustainability Foundation, 2014a). 
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Figure 5.1 An example of FAD that uses non-entangling design (left picture) and of FAD that 
uses biodegradable materials (right picture)
Non-entangling FADs (see Figure  5.1) do not use nets that are prone to trapping non-target species 
such as turtles and sharks (see Figure  5.2 for reference) (Goujon et al., 2012; International Seafood 
Sustainability Foundation, 2012b; Moreno et al., 2016b). These designs are currently only used for 
drifting FADs (dFADs), a non-stationary type of FAD deployed in oceanic area that is tracked by 
satellite. Entanglement is less of an issue for anchored FADs (aFADs), which are stationary floating 
objects most often deployed in archipelagic waters (Itano et al., 2004). Biodegradable FADs are 
made with bamboo, palm leaves, cottons, coconut fiber, and yute with the aim of eliminating 
marine litter and pollution (MRAG, 2017). The use of biodegradable materials is currently accepted 
in aFADs since they are easier to monitor and maintain. There is less acceptance for biodegradable 
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materials in dFADs due to their shorter lifetime and the cost of biodegradable materials, which is 
twice that of standard materials like plastic and nylon (MRAG, 2017). 
Figure 5.2 An example design of non-entangling FAD that uses nettings (from old purse seine 
nets)
5.3.2 Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 
The MSC certifies fisheries against their three principles, which focus on the sustainability of  fish 
stocks, minimisation of environmental impacts associated with fishing, and the demonstration of an 
effective management system (Marine Stewardship Council, 2014a). The PNA obtained its MSC 
certification for skipjack caught in free schools in their EEZ waters in December 2011 (Marine 
Stewardship Council, 2012). 
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The PNA, through their commercial partner Pacifical, incentivises fishers to participate in MSC 
compliant fishing through a 20% price premium, which is divided between the fishing company 
(10%), cannery (5%), and the PNA (5%) (Adolf et al., 2016; Yeeting et al., 2016). The PNA 
secretariat further supports certification of the free school fishery in two ways. First, by investing in 
the MSC assessment, which is assumed here to be at the upper bound of assessment costs at around 
US$500,000 (PNA, 2013). Second, by investing in electronic fisheries information system, 
including a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) for tracking fishing vessels, MSC observers, and a 
catch documentation scheme, all of which are valued at US$1.58 million (Poseidon Aquatic 
Resource Management Ltd, 2016).  
In order to participate in MSC compliant free school fishing, Filipino fishers need to upgrade their 
vessel engines to improve chasing free school tuna and make technological investments that can 
potentially improve free school fishing such as on: (1) bird radar to detect birds that associate with 
school of tuna at a distance of 20-24 miles; (2) fish finder to locate the position of school of fish; 
and (3) depth sonar radar to analyse fish composition when fishers are near the school of fish. 
5.3.3 Strategic decisions for Filipino fishing companies 
Investment decisions are normally made at fishing company level (Libre et al., 2015).* However, 
we assume that investment decisions are made at the vessel level since there are no economies of 
scale at a fishing company level when investing in compliance to incentive mechanisms like ISSF 
or the MSC. The rationales for this assumption are that (i) the investments of fishers are related on a 
per vessel basis and (ii), the investments at the fishery level, and therefore shared among vessels, 
are provided by the state. The investment options for fishers are considered to be mutually 
independent, meaning that accepting one investment does not affect the acceptance or rejection of 
*Assessing the investment related to adoption of private incentive mechanisms by fishers can be done using either the
private or societal perspective. This study takes the private perspective, which includes the investment, benefits, and
costs made by fishers. The societal perspective includes investments, benefits, and costs made by the society that
includes fishing company and government.
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other investments. In practice, vessel skippers have the freedom to employ different fishing 
techniques, such as FAD and free school fishing, at different fishing grounds during the year
(Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 2017). Therefore, the possibility of adopting the two incentive 
mechanisms that targets FAD and free school fishing at the same time is feasible.
Assessing the profitability of the two incentive mechanisms determines whether the mechanisms 
have the potential to improve the financial performance of a fishing company. In case both 
investments are not profitable, rational fishers will maintain their current business operation. In the 
case a single investment or the two investments combined are profitable, the investment option that 
has the highest profitability is the recommended option for a fishing company. 
5.4 Materials and methods 
5.4.1 NPV and Equivalent Annual Profit (EAP) Approach 
NPV is used to assess the profitability of investments in ISSF’s recommended eco-FAD designs
and compliance to MSC free-school. Due to the different life cycles of these investments their 
NPVs are made comparable by bringing them back to Equivalent Annual Profits (EAP). 
The NPV is the difference between the present value of cash inflows and the present value of cash 
outflows. All projects that have a positive NPV are profitable and are recommended to be accepted. 
The formula for calculating NPV is followed from Barry et al. (2000) and Kay et al. (1994) and is 
presented as:
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = −𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + ∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡(1+𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡1 + 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(1+𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 .
The INV is the initial investments, NCF is the net cash inflow during the period t, which is yearly 
additional fishing revenues generated from the investment in incentive mechanism minus annual 
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additional operating cash expenses, i is the discount rate, and V is the terminal value based on the 
life cycle of investments made on private incentive mechanisms. 
The formula to calculate the EAP is:
C = 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)1 − (1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)−𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
where C is the equivalent annual profit cash flows, NPV is the net present value, i is the discount 
rate, and n is the number of periods. 
5.4.2 Data 
Calculating the NPV requires information on the level of investment, cash inflows and cash 
outflows, the discount rate, and the terminal value of investment. The data collection is a 
combination of primary and secondary data. Primary data include interviews with five experts on 
sustainable FADs in 2017 and with 10 skippers and mechanics in PNG in 2014, and 55 skippers 
survey in General Santos in 2013-2014. Secondary data involve scientific literature, technical 
reports, and websites of government, tuna industry, and NGOs like MSC and ISSF.  
NPV is calculated for fishers with different levels of risk aversion based on Tolentino-Zondervan et 
al. (2017).  ‘Somewhat risk averse’ and ‘very risk averse’ classifications are used from that study to 
demonstrate the effect of risk aversion on the NPV. Somewhat risk averse fishers have a higher 
number of fishing days (208 FAD fishing days and 157 free school fishing days) than very risk 
averse fishers (106 FAD fishing days and 84 free school fishing days). Tables 5.1 and 5.2 
summarise the cost and revenues which are needed for the computation of the NPV for eco-FADs 
and for MSC free school for initial year 2015.  
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Table 5.1 The cost and revenues using traditional FADs versus using eco-FADs, per risk aversion, 2015
Somewhat risk averse Very risk averse
Item Units Traditional
FADs
Using eco-FADs Difference in
costs and
revenue
Traditional
FADs
Using eco-FADs Difference in
costs and
revenue
Investments (in ‘000) US$ 123.68 (123.68) 123.680 (123.68)
Cash inflow
• Price (in ‘000) US$ mt-1 1.17 1.29 (0.12) 1.17 1.29 (0.12)
• Yield Mt year-1 4,490 4,490 0 1,299 1,299
Revenue (price x yield in
‘000)
US$ mt-1year-1 5,253.30 5,792.1 538.80 1,519.83 1,675.51 155.68
Cash outflows (in ‘000)
• Fuels US$ vessel-1year-1 499.2 499.2 0 254.4 254.4 0
• Crew labour (share of
fishers @20%
revenue)
US$ vessel-1year-1 1,050.66 1,158.42 107.76 303.97 335.10 31.13
• Share of skippers and
mechanics
US$ vessel-1year-1 925.86 1,033.62 107.76 240.37 271.50 31.13
• Costs of VDS US$ vessel-1year-1 540.6 540.6
• Cost of VMS US$ vessel-1year-1 11.22 11.22
• Annual maintenance
costs
US$ vessel-1year-1 40 80 40 40 80 40
• Non-entangling
dFADs
US$ vessel-1year-1 15.8 15.8
Total variable costs 3,067.40 3,338.66 271.32 838.74 941 102.26
Net cash inflow 267.48 53.42
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Table 5.2 The cost and revenues with and without MSC free school per risk aversion, 2015
Units Somewhat risk averse Very risk averse
Item Without MSC With MSC Difference in
costs and
revenue
Without MSC With MSC Difference 
in costs
and 
revenue
Investments (in ‘000) US$ 193.5 193.5
Cash inflow
• Price (in ‘000) US$ mt-1 1.17 1.29 1.17 1.29
• Yield Mt year-1 2,068.55 2,171.98 1,106.74 1,162.08
Revenue (price x yield in
‘000)
US$ mt-1year-1 2,420.20 2,801.85 381.65 1,294.89 1,499.08 204.19
Cash outflow
• Fuels US$ vessel-1year-1 828.96 753.60 75.36 443.52 403.20 40.32
• Labour (share of fishers
@20% revenue)
US$ vessel-1year-1 484.04 560.37 (76.33) 258.98 299.82 (40.84)
• Share of skippers and
mechanics (35% of net
revenue)
US$ vessel-1year-1 276.80 520.76 (243.96) 148.10 278.62 (130.52)
• MSC observer US$ vessel-1year-1 0 4.71 (4.71) 0 2.52 (2.52)
• Costs of VDS US$ vessel-1year-1 816.40 816.40 (0) 436.80 436.80 (0)
• Cost of VMS US$ vessel-1year-1 16.642 16.642 (0) 8.90 8.90 (0)
Total variable costs (in
‘000)
US$ year-1 2,422.84 2,672.48 249.64 1,296.3 1,429.86 133.56
Net cash inflow 132.01 70.63
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5.4.2.1 ISSF eco-FAD investment 
The two types of eco-FADs promoted by ISSF have different lifespans. Non-entangling dFADs last 
for less than a year and biodegradable aFADs are usable for two years. Only investments with 
duration of more than one year are considered in this study, meaning that investments in 
biodegradable aFADs will be incorporated in the model, while non-entangling dFAD will be 
considered as annual costs. The investment for a biodegradable aFAD is twice as large as the 
investment required for a traditional aFAD (MRAG, 2017); the latter amounting to US$3,092 based 
on data from fishers in General Santos in the Philippines. A purse seine vessel is allowed to have a 
maximum of 40 FADs, making the costs of transition to biodegradable aFADs to US$123,680 per 
vessel.
The cash inflow from ISSF eco-FADs is the difference in revenue between using traditional FADs 
and ISSF recommendations for eco-FADs. In order to arrive at the cash inflow, multiple steps are 
taken. First, the price of regular skipjack tuna is projected for years 2016-2017 (Figure  5.3) based 
on a linear trend line from the average monthly skipjack prices from 2010-2015 (Atuna, 2014). 
Second, the price for skipjack caught on eco-FADs was calculated by adding 10% to the projected 
prices of regular skipjack tuna. Third, FAD catches from 2010-2015 from the Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Commission (Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 2016) were 
plotted and were fitted in a trend line, which is used to obtain the equation and to predict skipjack 
catches of 2016 and 2017 (refer to Figure  5.3). Based on interviews with experts and from Goujon 
et al. (2012), catches from both traditional and eco-FADs are considered equal. Fourth, yearly 
revenues were calculated for both using traditional and eco-FADs, by multiplying the product of 
skipjack catches and prices on the number of FAD fishing days allocated per year (Tolentino-
Zondervan et al., 2017). 
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Figure 5.3 Projection of regular skipjack prices and skipjack prices caught on eco-FADs (top) 
and of skipjack catches using FADs in archipelagic and EEZ waters (bottom), 2016-2017 
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Cash outflow was then calculated as the difference in total yearly costs of traditional versus non-
entangling dFADs and biodegradable aFADs. The variable costs for fishing operation include (1) 
daily fuel costs at US$2,400 (3,000L*US$0.80/L) (Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 2017); (2) costs of 
labour (20% of revenue) (Vera & Hipolito, 2006); (3) share of skippers and mechanics (25% of net 
revenue that is total revenue minus fuel and labour costs); (4) cost of a fishing day under the VDS 
estimated at US$5,200 per day based on 30% yearly growth rate of VDS (Les & Clark, 2014); and 
(5) variable costs of VMS assumed to be US$0.11 per fishing day (Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 
2017). The variable costs related to FADs consist of two items. First, twice yearly repair and 
maintenance of biodegradable aFADs valued at US$80,000 per year (US$1000 per aFAD ×40 
aFADs ×2 times per year) (Sharp, 2011). Second, improvements to non-entangling dFADs, which 
amount to US$15,250 per year based on the difference in cost of non-entangling dFAD (US$184) 
and of old entangling dFAD (US$31) (Goñi et al., 2015), multiplied by the average dFAD usage per 
vessel of 100 dFADs per year (Morgan, 2011 p.p.2; Scott G. P. & Lopez, 2014). 
Investment in ISSF is assumed to be financed by the private equity of fishers’ since the level of 
investment is relatively small compared to the yearly income generated by a Filipino purse seine 
vessel (Cruz-Trinidad, 2003). Following this assumption, the discount rate, which is subjective and 
varies per fisher, is assumed to be 10% in this study based on the consensus on required return on 
investment of fishers on sustainable fish (Lallemand et al., 2016). The investment is assumed to be 
fully depreciated after two years.
5.4.2.2 MSC free school compliant participation 
Investment in MSC compliant fishing amounts to US$193,395. This figure includes (1) an 
estimated US$150,000 investment in upgrading the engine capacity of vessels to at least 2500 HP 
(2237.1 kW) in order to efficiently move with free school tuna (World Wide Power Products, 2017);
(2) investment in a bird radar estimated at US$ 34,000 (based on interviews with vessel mechanics); 
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(3) a fish finder estimated at US$2,400 (Furuno brand); and (4) a scanning sonar valued at $6,995
(Boating Magazine, 2001). 
The cash inflow derived from MSC compliant fishing is calculated as the difference in revenues 
from yearly skipjack catches using upgraded engine and fishing technologies (receiving the non-
MSC landing price with a 10% premium) minus the revenues from yearly skipjack catches using 
old vessel engine. The method for calculating cash inflow for ISSF eco-FADs is also employed for 
the MSC compliance. First, the trend line equation for regular skipjack prices in ISSF case is 
extended for years 2016-2020 to project the prices for non-MSC compliant fishing (see Figure  5.4) 
using the average annual skipjack prices from 2010 to 2015 (Atuna, 2014). The trend line equation 
obtained above is extended to the period 2016-2020 (see Figure  5.4). Second, the price for MSC 
caught skipjack tuna is calculated by adding an additional 10% to the projected prices of regular 
skipjack tuna. Third, daily free school catches of a DWFN Philippine vessels are predicted based on 
the yearly free school skipjack catches from 2010-2015 (Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission, 2016). Similar to skipjack prices, the daily free school skipjack catches were fitted in 
a trend line (in Figure  5.4) to determine the trend line equation for 2016-2020. Catches for vessels 
without an improved engine and free school fishing technologies is used as the basis of this 
calculation. It is assumed that renovated vessels have a 5% increase in free school catch (Tidd et al., 
2015). Finally, vessel revenues are calculated based on fishing days used for MSC free school 
fishing (see Table  5.2).   
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Figure 5.4 Projection of skipjack prices without and with MSC (top) and of free school
skipjack catches for vessels with old engine and with upgraded engine (bottom), 2016-2020 
The cash outflow for MSC compliant vessels is calculated as the difference between the variable 
costs for upgrading a vessel engine and fishing technologies and the costs incurred by pre-
investment vessels (see Table  5.2). The variable costs follow from the costs of fishing operation 
outlined for the ISSF eco-FADs, with three modifications. First, the costs of fuel for free school 
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fishing (with MSC) is assumed to be US$4,800/day, based on 6,000 L fuel consumption on free 
school and US$0.80/L fuel price in 2015. However, upgrading a vessel engine reduces fuel 
consumption by a reported 10% (Notti & Sala, 2012), meaning the fuel price without MSC is 
US$5280. Second, the share of skippers and mechanics on MSC compliance vessels is 35% of net 
revenue (Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 2017), or 10% higher than FAD and non-MSC regular free 
school fishing. Third, the costs of MSC observer is US$30/fishing day (Tolentino-Zondervan et al., 
2017). 
The assumed discount rate is similar to the case of ISSF, which is 10%, based on the required return 
on investment of fishers on sustainable fish. The terminal value in the case of MSC is based on an 
assumed 5-year lifecycle of the vessel engine. The initial year for investment in MSC compliant 
fishing is 2015, with the projection covering the renewed certification period of the fishery from 
2016 to 2020.
5.4.2.3 Investment in both ISSF’s sustainable FADs and MSC free school 
The NPV of the combined investments in ISSF’s eco-FADs and MSC free school are calculated 
based on the investments, prices, catches, costs, and discount rate for these two mechanisms. 
Combining these two investments required finding the least common multiple years for the two year 
time horizon of ISSF eco-FADs and five years horizon of MSC certification. This makes the time 
horizon of combined investments ten years. The investment for eco-FADs is then made every two 
years while for MSC free school fishing is made every five years. The projections for prices, 
catches, and costs are also extended for the period of 10 years from 2016 to 2025. 
5.4.3 Monte Carlo Simulation 
To incorporate the uncertainty of revenues, initial investments, and operating expenses used in the 
NPV calculation, a Monte Carlo simulation is applied using @RISK in Excel. First, the type of 
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distribution for all uncertain variables was assigned, as shown in Table  5.3. A normal distribution 
was used for evaluating uncertainties on time series data such as skipjack prices and catches. The 
standard deviations for both catches and prices based on historical data from years 2010-2015 
(Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 2016) were 0.36 for prices and 219.02 for 
catches in the ISSF case, and 0.36 for prices and 173.73 for catches in the MSC case. Triangular 
distributions for assessing the uncertainty of operational costs are based on the minimum most 
likely value (i.e. the mean in this case) and the maximum investment value for operating costs such 
as fuel, VDS, and repair and maintenance of all types of FADs (Ngoc et al., 2016; Valderrama & 
Engle, 2001). Second, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated for price and catch in order 
to control for the values of these two uncertain variables based on the strength and direction of their 
relationships. Using the time series (2010-2015) data of prices and skipjack catches, a correlation 
coefficient of -0.75 was found between skipjack price and catches in ISSF case while it was -0.67 in 
MSC case. The values for costs of labour and share of skippers and mechanics, which are directly 
calculated from revenues (skipjack price*catch), are then also influenced by the correlation 
coefficients. The third step is to simulate the NPVs using 1000 iterations.  
5. 5 Results
5.5.1 Statistical results of NPVs of investment on incentive mechanisms per risk 
aversion 
The mean NPV for investing in (1) ISSF’s sustainable FADs, (2) MSC free school, and (3) both 
mechanisms for somewhat and very risk averse type of fishers are shown in Table  5.4. The mean 
NPVs for three cases of incentive mechanism for somewhat risk averse fishers are all positive, with 
either nearly or 100% probability of having positive NPV. The variation in NPVs based on the 
standard deviations is lowest for MSC, while the combined ISSF and MSC has the highest variation. 
The mean NPVs under the very risk averse type of fishers is positive for the MSC case, while 
negative for ISSF and combination of MSC and ISSF. MSC free school has a 100% probability of a 
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positive NPV. However, for very risk averse fishers the probability of having positive NPV for the 
ISSF case decreases to 30.8% and to 13.2% for investments in both fishing methods.  
Table 5.3 The types of distribution and parameters used for uncertain variables in Monte 
Carlo simulation 
Variables Type of 
distribution 
Mean 
(standard 
deviation)
Minimu
m 
Most 
Likely
Maximum Sources
ISSF’s sustainable FADs
Price (‘000) Normal 1.44 (0.36) Atuna (2014)
Yield Normal 4,347.48
(219.02) 
Western and 
Central 
Pacific 
Fisheries 
Commission 
(2016)
Initial 
investment 
(‘000)
Triangular 100.00 123.68 175.80 Survey
Fuels (‘000) Triangular 468.00 499.20 624.00 Department 
of Energy 
(2016)
Costs of VDS 
(‘000)
Triangular 408.00 530.40 816.00 Les and Clark 
(2014)
Costs of non-
entangling FADs 
(‘000)
Triangular 14.70 15.25 15.80 Goñi et al. 
(2015)
Costs of FAD 
maintenance 
(‘000) 
Triangular 725.00 1,000.00 1,150.00 Beverly et al. 
(2012); Sharp 
(2011);
survey
MSC free school
Price Normal 1.44 (0.36) Atuna (2014)
Yield Normal 2,126.60
(173.73) 
Western and 
Central 
Pacific 
Fisheries 
Commission 
(2016)
Initial 
investment
Triangular 134.38 193.50 234.49 Boating 
Magazine 
(2001);
Furuno USA 
(2017)
Fuels Triangular 716.39 764.15 955.00 Department 
of Energy 
(2016)
Costs of VDS Triangular 628.00 816.40 1,256.00 Les and Clark 
(2014)
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Table 5.4 NPV results and statistics for ISSF’s eco-FADs, MSC free school fishing, and both mechanisms, per risk aversion based on 
simulation with 1000 iterations
Somewhat risk averse Very risk averse
ISSF’s sustainable 
FAD
MSC free 
school
ISSF + MSC ISSF’s sustainable 
FAD
MSC free 
school
ISSF + MSC
Mean NPV (in ‘000 
US$)
419.09 315.59 1,760.43 -28.51 108.47 -125.23
t (number of years) 2 5 10 2 5 10
Standard Deviation 140.77 39.62 515.92 58.02 33.07 114.25
5th percentile 170.86 257.06 858.87 -119.32 56.22 -313.88
95th percentile 642.18 387.57 2,562.54 74.55 164.62 62.27
Probability profit >0 
(%)
99.6 100 99 30.8 100 13.2
Table 5.5 EAP for comparing NPV of investments in ISSF’s eco-FADs, MSC free school, and both mechanisms
Somewha  risk averse Very risk averse
ISSF’s sustainable 
FADs
MSC free 
school
ISSF + MSC ISSF’s sustainable 
FADs
MSC free 
school
ISSF+MSC
Mean NPV (in ‘000 
US$)
419.09 315.59 1,760.43 -28.51 108.47 -125.23
I 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
t (number of years) 2 5 10 2 5 10
Equivalent Annual
Profit (in ‘000 US$)
241.48 83.25 286.50 -16.42 28.61 -20.40
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5.5.2 Equivalent Annual Profits
The three investments in incentive mechanism compliance with different life cycles are compared 
in terms of their EAP (Table  5.5). In general, the EAP of investments in incentive mechanisms by 
somewhat risk averse fishers are higher than those of the very risk averse fishers. The combined 
investment in ISSF and MSC has the highest EAP (US$286,500) among the three investment 
options by somewhat risk averse fishers. Investment in MSC by very risk averse fishers will 
generate an EAP of US$28,610, which is the highest and the only positive annual profit among the 
three investment options for this type of fisher. 
5.6 Discussion 
5.6.1 Risk aversion 
This study has demonstrated the effects of risk aversion on the profitability of investments in 
incentive mechanism compliance, which in turn provides insights into the likelihood of adopting 
these mechanisms and ultimately the impact of these mechanisms on achieving sustainability 
outcomes. Somewhat risk averse fishers are more likely to have a higher NPV as compared to very 
risk averse fishers, and also have a 100% probability of a positive return. As a consequence, 
somewhat risk averse fishers are expected to be more inclined to adopt incentive mechanism and 
therefore improve their fishing practices. The NPV results for very risk averse fishers, which are 
generally lower than somewhat risk averse fishers and negative, would be even less attractive if the 
effect of risk aversion is also accounted for in the discount rate. The choice of discount rate reflects 
both the expected reward and risk premium of an investor (Guerard Jr & Schwartz, 2007).
Therefore, fishers that are more risk averse are therefore expected a higher underlying discount rate 
which takes into account compensation for the perceived risk of their investment. However, a 
higher discount rate means a lower NPV, because cash flows that occur further away in time carry 
less weight in the NPV calculation. This means that investments in incentive mechanisms will be 
generally less appealing than suggested by the results of this study for more risk averse fishers.
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To increase the adoption of incentive mechanisms like MSC and ISSF eco-FADs, associated actors 
such as states or firms can influence the initial fishing strategy of fishers by reducing the perceived 
risk of investment. Reducing the perceived risk of investment might be achieved by controlling for 
risk generated by fluctuating prices and income. Controlling for price risk can be done in at least 
two ways. First, by setting future contracts between two parties who agree on buying and selling an 
asset or a commodity such as fish at a fixed price but delivered and paid for at an agreed date in the 
future. And second, by setting a floor (minimum) price in order to decrease price volatility and to 
guarantee acceptable fish prices to fishers (Peterson & Smith, 1982; Sethi, 2010). Controlling 
income risk can be done by providing a flexible taxation scheme that would allow fishers to cancel 
out low profits or losses through tax deductions in profitable years (Cunningham, 1994). These risk 
reducing strategies have been adopted in other species, for instance in white shrimp (Sanders & 
Manfredo, 2002), demersal fish (Trondsen et al., 2003), and farmed Atlantic salmon (Simioni et al., 
2013).  
By reducing the riskiness of the incentive mechanisms, risk averse fishers may choose different 
fishing strategy to start with, which is in line with enhancing the adoption of incentive mechanism. 
Further research on who will implement decisions (e.g. government, value chain actors, or the 
fishers) and the extent of involvement of these actors in these risk reducing strategies, however, are 
still needed. Alternatively, influencing the NPV of investments such as the ISSF currently doing 
further research on improving the lifespan of eco-FADs while controlling for costs (Moreno et al., 
2016b), will potentially lead to higher NPV and can also therefore encourage risk averse fishers to 
participate. 
5.6.2 Profitability performance of incentive mechanisms  
The results also show that a combination of different incentive mechanisms is the most profitable 
investment for less risk averse fishers. The combined investment in ISSF eco-FAD fishing and 
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MSC free school fishing generates the highest return on investment for somewhat risk averse fishers. 
This finding builds on other observations that multiple gear changes can address the shortfalls of 
any one mechanism and can increase the benefits for both fishery and fishers (Chuenpagdee et al., 
2003; Jenkins & Garrison, 2013).  
Concentrating on eco-FADs alone may address the by-catch of non-target species such as turtles 
and sharks and marine litter, but not the by-catch of juvenile bigeye and yellowfin tunas (MRAG, 
2017). The goal of MSC free school fishing in specifically reducing the catch of associated juvenile 
tuna can therefore increase the sustainability scope of FAD related gear change. At the same time, 
concentrating on MSC free school fishing alone reduces the productivity of fishery due to a lower 
success rate of fishing on free school as compared to FAD fishing (Guillotreau et al., 2011). The 
flexibility of MSC compliant vessels to fish on both free schools and FADs in a single fishing trip 
also raises issues about the reliability of the MSC certification to address overall impact of purse 
seining (see Moreno et al., 2016a). However, purely undertaking MSC free school fishing may not 
be the most economically efficient strategy for fishers based on the success rate of free school 
fishing (Guillotreau et al., 2011), and may eventually lead to a lower adoption of MSC. Therefore 
using eco-FADs not only complements the limitations of MSC certification to deal with 
sustainability across the entire purse seine fishery, but also makes the fishing operation even more 
profitable than MSC compliant fishing alone. Given the 100% probability of a positive return for 
investment in MSC compliant fishing for somewhat and very risk averse fishers, it is likely to 
remain the most attractive investment option for fishers. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This study draws three new insights on the profitability of investments by Filipino fishers in ISSF’s 
eco-FAD design and MSC compliant free school fishing. First, the level of risk aversion determines 
the extent that the NPV of investments in incentive mechanisms is profitable. Second, investing in 
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different incentive mechanisms that target different fishing practices is the most profitable option 
for somewhat risk averse fishers. Third, the MSC has the potential to perform far better among 
other mechanisms based on the robustness of investments in this mechanism by fishers across a 
broader spectrum of risk attitude. 
As a consequence of these findings, the value chain actors and the government supporting the 
implementation of these incentive mechanisms should incorporate risk reducing strategies in the 
design of incentive mechanisms to involve the broadest range of fishers. Risk reducing strategies 
could include using future contracts to reduce price volatility and improving the lifespan of 
investments in the mechanisms, such as the usability of FADs. Governments may intervene on fish 
prices, such as implementing floor prices to secure fishers from lower fish prices and/or may 
establish flexible taxation schemes to reduce the risk caused by fluctuation of fishers’ income. By 
increasing the participation of different types of fishers, the application of different private incentive 
mechanisms will potentially improve the overall sustainability of the fishery.
Future research is needed to assess this model empirically and to evaluate the public benefits 
accrued from both state and private investments in incentive mechanisms, including both financial 
returns and the improved health of tuna stocks and other associated marine organisms.  
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Chapter 6 
General Discussion and Conclusion 
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6.1. Introduction 
This dissertation started from the premise that unsustainable fishing practices, including the use of 
non-selective fishing methods and IUU fishing, have contributed to the decline of tuna fish stocks
globally. The perceived failure of the government to address unsustainable fishing practices of 
fishers has led to the rise of private incentive mechanisms as innovative instruments to enhance the 
sustainability of many fisheries including tuna (Grafton et al., 2006; Jack et al., 2008; Pascoe et al., 
2010). However, research on private incentive mechanisms has been biased towards either large or 
small scale fishers (Chand et al., 2003; Froese et al., 2011; Haward & Bergin, 2001; Kaczynski & 
Fluharty, 2002). The so called ‘missing’ middle-scale fishers, which include much of the Filipino 
tuna vessels, have received far less attention. As such the main objective of this dissertation was to 
evaluate the extent to which private incentive mechanisms influence the decision of Filipino tuna 
fishers to improve their fishing practices. 
The overall objective of the dissertation was addressed in four research chapters. Chapter two 
analysed and compared the ways existing private incentive mechanisms in tuna fisheries that 
include FIPs, MSC, and ISSF influence the upgrading strategies of Filipino tuna fishers in the value 
chain. Chapter three evaluated the important determinants for small-scale fishers’ decision to 
participate in two FIPs in Occidental Mindoro, Philippines. Chapter four modelled and evaluated 
the allocation of fishing days of Filipino purse seiners in response to MSC and based on this 
allocation, the influence of MSC on the level of income and risk of fishers. Finally, chapter five 
evaluated the profitability of investments in MSC and ISSF by Filipino purse seine fishers. 
This final chapter of the dissertation proceeds in the next section with a synthesis of the main results 
from the research chapters. Next, the chapter reflects on the theoretical insights offered by this 
dissertation on private incentive mechanisms using the decision making and global value chain 
theories, and on the methodological contribution of this dissertation. The final section then provides 
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recommendations for fishery managers and value chain actors to improve the future design and 
implementation of incentive mechanisms; for policy makers this chapter recommends how to 
enhance the adoption of private incentive mechanisms by fishers. Finally, recommendations are 
given for future research. 
6.2 Synthesis of the main results 
Two key themes emerge from the results presented in the four research chapters. The first theme is 
the role of fisher capabilities as a requirement for responding to the goals of incentive mechanisms 
and in doing so upgrade their production through the value chain. This theme was dealt with 
directly in chapters two and three. The focus on capabilities enables an understanding of whether 
producers can upgrade in the value chain under private incentive mechanisms and what type of 
upgrading strategies these producers can implement based on their capabilities given that they are 
willing to upgrade. The second theme focuses on the influence of risk attitude on the tactical and 
strategic decision making of fishers under private incentive mechanisms in chapters four and five.  
6.2.1 Capabilities for upgrading in the value chain 
As outlined in the introduction chapter, the capabilities of an individual are key to their achievement 
of functions and/or strategies for realising endowments (Sen, 1993). These capabilities are not 
inherently intrinsic, they are also influenced by the internal structure of the value chain and the 
wider public and private institutions outside the value chain (Giuliani et al., 2005; Robeyns, 2005).
This broader definition of capabilities in this dissertation opens up an improved understanding of 
how the different private incentive mechanisms work in tuna value chains and how private incentive 
mechanisms can improve the participation of fishers in transitions towards fishing techniques that 
are deemed desirable for achieving sustainable tuna production.  
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In order to understand how private incentive mechanisms in tuna fishery operate in the value chain, 
chapter two evaluated and compared the existing capabilities of the target fishers against the 
requirements of private incentive mechanisms in tuna fisheries that include FIPs, MSC, and ISSF. 
The results in this chapter show that different types of fishers develop varying levels of capabilities 
based on the influence of chain and non-chain actors. Reflecting the findings of other studies, 
capabilities enable (or disable) fishers to participate in incentive mechanisms and ultimately 
determine the type of upgrading strategies that participating fishers can implement (Kaplinsky, 
2000b; Morrison et al., 2008). The results of chapter two show that the majority of the target fishers 
in FIPs still lack the required capabilities to upgrade their production, while a few FIP participants 
developed capabilities through the support of the fisher association. Fishers involved in the MSC 
possess higher level capabilities to not only increase the value of their tuna by upgrading their 
product and processes, but also functionally upgrade through the establishment of joint venture 
company with local processors. Finally, fishers involved in the ISSF also demonstrably have the 
capabilities and potentially improved their vertical coordination by strengthening their relationships 
with ISSF processors and related traders. 
Based on these results, chapter two provided three insights on how private incentive mechanisms 
work in the value chain. First, the incentives offered by these private mechanisms are not delivered 
to fishers in a linear way because: (i) the vertical actors determine whether and how the incentives 
will be delivered to fishers; and (ii) horizontal actors influenced fishers’ capabilities to realise this 
incentive. This insight is contrary to literature that focuses on the role of market incentives as the 
main way of bringing about changes in the practices of producers (Grafton et al., 2006; Hilborn, 
2007a). Second, private incentive mechanisms target different kinds of fishers that vary in their 
levels of capabilities. And third, the incentives built into these mechanisms are so far not able to 
match short-term food security and income goals, nor long-term income and risk minimization
goals. The result is a lower overall participation by fishers. This finding is consistent with other 
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research findings that also show that fishers receive incentives for participation in the mechanisms, 
but in doing so do not necessarily respond the way that the mechanism intended (Blomquist et al., 
2015; Phillips et al., 2008; Ponte, 2012). These insights provide key considerations in the future 
implementation of private incentive mechanisms in tuna fisheries as well as other global 
commodities. 
In further support of the literature on private incentive mechanisms (Giuliani et al., 2005; Kaplinsky 
et al., 2003; Pérez-Ramírez et al., 2012a), this dissertation argues that capabilities are key 
understanding why or why not fishers work towards sustainability. Chapter three analysed the 
factors and capabilities that influence handline fishers’ decision to participate in two FIPs. The case 
of FIP is used because FIP participant fishers need the most attention in terms of improving the 
capabilities for participation based on the findings in chapter two, while fishers in the cases of MSC 
and ISSF already possess the capabilities to participate in incentive mechanisms. The outcome of 
chapter three shows that fishers possess different capabilities, which determines the types of FIPs 
that they participate in. The individual firm capabilities, which are possessed by few fishers in FIPs, 
strongly influence fishers to participate in market-oriented (top-down) FIPs while the collective 
capabilities that are possessed by the majority of fishers enable them to improve their fishing 
practices in order to participate in development-oriented (bottom-up) FIPs. Moreover, the majority 
of the fishers only partially participate in FIP because they do not possess the capabilities to a 
sufficient degree. Thus these fishers still need improvement in capabilities in order to fully 
participate in market-oriented FIPs, which will enable them to finally realise the incentives for 
participation and to contribute to fishery sustainability. This finding builds on studies (Giuliani et 
al., 2005; Kaplinsky et al., 2003; Perez-Aleman, 2013) that emphasize the importance of supporting 
the development of capabilities of more fishers, which in turn contributes to their decision to 
participate in incentive mechanisms and eventually lead to sustainability outcomes. 
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Contrary to literature that focuses on the creation of economic incentives for changing practices of 
fishers (Grafton et al., 2006; Kremen et al., 2000), the outcome of chapters two and three clearly 
show that capabilities of fishers are an enabling and/or limiting factor in the fisher decision making. 
Therefore focusing on capabilities, in addition to the delivery of economic incentives to fishers, is 
an important step in understanding how to increase participation by fishers in private incentive 
mechanisms (Perez-Aleman, 2013; Perez-Aleman & Sandilands, 2008). 
6.2.2 Tactical and strategic decision making under uncertainty 
The effects of risk attitude on the levels of income and risks and on the tactical (short-term) and 
strategic (long-term) decisions of fishers has been widely addressed in the fisheries literature
(Bockstael & Opaluch, 1983; Dupont, 1993; Eggert & Tveteras, 2004; Mistiaen & Strand, 2000;
Nguyen & Leung, 2009). However, none of these studies have analysed these effects in the context 
of private incentive mechanisms. This dissertation addressed this literature gap in chapters four and 
five. Chapter four evaluated the effect of incentive mechanisms on tactical decisions (choice of 
activity) of fishers that vary in risk aversion. Chapter five evaluated the profitability of investments 
(strategic decisions) in equipment that is needed to comply with incentive mechanisms. Together, 
these two chapters contribute to the literature on private incentive mechanisms and fisher decision 
making in two ways. First, these chapters provide a more elaborate understanding how fishers 
respond to incentives, in contrast to the traditional notion that fishers simply change practices based 
on the incentives of private incentive mechanisms (Grafton et al., 2006; Hilborn, 2007b). Second, 
they provide insight on the extent to which these mechanisms are effective in changing the fishing 
practices of fishers in the short- and in the long-term (e.g. Eliasen et al., 2013; Hicks & Schnier, 
2008; Lallemand et al., 2016).  
The results of chapters four and five show that the extent to which private incentive mechanisms 
like MSC and ISSF incentivise fishers depends on the fisher’s degree of risk aversion. Chapter four 
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shows that adopting MSC free school generally increases the income of purse seine fishers with 
different levels of risk aversion, and therefore clearly incentivises fishers to adopt practices that are 
believed to contribute to sustainable fishery. The outcome of chapter five also strengthens the 
finding of chapter four by showing that in the long-run, the return on investments for fishers in 
MSC is positive regardless of risk aversion. This result is similar with the findings of Lallemand et 
al. (2016), who shows that fishers will receive the incentives to invest in new equipment in order to 
comply with MSC requirements. The results from the ISSF case, however, are more ambiguous 
as they suggest that only fishers with low risk aversion will benefit from positive returns on their 
investment in ISSF eco-FADs, while fishers with higher risk aversion face lower and even 
negative returns on their investments. This supports the fisheries literature, which suggests that the 
risk aversion of fishers is positively related to their compliance with sustainable standards and 
regulations (Brick et al., 2012; Smith & Wilen, 2005), which enable them to realise the incentives 
of the mechanisms. In addition, the results of chapter five also show that investing in both 
mechanisms is the most profitable strategy for fishers that are less risk averse. Overall, these 
findings build on other observations that multiple gear changes can address the limitations of any 
one mechanism and at the same time can increase the benefits for both fishery and fishers 
(Chuenpagdee et al., 2003; Jenkins & Garrison, 2013). 
The results of chapters four and five also show that the risk attitude of fishers determines the 
decision of fishers on the extent to change their practices, which in turn influences the risk and the 
expected income of fishers. Consistent with studies that analyse the effect of risk aversion on 
compliance of fishers on sustainable measures (Brick et al., 2012; Cinner et al., 2011), the results of 
chapter four show that the less risk averse fishers (e.g. somewhat and rather risk averse) are those 
most willing to adopt MSC compliant free school fishing. Based on their level of risk aversion, 
fishers increase their MSC fishing days which at the same time leads to higher income and 
associated risk due to fluctuation in prices and catches. Conversely, the more risk averse fishers are 
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the less likely to allocate fishing days to MSC compliant free school fishing. This leads to lower 
income and lower risk for these fishers. Similar to other studies (Christensen & Raakjær, 2006;
Gelcich et al., 2007), the results of chapter 4 suggest that in a multi-gear fishery, fishers should not 
be seen as an homogenous group.  
In chapter five, the risk aversion of fishers to uncertainty in prices, catches, and other operating 
costs, are shown to influence the profitability of investing in compliance to private incentive 
mechanisms. The results suggest that fishers with low risk aversion are more likely to have high 
NPV of investments in incentive mechanisms. Therefore, they are more likely to adopt the incentive 
mechanisms. However, investing in incentive mechanisms for very risk averse fishers is less 
attractive since the probability of having positive NPV of investments is small for this type of 
fishers. Reducing the risks in implementing the incentive mechanisms will therefore attract these 
very risk averse fishers to change their initial fishing strategy into more sustainable fishing days. 
The results of both chapters 4 and 5 run contrary to the wider literature on fisher decisions in 
response to market incentives (e.g. Antle & Diagana, 2003; Grafton et al., 2006; Grafton et al., 
2008). Instead of reacting to price and/or market access directly, the results show that the risk 
attitudes of fishers play a role in changing their practices in order to realise these incentives. When 
combined with capabilities, this dissertation presents a more nuanced understanding of how private 
incentive mechanisms work – especially in developing world fisheries.
6.3 Private incentive mechanisms 
The results of this dissertation provide an improved understanding of the influence that private 
incentive mechanisms can have on fisher’ decision making on upgrading to more sustainable 
fishing practices. In doing so this dissertation questions the assumption that private incentive 
mechanisms allocate adequate proper incentives to fishers to change the behaviour of fishers 
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towards more sustainable fishing practices (Grafton et al., 2006; Hilborn, 2007a). The expectation 
that incentive mechanisms can shape sustainability related decisions through a narrow set of 
economic incentives is explained by Expected Utility theory, which assumes that fishers are rational 
individuals that are expected to improve their fishing practices in response to the incentives offered 
by these mechanisms (Schoemaker, 1982). In contrast, this dissertation argues that individual 
decision making is not only influenced by economic factors, but also by the social institutions of 
government, NGOs, and community within which individual operate (Granovetter, 1985). More 
specifically the results point to the extent to which fishers are capable to engage in private incentive 
mechanisms, given their wider institutional embeddedness, and their risk attitude to income and 
risks.
The use of these analytical concepts does not only contribute to understanding the decision making 
of fishers, but also to what constitutes a successful private incentive mechanism for sustainable 
primary production (e.g. Cocklin et al., 2007; Richards, 2000). The following section defines and 
explains the three key pillars that can drive the success of private incentive mechanisms for 
reaching its sustainability goals. These pillars are incentives, inclusiveness, and improvement, all of 
which are recurring themes in this dissertation and in the literature on private incentive mechanisms
(e.g. Bush et al., 2013; Giovannucci & Ponte, 2005; Hanley et al., 2012; Leadbitter et al., 2006).
They also provide a basis for new insights on the role of private incentive mechanisms in guiding 
decision making for sustainability improvements in fisheries as well as other sectors.
6.3.1. Incentives 
Much of the literature on private incentive mechanisms views incentive as the key driver for 
changing the practices of producers (Antle & Diagana, 2003; Grafton et al., 2006; Jack et al., 2008;
Pascual & Perrings, 2007). Therefore, private incentive mechanisms are designed to create ‘market’ 
incentives as a reward for sustainably changing the practices of producers (Marine Stewardship 
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Council, 2011). It is assumed that producers will respond and will get this incentive once they 
change their practices. As opposed to this argument, this dissertation found out that tuna fishers do 
not simply respond to incentives of private incentive mechanisms because two factors influence the 
way they see incentives. 
The first factor is the delivery of incentives. This study has shown that the incentives are not 
delivered simply to producers responding to the requirements of private incentive mechanisms in 
the value chain. Instead, the delivery of incentives to producers is determined by the economic 
relationship between producers and value chain actors (see Bolwig et al., 2010a; Dolan & 
Humphrey, 2000; Nadvi, 2008). As shown in chapter two, rent-seeking behaviour of value chain 
actors such as Casas and exporters in PPTST FIP case (chapters 2 and 3) and the brand members 
and processors in the ISSF case (chapter 2 and 5) make them more able to capture a higher portion 
of the incentive being offered by the private incentive mechanisms. As a consequence, fishers may 
find the economic value of the incentives insufficient to compensate for their costs and risks of 
upgrading.  
The MSC case (chapters 2, 4 and 5) similarly demonstrates that the delivery of incentives is 
influenced by the support given to fishers to building the necessary capabilities to recognise and 
respond to economic incentives. By supporting the development of producer capabilities, either the 
producers are able to upgrade and receive the incentives or other forms of incentives are created at 
the fisher level; such as generation of extra income for conserving the fishery, trainings, capacity 
buildings, and information, and subsidies and funding generated by the fisher association (Kiss, 
2004; McNeely, 1988; Robins et al., 2000). This has been shown in the case of FIP. Moreover, the 
FIP case also shows the importance of non-tangible benefits to producers based on their 
participation such as the feeling of inclusiveness, feeling of purpose, and emotional commitment for 
the community (e.g. Van Hecken & Bastiaensen, 2010). Together these results build on a relatively 
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marginal observation in the economic literature (e.g. Giuliani et al., 2005; Leimona et al., 2009) that 
private incentive mechanisms not only offer ‘market’ incentives but also non-economic incentives 
for producers.  
The second factor is the risk attitude of producers, which determines the preference and extent 
fishers make changes in their fishing practices under private incentive mechanisms. Building on 
works that focus on fisher behaviour in response to economic risks (e.g. Branch et al., 2006; Fulton 
et al., 2011), all cases of private incentive mechanisms investigated in this dissertation show that 
only less risk averse fishers are able to capture the incentives offered by these mechanisms given 
their higher willingness to participate. For instance, chapter three shows that less risk averse fishers 
choose to participate in Artesmar FIP, therefore enabling them to realise the market incentive
offered by this type of FIP. In contrast, highly risk averse fishers choose to partially participate in 
development-oriented FIPs, but are unable to realise the incentives on offer. This situation is highly 
observable in small-scale fisheries in developing countries because of the tied-credit relations of 
these fishers with Casas and the lack of motivation of buyers to move to quality form of buying
(Pérez-Sánchez & Muir, 2003; Ruddle, 2011; von Essen et al., 2013). In chapter four, the less risk 
averse fishers choose to increase their MSC fishing days, which leads to higher income and 
therefore allows them to materialise the incentives for participation. The results in chapter five 
suggest that less risk averse fishers decide to do more fishing days, which results in an increase in 
profitability of investments associated with private incentive mechanisms. 
The third factor is an outcome of the influence of the institutions on building the capabilities of 
producers on the risk attitude of producers to adopt the mechanisms. Building the capabilities of 
producers reduces the perceived risk of producers to upgrade production (Murphy C & P., 2008),
which in turn can lead to an increased willingness of producers to participate in private incentive 
mechanisms. Coming full circle, this then allows them to realise the incentives for participation. At 
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the same time, by improving capabilities and influencing the risk perception of fishers, more fishers 
could start adopting private incentive mechanisms which may further spread the adoption to other 
fishers. 
6.3.2. Inclusiveness 
Private incentive mechanisms seek to provide opportunities for developing country producers, to 
access higher value markets in the value chain (Buller & Morris, 2004; Gullison, 2003; Lee et al., 
2012; MacDonald, 2007). To realise this opportunity producers need the ability to comply with the 
requirements for participation in the value chain through which private incentive mechanisms are 
applied (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; Nadvi, 2008; Ponte, 2008a; Schmitz & Knorringa, 2000; Tran 
et al., 2013). The extent to which a producer is able to participate or not in the value chain then 
determines the level of inclusiveness of private incentive mechanisms (Berdegué et al., 2008).
Building on the findings of chapter 2 in this dissertation, the inclusiveness of producers is then a 
function of both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of coordination and institutional embedding 
in and around the value chain (Bolwig et al., 2010a; Bush & Oosterveer, 2007; Bush & Oosterveer, 
2012).  
The degree of inclusiveness is therefore determined by the requirements of incentive mechanisms 
and by the capabilities of producers. Inclusiveness influences the decision making of producers to 
adopt private incentive mechanisms. If private incentive mechanisms set high requirements for 
changing towards sustainable practices, more capable producers have the advantage of complying 
with these requirements while the less capable producers face difficulty that may results for their 
exclusion in the value chain (Bush et al., 2013; Pérez-Ramírez et al., 2012a). The danger of highly 
exclusive private incentive mechanisms is that they have the tendency to contribute less to 
sustainability because only few producers change their practices (California Environmental 
Associates, 2015).  
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Next to inclusiveness in the value chain, private incentive mechanisms also manifest inclusiveness 
in the mechanisms themselves. The degree of inclusiveness of private incentive mechanisms 
increase when the mechanisms address a wider group of actors at institutional level. Private 
incentive mechanisms bring together chain and non-chain actors that include the government and 
NGOs in order to push for the sustainability of the production area (Miller, 2014). These 
institutional actors influence and enable the development of capabilities of producers to upgrade 
using private incentive mechanisms, which then enhances the inclusion of producers in the chain. In 
the case of tuna fisheries, NGOs such as WWF, government, value chain actors, and fisher 
associations in PPTST FIP work together in order to improve the fishers’ capabilities that are 
needed for participation in the value chain. For MSC certification of the PNA, the PNA government 
made investments in certifications and VMS that enable producers to comply with the requirements 
of MSC. In the ISSF case, there is less involvement by the government but the ISSF themselves as 
an NGO invested in research for improving the sustainability of FAD fishery.  
Inclusion is not necessarily good per se. Despite offering opportunity to producers, private incentive 
mechanisms at the same time expose producers to risks originating from the choice of mechanism, 
price and yield fluctuations, stringent market competition, and business transactions (Bolwig et al., 
2010a). Building on the results of chapters four and five, the economic value of the incentive of 
private incentive mechanism should be able to compensate for the increase in risks and costs of 
upgrading practices by fishers, in order to be inclusive of a wider group of fishers that vary in risk 
aversion.  
6.3.3. Improvement  
There is a normative notion that private incentive mechanisms should lead to improvements of the 
environment and of the economic situation of producers (Engel et al., 2008; Fisher et al., 2008). The 
sustainable improvements in the environment depends on the environmental issues that private 
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incentive mechanisms try to address, such as reduction in carbon emission by the energy and 
manufacturing sectors, long-term viability of fish stocks in the fishery, and conservation of soils in 
the agriculture sector (Antle & Diagana, 2003; Kinzig et al., 2011). Improvements in the economic 
situation of producers can either be in the form of alleviating their poverty or improving their way 
of living and having a sustainable source of income in both the short- and long-term (Jack et al., 
2008).  
This dissertation argues that the pathway towards improvement is dependent on whether or not a 
fisher can improve their practices before they can reap the economic benefits before the fishery as a 
whole can become more sustainable. The notion of improvement in the  production practices of 
producers under private incentive mechanisms is referred to as ‘sustainable upgrading’ strategy,
because producers make improvements in their practices based on compliance with sustainability 
standards set by the wider institutions and the value chain actors (e.g. Jeppesen & Hansen, 2004;
Kaplinsky, 2010; Marchi et al., 2013). Producers make improvements in their practices in the short-
term (tactically) and in the long-term (strategically). Producers that are incorporated in the value 
chain through the incentive mechanisms will make continuous improvements in their practices as 
long as the economic incentive of their participation covers the increase in costs and risks 
associated with the dynamic and increasing requirements in the value chain. In case that the trade-
off between income and risks is not any more favourable to producers, producers might 
‘functionally downgrade’ (Ponte & Ewert, 2009), which means that they go back to their traditional 
practices instead of doing improvements.  
6.3.4. Interrelationship between the 3Is  
The three I’s presented - incentive, inclusiveness, and improvement - are interrelated with each 
other in terms of driving the success of private incentive mechanisms towards sustainability 
(Figure  6.1). As shown in Figure  6.1 (part A), the incentive is traditionally viewed to have a direct 
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linear relationship with improvements in the environment (Jack et al., 2008; Marine Stewardship 
Council, 2011). However, this dissertation shows that this relationship is not direct, as explained by 
the analytical concepts capability, risk attitude, risks and income (see Figure  6.1, part B).
Figure 6.1 Framework for understanding how private incentive mechanisms can drive 
sustainability
First, private incentive mechanisms offer incentives to producers. In order for producers to realise 
economic value of the incentive of private incentive mechanisms, they first need to have 
capabilities that will enable them to satisfy the requirements of private incentive mechanisms (and 
in that way be inclusive). However, the availability of capability doesn’t mean that producers will 
participate. Producers must also have the right attitude to take risks in order to make changes in 
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their practices. Assuming that producers have the capabilities needed to upgrade and that they deem 
an incentive is sufficient to opt for participation based on their risk attitude, they may decide to 
improve their practices. Their improvement strategies, which can combine short- and long-term 
time horizon, eventually will contribute to the ultimate sustainability improvement goal of private 
incentive mechanisms. In order to allow producers to continuously make improvements, the 
economic incentive of the incentive must cover the additional costs and compensate for the increase 
of the risks of participation of currently participating producers. Therefore, at the core of these three 
pillars for a successful private incentive mechanism is the decision making of producers. 
The implications of these findings are that private incentive mechanisms must take into 
consideration the capabilities, risk attitude of fishers, and risk and income in the current 
implementation and in the future design of private incentive mechanisms. By doing so, the 
mechanisms will be more inclusive of producers and eventually will increase the sustainability 
outcome for both the environments and producers.
6.4 Methodology 
The various methodologies employed in this dissertation provide a comprehensive and rich 
understanding of the decision making of Filipino fishers in private incentive mechanisms. Chapter 
two uses an inductive multiple case study approach, which is capable of generating new theoretical 
insights (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). Chapter three uses a positivist (or deductive) 
approach, which tests a number of hypotheses that are derived from theory (Crowther & Lancaster, 
2008). Chapters four and five both use a normative approach, which is subjective and value based 
and determines which aspect of the focus of the study needs improvement based on an a priori
determined set of criteria/values (Hardin, 2008). 
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There are two advantages of using multiple methodologies in this dissertation. First multiple 
methodologies enable this dissertation to produce more coherent results because each different 
methodology triangulates and complements the results from other methodology (Byrne & Humble, 
2007). For example, chapter two theorizes the importance of capabilities in the upgrading of fishers 
in the value chain using inductive approach. The positivist approach in chapter three complements 
the importance of capabilities in upgrading by confirming the significant capabilities that influence 
fishers’ participation in FIPs. Another example is that the inductive and positivist approaches use 
completely different forms of data collection and analysis. Inductive approach uses a highly 
qualitative form of data collection and analysis while the positive approach uses purely quantitative
data and analytical methods. This diversity in methods of gathering and analysing data further 
triangulated and strengthened the results generated by chapters two and three.
Second, the use of multiple methods addresses the limitations or disadvantages of certain methods 
(Byrne & Humble, 2007). In this dissertation, the inductive approach is applied in multiple case 
studies instead of single case study. Thus, the analysis of specific cases of private incentive 
mechanisms could have been richer and more insightful by using the inductive approach for single 
case study. However, this limitation has been cancelled out by using specific cases of incentive 
mechanisms while applying either positive or normative approaches in Chapters three, four and five.
Another example is that the inductive approach using multiple case studies in chapter two has a 
generalisation issue on whether and on what extent fishers are incentivised from their participation 
in MSC and ISSF. This could be complemented by an empirical study to provide a deeper
understanding of the extent fishers are incentivised from their participation. This dissertation 
addressed this research gap using normative modelling based on historical data on prices and 
catches in chapters four and five. This shows that ‘in theory’ these incentive mechanisms should 
incentivise fishers depending on fishers’ level of risk aversion. However, the result of the normative 
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modelling may still require comparing how the actual behaviours of the fishers may deviate from 
the behaviour assumed in  the normative model.  
Finally, this dissertation not only combined various methodological approaches but also employed 
an interdisciplinary approach in understanding fisher’s decision making in the context of private 
incentive mechanisms. The implementation of private incentive mechanisms in fishery has been 
anchored in a single scientific discipline, such as the theory of change (Marine Stewardship Council, 
2011). This leads to a lack of understanding of the role of factors other than incentives in 
determining the success of private incentive mechanism. In this dissertation, the use of an 
interdisciplinary approach brings together and connects concepts and theories from various 
disciplines such as global value chain, expected utility, capability, and sociological embeddedness. 
The interdisciplinary approach leads to a deeper understanding of the decision making of fishers in 
private incentive mechanisms and the role of inclusiveness and improvements in addition to 
incentives.
6.5 Management and policy contributions 
The results of this research hold a series of recommendations for incentive mechanisms, private 
actors, policy makers in tuna fisheries and further research.  
6.5.1. Recommendations for private incentive mechanisms 
This dissertation has shown that in addition to incentives, the focus on inclusiveness and 
improvement in the decision making of fishers will enable private incentive mechanisms to achieve 
more sustainable impact. Existing private incentive mechanisms such as the MSC certification, 
FIPs, and ISSF pro-active vessel register (PVR) and recommendations on eco-FADs, should cover 
different groups of fishers in order to be more inclusive of fishers in their program and to bring the 
highest possible sustainability impact in the fishery. 
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First, depending on their specific goals, private incentive mechanisms can either operate 
independently or work together with the fishers. For instance, the MSC is an independent, third 
party certification scheme and is considered as the ‘gold’ standard in fishery sustainability (Kaiser 
& Edward-Jones, 2006; Pérez-Ramírez et al., 2012a). Given that the MSC is independent, it is not 
advisable for them to provide direct support to fishers for them to comply with their 
standards. This would undermine the credibility of their status and standards (Bush et al., 2013). 
Second, as a consequence of maintaining its independence, the MSC will still face challenges in 
being more inclusive of developing country fishers that generally lack capabilities to participate in 
this mechanism (Constance & Bonanno, 2000; Jacquet & Pauly, 2008; Pérez-Ramírez et al., 
2012a). This justifies the existence of FIPs, which operate directly with fishers in order to 
address the limitation of MSC to include more fishers in its program. Third, the incentive 
mechanisms can also offer a different opportunity to fishers by improving the existing practices of 
fishers other than the alternative pathways towards improvement. For example, the MSC free 
school in PNA is implemented to address the FAD fishing of fishers. However, fishers still use 
FAD fishing in their fishing practices. As shown in chapter five, introducing the ISSF 
recommendations on eco-FADs through close collaborations with fishers and scientists, fishers are 
able to improve their existing FAD fishing practice. 
The future design of private incentive mechanisms must take into account incentives, inclusiveness, 
and improvements. In order to deliver the highest sustainability coverage and impacts, private 
incentive mechanisms must develop or maintain a high level of sustainability standards, while at the 
same time allow for high inclusiveness of fishers. In order to do this, first private incentive 
mechanisms could be created through the collaboration of actors within the local fishery and the 
chain actors demanding the sustainable fish under the incentive mechanisms. The traditional 
approach of implementing incentive mechanism is through the demand from the markets and
retailers (Bush et al., 2013; Perez-Aleman, 2013). However, this approach lacks understanding of 
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the situation of the fishery and fishers, and could often not work effectively. But if the mechanisms 
are created through collaboration with local fishery and chain actors, the incentive mechanisms can 
be designed in such a way that they address the current capabilities of fishers and that they have 
lower risk of adoption by fishers. Second, in case that private incentive mechanisms has a market-
oriented approach, the mechanisms must target the group of fishers that have the capabilities to 
comply with their requirements and must be able to deliver the incentives. By focusing on 
capabilities and delivery of incentives to fishers, these mechanisms will attract a large participation 
of fishers and may contribute to increase in sustainability of the fishery. For both future and 
currently operating private incentive mechanisms such as MSC, FIPs, and ISSF, the 
recommendations could be implemented via the set of private and public actors that engage in these 
mechanisms as will be discussed in the next section.  
6.5.2 Recommendations for private actors  
Private actors that engage in private incentive mechanisms include both value chain actors and 
NGOs. In order for these actors to attract more fishers to adopt the incentive mechanisms, they also 
have to assume certain roles in the implementation of incentive mechanisms in the fishery through 
the value chain.  
First, downstream value chain actors that include retailers and marketers should not only focus on 
providing the financial means for creating and implementing private incentive mechanisms, but also 
on building the capabilities of fishers in order to enable the mechanisms to be more inclusive of 
fishers. In all cases of incentive mechanisms, chain actors such as retailers from Europe, Pacifical, 
and brand members and processors in ISSF make investments in the creation and implementation of 
incentive mechanisms in the fishery. However, their role as financier should also be extended into 
being a partner in building the capabilities of fishers either through direct interaction with fishers or 
through collaboration with wider institutional actors that include NGOs and the government.
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Assuming a partnership role with fishers or/and with NGOs and governments provide two benefits 
(Bitzer & Glasbergen, 2015; Perez-Aleman, 2013). First, retailers and marketers that set 
requirements in the chain can transfer knowledge on how to increase the value of tuna, which 
includes using sustainable fishing practices and making fish traceable, to fishers. Second, through 
partnership with institutional actors, the challenges in the implementation of incentive mechanisms 
in the fishery that includes the lack of capabilities of producers and other social conditions such as 
interdependency of fishers with local financial providers (e.g. Casas), can be overcome. As a 
consequence, producers become more capable to participate in the value chain and ultimately 
upgrade their practices and contribute to the sustainability of fishery. At the same time, downstream 
actors can ensure sustainable source of fish. 
Second, once fishers have the capabilities to improve their practices, the next step that downstream 
chain actors can implement is to reduce the risks in the adoption of private incentive mechanisms by 
fishers. Risks can be reduced by using different risk management strategies that include future 
contracts, individual and group insurance policies, and vertically integrating or establishing joint 
ventures with fishers (refer to Mumford et al., 2009; Sanders & Manfredo, 2002; Sethi, 2010). By 
reducing the perceived risks in the adoption of the incentive mechanisms, more risk averse 
fishers could potentially participate in the incentive mechanisms and could contribute to overall 
benefit for the fishery.  
NGOs such as WWF and ISSF should strengthen the build-up of partnerships with wide set of 
actors that include fishers, government, value chain actors, and scientist in order to facilitate the 
improvement in capabilities of fishers and to enable fishers to participate in private incentive 
mechanisms. However, these NGOs should not assume the roles of the actors that they partnered,
such as the policy makers and value chain actors. Instead these NGOs presence should only focus 
on facilitating the capabilities of fishers to enable them to participate. 
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6.5.3 Recommendations for policy makers/government 
The government should not assume a single role in the implementation of private incentive 
mechanisms. As shown throughout the chapters of this dissertation, they have different positions in 
the operation of private incentive mechanisms in the fishery. This means that private incentive 
mechanisms do not simply exist in a vacuum and that these mechanisms need the help of the 
government to allow them to effectively work in the market (Engel et al., 2008).  
First, the government as a partner in pushing for the sustainability goals of incentive mechanisms 
should support the implementation of these mechanisms through regulatory measures that focus on 
building the capabilities of producers (see Adolf et al., 2016; Foley, 2012; Gulbrandsen, 2014). As 
reflected in the case of FIPs, local government can push for the registration of fishers as the first 
step to organise fisher association, which later on help in the development of capabilities of 
majority of fishers. At the same time, local government can also provide institutional supports that 
include trainings, in-kind help, and strengthening of the fisher association through providing 
subsidies and grants on the projects of the association as found out in chapters two and three. The 
case of MSC shows that management measures such as VDS and seasonal FAD closures in the EEZ 
influence fishers to do MSC fishing as shown in the results of chapter four. Moreover, government 
also provided institutional supports such as investments in MSC certification and in VMS. 
Second, the government should also facilitate reducing the risk inherent in the adoption of private 
incentive mechanisms by fishers. The risk reducing strategies that the government can implement 
could include reducing price risk through setting minimum price and developing a flexible taxation 
scheme that will protect fishers from fluctuating fishing income (Cunningham, 1994; Peterson & 
Smith, 1982). For private incentive mechanisms that are operating with less involvement from the 
government, such as the ISSF case, the government should act as a watchdog in terms of the effects 
of these mechanisms in the fishery.
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And third, the government should exercise its ‘command and control’ role by continuously 
monitoring the behaviour of fishers in response to private incentive mechanisms, and based on this 
interaction, the government must adjust their policies to adopt with the changes in fisher’s 
behaviour. For example, there is a currently observed increase in MSC fishing by fishers in the 
PNA region in response to the newly introduced MSC certification of yellowfin tuna caught in free 
school (Marine Stewardship Council, 2017). Since skipjack tuna caught on free school is also 
certified in this region, more fishers are encouraged to do MSC fishing. Therefore, the government 
must allocate properly the fishing effort to vessels in the forms of restricting fishing areas, 
influencing the price of vessel day scheme, and restricting fishing licenses.  
6.5.4. Recommendations for future research 
The recurring theme in this dissertation is how to engage more fishers to participate in private 
incentive mechanisms. This dissertation calls for a research that focuses on improving the 
implementation of incentive mechanisms, in order to be more effective in bringing wider impacts to 
fisheries. The improvement could focus on the ways these mechanisms make more inclusive of 
wider group of fishers. This could include ways on how to build the capabilities of fishers, how to 
ensure that the incentives within the value chains are delivered to fishers, and how to reduce the 
riskiness of adopting the incentive mechanisms in order to be more attractive to fishers.  
This dissertation also has shown the importance of understanding the risk attitude of fishers in the 
implementation of the incentive mechanisms. Future research that focuses on the risk attitude of 
target and participating fishers in incentive mechanisms will be useful in understanding the actual 
level of risk aversion of fishers for participating and the level of acceptability of incentive 
mechanisms to fishers. Having this knowledge will aid in matching the right type of fishers for the 
incentive mechanisms or aid value chain and non-value chain actors to do the proper intervention in 
order to attract fishers to participate, and eventually to improve the sustainability of fishery. 
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The decision making framework of this research has been applied to private incentive mechanisms 
in tuna value chains. Testing this framework in other ‘missing middle’ developing world fisheries, 
such as Indonesia, may strengthen the results of this dissertation or may also provide new insights 
in terms of the differences on how these fishers operate.  
Finally, the analysis of the decision making in private incentive mechanisms is done in the context 
of tuna fisheries. Testing and extending the analysis of this study to mechanisms that are present to 
similar type of fisheries, aquaculture, and agricultural products could validate and provide richer 
understanding of these mechanisms. 
6.6 Concluding Remark 
This dissertation has evaluated the extent to which private incentive mechanisms influence the 
improvement in fishing practices of Filipino tuna fishers. Based on the findings of this study, 
private incentive mechanisms are able to influence the change in fishing practices of Filipino fishers, 
however, at limited effect based on the level of participation of fishers in the mechanisms. The 
broader challenge that remains in the successful implementation of private incentive mechanisms is 
how to increase the inclusiveness of developing country producers in these mechanisms in order to 
bring more sustainable outcome. By not only taking incentives into account and instead also 
account for inclusiveness and improvements in the design of private incentive mechanisms, the 
more likely that these mechanisms will succeed in bringing sustainable improvements in the fishery.
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Unsustainable fishing practices, including the use of non-selective fishing methods and Illegal 
Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, contribute to the decline of tuna fish stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). Addressing these unsustainable fishing practices 
requires improved fishery governance. Government regulations, such as catch quotas, restrictions in 
fishing gears and licenses, and seasonal closures of fishing areas, have been traditionally applied to 
address the conservation challenges in WCPO tuna fishery. The perceived failure of the government 
to address unsustainable fishing practices of fishers has led to a shift towards private incentive 
mechanisms as innovative instruments to enhance the sustainability of tuna fisheries.  
Private incentive mechanisms are instruments that allow value chain actors to decide whether and to 
what extent to change fishing practices based on economic incentives (e.g. price premiums). 
Research on private incentive mechanisms has mostly focused on the extremely large and small 
scale fishers to tackle the sustainability issues in tuna fisheries. This has resulted in a lack of 
attention given to ‘missing’ middle-scale fishers such as Filipino tuna fishers. The majority of 
Filipino tuna fishers operates neither at a small-scale, nor at a large scale compared to fishers in 
countries in Europe and the United States. In addition, the analysis of private incentive mechanisms 
is mostly focused on the incentives and on the failures and successes of these mechanisms to bring 
sustainable improvements in the fishery. However, there is no study so far that analyses the 
influence of private incentive mechanisms on the decision making of fishers. These knowledge gaps 
lead to the main objective of this dissertation which is: to evaluate the extent to which private 
incentive mechanisms influence Filipino fishers’ decisions to improve their fishing practices.  
This thesis combines concepts from global value chain analysis and economic decision making 
theory to build an overall framework for analyzing private incentive mechanisms in tuna fisheries. 
The main assumption in the framework is that the behaviour of an individual is not simply 
influenced by economic factors, but also by the individual’s social interaction with society. This 
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means that the incentives of private incentive mechanisms do not directly lead to the change in 
behaviour of fishers because several factors could influence the decision making of fishers to 
improve their practices. These factors include their capability to comply with requirements of 
incentive mechanisms and their risk attitude to the income and risks inherent in private incentive 
mechanisms. The overall objective of this thesis is addressed through four sub-objectives 
represented by the four research chapters.
Chapter two analyses and compares the ways existing private incentive mechanisms influence the 
upgrading strategies of Filipino tuna fishers in the value chains. The three private incentive 
mechanisms analyzed in this chapter are Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs), Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC) certification, and International Seafood Sustainability Foundation’s (ISSF) pro-
active vessel registry. This chapter starts by introducing the value chain analysis framework which 
includes producers’ capabilities as a condition for upgrading. These capabilities are influenced by 
existing governance arrangements at the vertical dimension of the chain and by public and private 
institutions that set rules and norms and that provide institutional support at the horizontal 
dimension. The results of the three private incentive mechanism cases show that the majority of the 
target fishers in FIPs still lack the required capabilities to upgrade while a few FIP participants who 
developed capabilities with the help of fisher associations are able to upgrade their product and 
therefore realize the incentives for participation. Fishers involved in MSC possess capabilities, and 
one third of these fishers not only choose to upgrade their product and process, but also their 
functions in the chain through the establishment of joint venture companies with local processors. 
The rest of the fishers do not upgrade because it is unclear for them whether the economic value of 
the incentive in MSC is sufficient to cover their costs and compensate for the risks of doing MSC 
free school fishing. Finally, fishers involved in the ISSF also have the capabilities and can
potentially improve their vertical coordination by strengthening their relationships with ISSF 
processors and related traders. Reflecting on these results, some fishers are able, while others are 
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not able to upgrade their practices under private incentive mechanisms based on their capabilities. 
Moreover, the incentives offered by private incentive mechanisms are not simply delivered to 
fishers because (i) the vertical actors determine whether and how the incentives will be delivered to 
fishers, and (ii) the horizontal actors influence fishers’ capabilities to realize this incentive.
Chapter three evaluates the important determinants for small-scale handline fishers’ decisions to 
participate in two FIPs for yellowfin tuna in the Philippines. These include the market-oriented 
Artesmar and the development-oriented Partnership Programme Towards Sustainable Tuna (PPTST) 
FIPs. Based on the differences in requirements and performance in delivering market incentives to 
fishers, this chapter develops a two-stages participation decision making framework of fishers. The 
first stage decision assumes that fishers will choose to participate in Artesmar FIP because this FIP 
delivers higher returns and lowers the risk of fishers in terms of fluctuation in fish prices. In case 
fishers are not able to participate in Artesmar FIP, the next best option for fishers at the second 
stage is to choose for PPTST FIP, which offers partial and full participation depending on fishers’ 
ability to fulfill the requirements. In case fishers do not participate in PPTST FIP, the final option 
for them is to not participate at all. The results of this chapter show that fishers possess different
capabilities, which determine the types of FIPs that they participate in. The individual firm 
capabilities that are possessed by few fishers in FIPs strongly influence fishers’ decision to 
participate in the top-down market-oriented Artesmar FIP. The collective capabilities, which are 
possessed by the majority of fishers, enable them to improve their fishing practices in order to 
participate in bottom-up development-oriented FIPs. Moreover, the majority of the fishers only 
partially participate in development-oriented FIP because they do not possess the capabilities to a 
sufficient degree. If the capabilities of these fishers improve, they may choose to fully participate in 
market-oriented FIPs, which will enable them to realize the incentives for participation and to 
contribute to fishery sustainability. In line with chapter two, this chapter shows that private 
incentive mechanisms should balance the delivery of incentives to fishers and should support the 
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development of capabilities of fishers, in order to enhance the participation of wider group of 
fishers. 
Chapter four examines the effect of MSC certification on the allocation of fishing days by Filipino 
purse seiners operating in Papua New Guinea (PNG), one of the member states of Parties to Nauru 
Agreement (PNA). As part of its management measures, the PNA employs Vessel Day Scheme 
(VDS) to set the price of fishing days in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and MSC free school for 
skipjack caught in their EEZ. Vessels doing MSC fishing are allowed to fish both in free school and 
in Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) when there is no seasonal FAD closure in the EEZ. In addition, 
vessels can also fish in the archipelagic water of PNG under Federated States of Micronesia 
Arrangement, using FAD and free school fishing methods. The allocation decisions of fishers in 
these fishing grounds using different fishing methods are influenced by their risk attitude and by the 
level of income and risks caused by the fluctuation in prices and catches. This chapter determines 
the likely outcome of the allocation decisions of fishers in order to assess the effectiveness of MSC 
in reducing FAD fishing and increasing free school fishing practices of fishers. The results show 
that adopting MSC free school fishing generally increases the income of purse seine fishers with 
different levels of risk aversion, and therefore MSC clearly incentivizes fishers to adopt practices 
that are believed to contribute to sustainable fishery. The results show that somewhat and rather risk 
averse fishers are those most willing to adopt MSC compliant free school fishing. These fishers 
increase their MSC fishing days, which leads to a higher level of expected income and risk. The 
highly risk averse fishers on the other hand are less likely to adopt MSC and therefore allocate the 
least days to MSC free school fishing. This leads to lower income and lower risk for these fishers. 
This chapter shows the importance of understanding the risk attitude of fishers so that fishery 
managers or value chain actors employing the incentive mechanisms can match the expected 
premiums against the expected risks of these fishers. 
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Chapter five analyses the profitability of investments in measures needed to comply with private 
incentive mechanisms by Filipino purse seiners. The two private incentive mechanisms that this 
chapter analyses are the ISSF eco-FADs and MSC free school fishing, both of which aim to address 
the FAD fishing practices of purse seiners. Using the Net Present Value (NPV) method, this chapter 
assesses the investment decisions in either one, or both mechanisms jointly. The results show that 
less risk averse fishers in general will benefit from positive returns on their investments in ISSF 
eco-FADs and MSC free school and that the investment in both mechanisms is the most profitable 
strategy for this type of fishers. Moreover, the findings show that the investments in MSC free 
school are more robust given the positive return on investments of fishers regardless of their risk 
aversion. The investments on both mechanisms and on ISSF eco-FADs of fishers with higher risk 
aversion lead to lower and even negative returns on their investments. Based on these findings, this 
chapter concludes that a combination of incentive mechanisms in multi-gear fishery can cover a 
wider set of sustainability issues and at the same time provide more economic benefits for less risk 
averse fishers. Moreover, reducing the perceived risks of investments through future contracts, floor 
prices, and flexible taxation schemes among others, are necessary to attract more fishers to adopt 
incentive mechanisms. The higher inclusiveness of a wider group of fishers that vary in risk 
aversion in the incentive mechanisms may further increase the sustainability of the fishery.
Chapter six reflects and synthesizes the results of chapters two to five and discusses the theoretical 
implications of this thesis on the future design of incentive mechanisms and on the set of actors who 
engage in these mechanisms. In the synthesis section, this chapter uses two themes, i.e. capabilities 
and risk attitude. The first theme focuses on capabilities to cover the insights from chapters two and 
three while the second theme focuses on tactical and strategic decision making under uncertainty to 
incorporate the insights in chapters four and five. Based on the results of chapter two and three, the 
first theme shows that the capabilities of producers are an enabling or limiting factor in the 
upgrading of producers. Therefore, focusing on capabilities of producers is an important step in 
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understanding the participation of fishers in private incentive mechanisms. Based on the results of 
chapters four and five, the second theme shows that producers do not simply change their fishing 
practices in response to incentives offered by private incentive mechanisms. Instead, the risk 
aversion of fishers influences their decision making to adopt sustainable tuna fishing. Therefore, 
reducing the risks associated with the participation in private incentive mechanisms can increase the 
participation of fishers that vary in risk aversion. 
The synthesis of the four chapters contributes to theoretical insights on the role that private 
incentive mechanisms in tuna fisheries and other commodity sectors in facilitating a transition to 
sustainable production practices. At the start of this dissertation, the initial assumption was that the 
incentives of private incentive mechanisms do not directly lead to improvements in fishing practices 
of fishers. This assumption is further elaborated using the analytical concepts of capabilities, risk 
attitude, risk and income. As shown in chapters two and three, producers first need to have the 
capabilities to meet the requirements of private incentive mechanisms, so that they can be included 
in the value chain and that they can realize the incentives offered by these mechanisms. However, 
being capable does not guarantee that producers will improve their practices. The producers must 
also have the willingness to upgrade, based on the ability of the economic incentive to cover the 
additional costs and to compensate for the increase of the risks of participation of producers. Given 
that producers have the capabilities to upgrade and that the benefit is sufficient to opt for 
participation, they may decide to improve their practices. And that decision to make improvements 
in their practices may contribute to the sustainability improvement goal of private incentive 
mechanisms. Based on these theoretical insights, the future design of incentive mechanisms must 
account for incentives, inclusiveness, and improvement in order to successfully bring sustainability 
improvements. Recommendations on ways to increase the participation of fishers that include 
focusing on the development of capabilities of fishers and reducing the perceived risks of adopting 
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private incentive mechanisms by fishers are provided for different actors involved in the incentive 
mechanisms.
The overall finding of the thesis is that private incentive mechanisms are able to influence the 
change in fishing practices of Filipino fishers but only to a limited overall extent based on the 
participation of fishers. The broader challenge these mechanisms face is the limited inclusiveness of 
developing country fishers in its program. Private incentive mechanisms that build the capabilities 
of fishers and ensure that the economic value of the incentives covers the costs, and compensate for 
the risks, of participation of fishers, will attract a large participation of fishers and may contribute 
more to the sustainability of the fishery.
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Appendix A. Estimation of the sample size 
The sample size was calculated starting from unknown population equation: 
ss = (Z-score)² *sd*(1-sd) / (c)² (1)
where Z-score is the standard score in statistics, sd is the standard deviation, expressed as decimal, 
and c is the confidence interval, also expressed as decimal. We use the 95% confidence level with 
Z-score of 1.96 and a confidence interval of ± 5%. The recommended standard deviation of 0.5 is 
used before the survey is administered as it ensures that the samples will be large enough (REF).
The recommended sample size for unknown population is 384. Since the population of fishers in the 
area is known, the sample size is adjusted based on unknown population equation (Field, 2003): 
new ss = ss/(1+ ss-1/population)  (2)   
In equation 2, the new ss represents new sample size while ss is the required sample size in equation 
1. The adjusted sample size of  for known population is 350 samples.
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Appendix B. Survey forms on household fishers 
SURVEY FORM FOR SHORT- AND LONG-TERM DECISION MAKING OF 
HOUSEHOLD/INDIVIDUAL FISHERS
Dear Madame/Sir:
Good day! 
I am Frazen Tolentino, Phd student at Wageningen University (The Netherlands). I am currently 
conducting research on the effects of incentive mechanisms such as MSC certifications, Fishery 
Improvement Projects or FIPs, and private branding strategy of ISSF member brands, to short- and 
long-term decision making of fishers. The goal of my research is to provide insights on which 
decisions, such as how much to catch, how much resources to use, and invest or disinvest in fishing 
technologies and fleets, will help fishers reach their objectives. In line with this, I would like to 
request for your participation in a survey. The survey may take an hour of your time. Please rest 
assured the information you provided will be used for academic and research purposes only. At the 
end of the survey, I’ll kindly ask you to sign the form as proof of your participation in the survey 
and that you agree to use the information for academic and research purposes.  
Thank you very much. 
P.S.: In case of further information or clarification, provided is my contact information: 
Frazen Tolentino 
+63927-248-1512 
Frazen.tolentino@wur.nl, frazentolentino@gmail.com
Business Economics Group 
Wageningen University, The Netherlands
Name of interviewer: Date and time of interview:
Signature of fisher:
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A. HOUSEHOLD FISHERS’ CHARACTERISTICS
A.1. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECT
Name:
Address:
Contact Information (cell no.):
Gender (mark X): O=Male O=Female Age:
Number of years in fishing:
Number of family members:
Other sources of income (mark X and 
specify associated monthly income):
O=fishing other species , ______________________ 
O= farming, ________________________________ 
O= driving tricycle, __________________________            
O=grocery stores/small business, _________________ 
O=construction works, _________________________  
O=others, please specify ________________________
Highest educational attainment (mark X, 
specify level and degree, if applicable)
O=no formal education           O=primary (elementary)
O=secondary (high school)      O=vocational degree 
O= college degree (BS or BA)   O=others, specify
B. MATERIAL RESOURCES
B.1. FISHING BOATS  
No. of fishing boats
Name of fishing boats/vessels
Initial investment (PhP)
Replacement value (PhP)
Boat repair (PhP/year)
Age of the boat (year)
Number of boat crew (including 
captains)
Fishing licenses or registration 
(PhP/year)
Vessel weight (metric tons) 
Length size (m)
Fish capacity (in kg)
Number of compartments/bins
B.2. VESSEL OWNERSHIP (mark X)
O=owner  O=boat captain O=passenger
If owner, how did you finance your vessels?
O=personal savings O=bank loans O=fisher’s cooperative
O=through relatives O=others, specify_____________
Amount loan: _________________________________ 
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Interest Rate: _________________________________ 
Monthly Payment: _____________________________ 
B.3. FISHING GEARS (What fishing gears do you use? Mark X) 
Fishing gears Costs:
O= handline 
O=hook-and-line 
O=jigger
O=pole and line
O=others, specify ____________________
Length size: 
__________________________
Number of traps: _____________________
B.4. FISHING TECHNOLOGIES (mark X and determine the amount of investments, life span, 
number of years used, maintenance costs) 
Investment 
(PhP)
Life span No. Of years 
used
Maintenance 
costs
O= sonar radar
O=compass
O=GPS tracking 
device
O=radio
O=generator
O=others, specify
C. FIP REQUIREMENTS
A. Fisherfolk and Vessel registration 
A.1 Are you a registered fisherfolk in your respective municipality? O=No O=Yes 
If not, reason why? __________________________________________________________ 
A.2 Vessel registration (in Table B1)
B. Traceability 
B.1 Do you use catch documents O=No O=Yes 
If yes, what are the information provided in catch documents? _________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
B.2 Do you use tuna tags? O=No O=Yes 
If yes, what are the information provided in tuna tags? ______________________________ 
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___________________________________________________________________________
 C. Fish Quality 
C.1. What’s your mode of selling tuna? O=Straight buying  O=Quality Buying 
Price in Straight Buying (PhP) ________________________ 
Price in Quality Buying: Good quality: ______________ Reject: _____________________ 
D. Trainings 
Are you aware of FIP O=No  O=Yes
If yes, which FIP are you aware of? O=PPTST  O=Artesmar
When did you join FIP? 
Reasons for joining?
Are you a member of fishers’ 
cooperative/association? (mark X)
O=No          O=Yes
If yes, name of association
Position in association
Activities of association (mark X): O=provide credit
O=provide trainings
O=provide marketing services
O=others, specify
C.2. Trainings and Education (please shade and identify the name of trainings) 
O Capacity buildings, _______________________________________ 
O = Marketing and value-adding activities on tuna, ________________ 
O=New fishing technology, ___________________________________ 
O=Seminars on fishery management, ___________________________ 
C.3. Subsidies from the government (mark X those that are received) 
Subsidies from the government O= fuel subsidy
O=new fishing gears
O=new boat motors
O=others, please specify, 
___________________________
SHORT-RUN OBJECTIVES (Maximise fishing income, minimise risks)
A. FISHING TRIP INFORMATION 
Name of fishing Ground
Fishing trip (in hours or days, one 
way)
Number of fishing days
Number of fishing trips in a month 
Name of unloading port  
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Distance of fishing ground to 
unloading port 
B. COSTS per FISHING TRIP
Usage Costs
Fuel consumption for boat's motor (L) 
Gasoline consumption  for generator (L)
Ice (Blocks)
Baits (bottles)
Workers expenses (include foods, cigarettes, 
water, medicines)
Total Fishing Costs (PhP)
Worker’s wage: If sharing system what are the percentages for:
 boat owners ________ captains _________ crews _________ 
how much do you normally get per fishing trip? _____________ 
How do you finance your fishing operation? O=Own financing O=Casas
E.  FISHING OUTPUTS 
Catches 
(2013 and 
2014):
Yellowfin Skipjack Small pelagics for home 
consumption 
(Kgs)
Highest 
catch
Average 
catch
Lowest 
catch
Tuna 
Prices in 
PhP (2013 
and 2014):
Yellowfin Skipjack Small pelagics for home 
consumption 
(Kgs)
Highest 
price
Average 
price
Lowest 
price
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Who are the buyers of tuna? (mark X) O=Casas
O= Local consumer
O=Restaurants
O=others, specify ___________________________
Break-even catch (in kg) per fishing trip __________________________________________ 
Difference in price before and after joining FIP? ___________________________________ 
Difference in fish volume before and after joining FIP? _____________________________ 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. ALTERNATIVE ACTIVITIES:
During low season of tuna, what species do you catch? _______________________________ 
Where do you fish? ___________________________________________________________ 
What will make you exit tuna 
fishery? (Rank from 1-5)
Low supply 
Stiff competition 
Stringent regulation
Age
Others
Alternative activity when you exit tuna fishery? (Mark X) 
O=Farming
O=Grocery 
store
O=tricycle 
driving
O=other 
business 
venture
O=construction 
work
O=others, specify 
___________________
------------------------------------------------------- Thank You ---------------------------------------
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Appendix C. Testing the explanatory variables for multi-collinearity using a 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF  
Fishingyears 1.72 0.581286
Educ 1.09 0.914702
Membershiptoasso 1.45 0.68818
Training 1.68 0.596774
Initialinv 1.35 0.73808
Boatown 1.53 0.653497
Boatcap 1.38 0.722977
Financeop 1.26 0.792804
Fishingtrips 2.42 0.413616
Season 1.53 0.655531
Opdistance 1.29 0.774056
Fishingdays 2.25 0.444646
Risksattitude 1.2 0.834178
Age 1.78 0.563052
Fammem 1.17 0.857847
Sourinc 1.16 0.862938
Mean VIF 1.54
Appendix D. Testing the explanatory variables for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
Breusch- Pagan / Cook- Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of stages
chi2(1) = 1.90 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1679
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Appendix E. Summary of the marginal effects of ordered probit model in second stage decision making 
Variable dy/dx (part=1) Std. Err. z dy/dx (part=2) Std. Err. z dy/dx (part=3) Std. Err. z
0.4125 0.4924 0.0951
Individual personal capabilities
Fishing years -0.0046 0.003 -1.52 0.0027 0.0018 1.48 0.0023 0.0013 1.83
Education -0.0345 0.059 -0.58 0.0195 0.0333 0.58 0.0240 0.0234 1.03
Individual firm-capabilities
Initial investment -0.0286 0.0237 -1.21 0.0162 0.0136 1.19 0.0124 0.0104 1.19
Boat ownership -0.0889 0.0816 -1.09 0.0520 0.0499 1.04 0.0368 0.0325 1.13
Boat capacity 0.0145 0.0276 0.53 -0.0082 0 0156 -0.53 -0.0063 0.012 -0.53
Fishing trips 0.0036 0.0055 0.65 -0.0020 0.0031 -0.64 -0.0015 0.0024 -0.65
Type of fishing employment -0.1564** 0.0711 -2.2 0.0852** 0.0390 2.18 0.0712** 0.0351 2.03
Operating distance -0.0020** 0.0010 -2.02 0.0011* 0.0006 1.94 0.0008** 0.0004 1.98
Fishing days -0 0102 0.0157 -0.65 0 0058 0 0089 0.65 0.0125 0.0048 2.63
Collective c pabilities
Membership to association -0.5155*** 0.0525 -9.81 0.2136*** 0.0402 5.32 0.2272*** 0.0414 5.49
Financing operation 0.0937 0.0613 1.53 -0.0528 0.0351 -1.77 -0.0426 0.0241 -1.77
Trainings and subsidies - .03 1 0.0758 -0.4 -0.0167 0.0415 0.4 -0.0146 0.0288 -0.51
Individual perception of risks and socio demographic
Risk attitude -0.2661*** 0.0737 -3.61 0.086*** 0.0240 3.6 0.1797*** 0.0767 2.34
Age -0.0013 0.0033 -0.41 0.0008 0.0019 0.41 0.0006 0.0014 0.41
Family members 0.0130 0.0149 0.88 -0.0074 0.0085 -0.87 -0.0057 0.0065 -0.87
Other sources of income 0.1183* 0.0612 1.93 -0.0338* 0.0307 -1.1 -0.0502* 0.0261 -1.92
Inverse mills ratio 0.4216 0.3003 1.4 -0.2384 0.1731 -1.38 -0.1832 0.1323 -1.38
Cut 1 .4530
Cut 2 .0995
N=316; Log likelihood = -304.17358; LR chi2(12)=156.04; Prob > chi2=0.0000
*, **, *** significance at α=0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 respectively  
The part=1, =2, and =3 represent non-participation, partial-, and full participation in PPTST FIP respectively
The following Cut corresponds to: 1=non-participation, 2=partial participation, 3=full participation
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Appendix F. Ordered probit model of fisher data from Sablayan and Mamburao, 
Occidental Mindoro, with inverse Mills ratio 
Ordered probit regression   Number of obs   =        200
LR chi2(16)     =     105.48
Prob.chi2 =0.000
Log likelihood = -138.76397 Pseudo R2       =     0.3088
Stages Coefficients Standard error Z
Fishing years 0.016 0.011 1.46
Education -0.036 0.209 -0.17
Membership to association 1.68 0.252 6.65***
Training 0.148 0.259 0.57
Initial investment 0.036 0.072 0.5
Boat ownership 0.485 0.246 1.97**
Boat capacity -0.052 0.084 -0.62
Financing operation -0.296 0.200 -1.48
Fishing trips -0.037 0.024 -1.55
Fishing employment 0.255 0.236 1.08
Operating distance 0.004 0.003 1.52
Fishing days 0.051 0.053 0.96
Risk attitude 0.957 0.410 2.33**
Age -0.003 0.010 -0.28
Family members -0.007 0.065 -0.11
Other sources of income -0.422 0.204 -2.07**
Inverse Mills Ratio1 -0.865 1.1018 -0.79
/cut1 1.20 0.573
/cut2 2.31 0.606
1The inverse Mills ratio is insignificant in ordered probit model of fisher data from Sablayan and Mamburao, 
Occidental Mindoro
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Appendix G. Ordered probit model of fisher data in Occidental Mindoro without 
inverse Mills ratio 
Ordered probit regression   Number of obs   =        296
LR chi2(16)     =     166.46
Log likelihood = -224.41025 Pseudo R2       =     0.2705
Stages Coefficients Standard error Z
Fishing years 0.010 0.008 1.3
Education 0.067 0.151 0.45
Membership to association 1.54 0.181 8.54***
Training 0.147 0.189 0.78
Initial investment 0.052 0.058 0.89
Boat ownership 0.292 0.203 1.44
Boat capacity -0.047 0.070 -0.68
Financing operation -0.241 0.158 -1.52
Fishing trips -0.011 0.014 -1.82
Fishing employment 0.490 0.179 2.73***
Operating distance 0.006 0.002 2.31**
Fishing days 0.007 0.038 0.17
Risk attitude 0.597 0.221 2.7***
Age 0.002 0.008 0.28
Family members -0.054 0.035 -1.52
Other sources of income -0.313 0.157 -2**
/cut1 .913 .446
/cut2 2.44 .464
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Appendix H. Calculation of daily skipjack catches using FADs and free school fishing in PNG’s archipelagic and EEZ waters
Row Description 2012 2013 2014 Average Source/Calculation
1 SKJ catches in PNG EEZ (mt) 108,535 101,410 73,648 source: Usu et. al, 2013-2015
2
SKJ catches in PNG EEZ as a percentage of total SKJ catches in
PNG waters 65% 65% 65% source: Pokajam, 2012
3
SKJ catches in PNG Arch. waters as a percentage of total SKJ
catches in PNG waters 35% 35% 35% source: calculated based on Row 2
4 SKJ catches in PNG archipelagic water zone (mt) 58,442 54,605 39,657 = row 3 x row 1/row 2
5 Total skipjack catches in PNG waters (mt) 166,977 156,015 113,305 = row 1 + row 4
6
Catches on FADs as a percentage of total SKJ catches in PNG
waters 45.20% 34.80% 39.20% source: WCPFC, 2015
7
Catches on Free School as a percentage of total SKJ catches in PNG
waters 54.80% 65.20% 60.80% source: WCPFC, 2015
8 Catches on FADs in PNG waters (mt) 75474 54293 44416 = row 5 x row 6
9 Catches on Free School in PNG waters (mt) 91504 101722 68889 = row 5 x row 7
10 SKJ catches on FADs in PNG archipelagic water (mt) 26416 19003 15545 = row 4 x row 6
11 SKJ catches on free school in PNG archipelagic water (mt) 32026 35603 24111 = row 4 x row 7
12 Skipjack catches on FADs in PNG EEZ 49058 35291 28870 = row 1 x row 6
13 Skipjack catches on free school in PNG EEZ 59477 66119 44778 = row 1 x row 7
14 Estimated FAD fishing days in PNG archipelagic water 1171 1075 700 source: WCPFC, 2015
15 Estimated free school fishing days in PNG archipelagic water 923 3879 2525 source: Tremblay-Boyer, 2016
16 Estimated FAD fishing days in PNG EEZ 1150 1029 1412 source: WCPFC, 2015
17 Estimated free school fishing days in PNG EEZ 2832 3017 2778 = row 18 - (row 14 + row15 + row 16)
18 Total fishing days in PNG waters 5209 9000 7415 source: Usu et. al, 2013-2015
19 Daily skipjack catches on FADs in archipelagic water 22.56 17.68 22.21 20.81 = row 10 / row 14
20 Daily skipjack catches on free school in archipelagic water 34.70 9.18 9.55 17.82 = row 11 / row 15
21 Daily skipjack catches on FADs in PNG EEZ 42.66 34.30 20.45 32.47 = row 12 / row 16
22 Daily skipjack catches on free school in PNG EEZ 21.00 21.92 16.12 19.68 = row 13 / row 17
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Appendix I. Detailed fishing vessels operation on FADs and on free school (2014) 
FAD fishing Free school fishing
Average fuel consumption (L) 3000 6000
Range of fuel consumption (L) 1500 to 3500 4000 to 10000
Hours of fishing 6-7 hours 10-12 hours
Time of fishing (searching, preparation, and 
setting)
4:00AM to 10-11:00AM Between 6:00AM to 
6:00PM, depending on 
the time of sunset
Average number of times to set per fishing 
day 
1 1-2
Vessel engine speed (in knots) 8-10 12-14
Source: Field interviews in Lae PNG, 2014 
Appendix J. Variable costs of Vessel Monitoring System valued at 2015 
Items Cost (US$/day)
a. Electronic tracking
Staffing costs 1.65
Costs of airtime ((US$66 per trip x 15 trips/year)/230
days
4.30
b. Electronic monitoring
Observer costs for viewing 65
Observer travel rate 35
c. Electronic reporting
Staffing costs 2.10
e-log 0.21
e-obs and observer management 0.42
e-Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS) 0.52
Trip management and communication 0.04
Total variable costs 109.24
Source: Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management Ltd, 201
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